THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE TENTH CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

THE tenth annual conference of Modern Churchmen held at Girton College, Cambridge, in the last week of September, 1923, took for its theme 'Christ and Human Society.' As the subject was one of enormous range only very limited aspects of it could be treated in the brief space of five days. The papers fell roughly into three groups. The first group dealt with pressing problems connected with sex and the family viewed from the Christian standpoint. In this group came Dr. Douglas White's paper on 'The Sexual Basis of Human Society,' the Rev. T. F. Royds on 'The Christian Ideal of Marriage,' Mr. Claud Mullins on 'Marriage and Divorce in the Modern State,' Professor F. B. Jevons on whether the family is the fundamental social unit, and the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson on 'Women and the Priesthood.' The discussions on these papers brought into relief points which were only adumbrated in the papers themselves. One of the most important was the statement of Dr. Douglas White that as the result of research he had, contrary to his preconceived notions, come to the conclusion that moral self-control, based on sound educational, economic, and social conditions, could alone check prostitution and the accompanying extension of venereal disease, and that early marriage had proved no real remedy.

The second group of papers dealt with Education and the Christian Ideal. This group was small, but the Conference was fortunate in listening to two educationists of wide experience who are typically modern and typically English in their outlook. Mr. Holmes' paper on 'The Education of the Child,' and Dr. Barker's on 'The Aims and Achievement of Public Elementary Education' deserve the attention of advocates of secularist educational systems both in America and in our British Dominions. These secularist systems have now been planted long enough to bear fruit, and the fruit would appear to be of rather poor quality. Modernists will note the emphasis Dr. Barker placed on 'providing for the proper training of teachers in the methods and spirit of religious instruction' (p. 403). Without such training religious teaching is a repellent task for the teacher and a profitless exercise for the pupil. Our Church Training Colleges ought to be models to the State educationist in the training they give in this department. It may be questioned how far this is the case. The emphasis Dr. Barker placed on the need for aesthetic education is of pressing importance. It is too much to expect that the young should be trained to create beautiful things, but they should be taught to recognise and reverence beauty, whether in Nature or in Art, and the duty of preserving it, even if such preservation interferes with financial gain or the reduction of the speed of motor traffic.

The third group of papers dealt with the Kingdom of God in its various relations, namely, to God, the individual, the State, the Church, and humanity viewed as a community of nations. This group was large and there was some overlapping. Canon Quick's able paper on 'God as King and Father' seems to constitute the proper introduction to it. Next come two papers on 'The Sons of the Kingdom' (*a*) in their relation to God, by Professor Percy Gardner, (*b*) in their relation to the State, by Mr. Woodward. These are followed by Mr. Hunkin's paper on 'The Church and the Kingdom,' Dr. Tollinton's paper on 'The Contribution of Races and Nations to the Kingdom of Christ,' Dr. Longford's paper on whether that Kingdom must be characterised in its structure by uniformity or variety, and Mr. Pryke's paper on 'The City of God.'

This number concludes with a brief address delivered by Mr. Royds in Girton Chapel on the Sunday morning after the Conference on 'The Warfare of the Modernist.'

Owing to the late date of the Conference many of our leading members were absent, and the discussions suffered in consequence. We were fortunate, however, in having with us our President, the Dean of Carlisle, who acted as Chairman on several occasions, and Dr. A. J. Carlyle, who contributed a number of stimulating speeches.

At the conclusion of the Conference a vote of thanks was passed to the authorities of Girton for their gracious hospitality. This expression of gratitude was united with no lively anticipation of favours to come, for although the name of Girton is inseparably connected with the English Modernist Movement, yet owing to various practical considerations we are unlikely ever to meet there again. We feel towards Girton as St. Patrick did towards Derry. It has been an ideal spot for our gatherings, and we leave it with regret.

H. D. A. M.

OPENING ADDRESS

By Canon M. G. Glazebrook, D.D.

WHEN Jesus appeared as a prophet in Galilee, His message was: 'Change your ways, for the Kingdom of God is at hand.' This was not merely a call to repentance, though that was essential. As the Sermon on the Mount shows, the Lord required His followers to adopt a new view of God and the world, a new standard of personal and social duty. He said nothing about organization, ecclesiastical or social: yet nothing is plainer to us who read history than that the doctrine of the Kingdom was a powerful solvent of old institutions, and creative of new ones. These two processes have gone on through all the Christian centuries, and there is yet no sign that either is nearly complete. It is because we believe there is still much to be done that we are here to-day. We wish to anticipate, and if possible to hasten, the reforms which His teaching is destined to effect in the structure of society. If our delibera-

tions are to be fruitful, we must approach our problems in the right frame of mind. We cannot indulge in hopes for the future unless we regard the present with faith and patience, and the past with sympathy and understanding. There are various ways in which we might prepare ourselves this evening for the debates of the week. As the responsibility of choice rests upon me, I am going to ask you to remind yourselves of the conditions under which the Lord's message was delivered, of the preconceptions which occupied the minds of His first disciples and coloured their reports, and then to review the various conceptions to which it has given rise in the minds of subsequent generations, and the ways in which they have endeavoured to put it into practice. If I can help you at all, it will be by presenting a bare outline which may be filled in and coloured by your own knowledge. May our joint efforts produce such a general impression as will put us all in the right mood for fruitful study.

Let us begin by recognizing a fact which history makes plain. The desire for a social ideal is recurrent and inextinguishable in civilized mankind : and, in spite of infinite failures and disappointments, that desire has been justified by events. Not that the ideal has ever been attained, but that human society has advanced by slow steps towards it. The various forms of this desire may all be grouped under two heads—the retrospective and the prospective. In the earlier stage of thought men regarded human history as a record of successive declensions from a golden age in the past. Horace and Virgil both gave expression to that belief in famous words. Horace tells how our fathers, inferior to their sires, begat in us a puny race whose progeny will be more wretched still :

> Aetas parentum, pejor avis, tulit
> Nos nequiores, mox daturos
> Progeniem vitiosiorem.

Virgil draws the natural conclusion : Oh, that the golden age might return, and the procession of the ages begin once more !

> Magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo.
> Jam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna ;
> Jam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.

In the later stage a more reflective generation, recognizing the futility of such hopes, and the delusiveness of the ideas on

which they are based, turned a constructive eye on the future, and saw visions of a new order, which shall be free from the faults of the past.

The Old Testament offers examples of both these modes of conceiving the ideal. The legend of the first man in Paradise, innocent, happy, and free from toil, was always present to suggest the hope of a restored golden age. Some current phrases indicate the forms which it took. The oft-repeated promise of a land of milk and honey—a land, that is, in which men would enjoy the food of the gods—shows one direction in which their thoughts turned. The day of the Lord, when Jehovah would give Israel victory over all His enemies, and restore the good times of Solomon, indicates another. There is nothing systematic. But the phrases, vague, fragmentary, and contradictory, suggest that the mind of Israel was often turning backwards. The early prophets discouraged such fancies. Amos, for instance, told them that the day of the Lord meant the day in which Jehovah would punish them for their iniquities. Instead of victory and dominance, he foretold defeat and captivity.

That was in the day of material prosperity, when Israel was rich and self-confident, and needed to be brought face to face with reality. A time came later when Judah, defeated, crushed, and miserable, in spite of Sennacherib's failure to take Jerusalem, needed to be encouraged. It was then that Isaiah struck the note of hope—not the old hope of a return to Paradise, but the new and fruitful hope of an age of gold which should dawn in the near future.

Both these prophets, whether repressing or enhancing the popular anticipations, amended them in one respect. The popular fancy drew its pictures in the colours of miracle: the prophets looked for nothing outside the normal course of providence. Amos translated the day of the Lord into the terms of an Assyrian invasion. Isaiah rested his hopes of a new age upon the expectation of a wise and virtuous king. We are mainly concerned with Isaiah. He more than satisfied the vague and disconnected longings of the past, substituting a conceivable and possible course of events for speculations about unprecedented wonders, and putting his new vision into relation with the facts of his own time. That is why it is from Isaiah

that we date the long and momentous series of pictures in which prophets have embodied their hopes for a better order of human society.

The three poems[1] in which Isaiah expressed his hope are too well known to require quotation. Let me only remind you that when we put them together we find three principles recognized.

(1) All reform must come from above. God teaches the hearts of kings, and kings alone can reconstruct the state.

(2) The personal element is everything. It is not laws, but men who can re-make a nation. A true aristocracy is indispensable, whose influence may permeate the commonalty.

(3) The test of social order is the security of life and property, and the cultivation of the land.

It is easy to criticise the prophet's vision in the light of subsequent events. Isaiah was, like all Orientals of his age, an aristocrat. He wrote for a society whose constitution was extremely simple. His thoughts were obviously influenced by a reaction against the evils of which he had experience. He rested his hopes upon a prince who was born about the time of Sennacherib's retreat—a prince of that decadent family, whose scions proved themselves, with one partial exception, weak and tyrannous, rash and cowardly, stupid and treacherous. Such a race of degenerates could not reasonably be expected to produce a Marcus Aurelius or a King Alfred: and therefore his hopes were bound to be disappointed. In fact Manasseh, who succeeded Hezekiah, is said to have begun his reign by executing the idealist prophet, who set up such an inconveniently high standard for kings.

But these three poems do not stand merely as monuments of a sanguine man's miscalculation. They are more important, and have borne richer fruit, than any of the prophecies which were literally fulfilled. For they presented a new ideal, whose influence upon the world is not yet exhausted: and presented it, not as a restoration of the past, but as a new condition to be attained in the future. Isaiah, in fact, changed the polarity of Israel's thought, teaching them to look and strive

[1] IX, 2—7, XI, 1—8, XXXII, 1—5, 15*b*—20.

for a golden age; not a primitive garden of Eden, but a new order in a civilized society, numerous, elastic, and capable of development.

The history of Israel during the next five centuries appeared to give the lie to the prophet's predictions. A hundred miserable years of political and moral declension led to the exile. The return after some seventy years did not fulfil the hopes with which the second Isaiah, true successor to the first, inspired his people in their captivity. Another hundred years passed, and then Ezra imposed a revised code of law upon the people; but he failed to make them anything but factious, cruel, and corrupt. And all the while the Jews were becoming less and less a nation. Judah was an insignificant province in one or other of the two great empires on whose frontiers it lay, the plaything and the footstool of one tyrant after another. Yet the literature of that age, especially the psalms, reflects a passionate nationalism, which gave a stern aspect even to piety; a devotion to the law which was ready to assert itself with the sword; a temper mingled of scrupulosity and ruthlessness, such as made the Scotch Covenanters a power out of all proportion to their numbers. It was this temper which, when the political condition of Judah went from bad to worse, caused a recrudescence of the half-savage ideals of the long past. The day of the Lord assumed a new importance, because men had ceased to hope for any deliverance by the hand of man. When the tyrant Antiochus sought to denationalize them, taking away at once their God and the cherished observances which distinguished them from the heathen, their very despair drove them to take arms even against hopeless odds and to cry out for miracles to give the victory which they seemed powerless to win. They demanded, and the book of Daniel promised, a divine intervention—visible, decisive, convincing—which should destroy the existing tyranny and reconstruct human society. The same Jehovah who had confounded the Egyptians and led Israel through the wilderness was ready, they believed, to establish a new world empire, of which Israel should be the unquestioned rulers.

The manner of its expected birth naturally affected the character attributed to this new empire. The Kingdom of God (as

it came later to be called, but not yet) was penetrated through and through with miracle. The heathen were to be destroyed by supernatural means, the dead saints and heroes were to be restored to life, and to share with the living Jews an unending reign in Jerusalem, enjoying all the privileges of power and the indulgences which boundless wealth and longevity can supply.

But when the Jews had won their victory over the power of Syria, and established a kingdom very far from the ideal, they began to reflect upon the pictures which Daniel and Enoch had drawn for their encouragement. They found it impossible to conceive in any detail how Jehovah could dwell among men who continued their life of appetite and growth and decay, only on a larger scale—living for hundreds of years and having countless children—and they began to feel the truth which St. Paul expressed later by saying that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of Heaven. Accordingly, by the opening of the first century before Christ, their hope took a new form. The earthly kingdom of the saints was to be of short duration —from 400 to 1,000 years—and then the old world was to perish, and a new world to be created, a spiritual world in which the spirits of the righteous would enjoy endless bliss.

With many varieties of detail, such was the eschatological scheme which commanded general assent during our Lord's lifetime and after. St. Paul's letters to the Thessalonians and the Corinthians take it for granted: and the Rabbinical writings show that such was the usual teaching of the Rabbis in the first century. St. Paul, as his later epistles prove, gradually renounced the expectation that the coming of the Son of Man was imminent, and came to conceive the Resurrection and the Kingdom of God in quite another way. But his was not the view which prevailed in the early Church. The book of Revelation, written in the last decade of the first century, presents the traditional eschatology in all its crudity, and most Christian writers of the second century adhere to its teaching.

It was in an atmosphere so charged with apocalyptic fancies that our Lord lived and taught, and that the oral tradition of His teaching was passed on for a whole generation before being written down. That is a fact of immense importance: for it

means that the records which we have inherited of His words must inevitably be coloured to some extent by the preconceptions which possessed the minds alike of His hearers and of those to whom they preached His Gospel. If we recognize this truth, we must be prepared to discount the eschatological elements in the records, while we attach a proportionately greater weight to the many sayings which imply a prophetic, as distinct from an apocalyptic, conception of the future. 'The Kingdom of God is within you.' 'The Kingdom of God is like unto leaven.' 'The Kingdom of God is like a grain of mustard seed.' These and many like expressions are inconsistent with any idea of a cataclysm. They present the Kingdom as a gradual, ethical, development of the faith which He taught, of the new covenant which He sealed with His blood. How characteristic, how emphatic, such a presentment must have been, to maintain its place in records written by men who from their youth up had thought in terms of the traditional eschatology!

Alas! that our dear friend Cyril Emmet is not here to develop a line of thought which he had explored with such loving care. We shall miss him daily and hourly through this Conference, for he has been the life of many a Conference. But I miss him most acutely at this moment, when I must tread upon ground which he had made specially his own. I believe that he would agree with what I am about to say.

Jesus did no doubt sometimes use the current apocalyptic language. The parable of the sheep and the goats, for instance, takes the traditional idea of the Great Assize for granted. But there are two points to be observed in this and in some other cases. The general idea is used as a conventional background for the exhibition of a moral truth: it is not put forward as a part of His message. And secondly, as Mr. Emmet remarks in his last book, the passages in which such language is used all refer to a final judgment by the Son of Man, not to any Kingdom of God upon earth. This is not the occasion for discussing the large questions which arise out of the various sayings about the Son of Man. I would only offer one observation. Jesus did, I believe, sometimes use the traditional language about a heavenly kingdom which was to be established after

the last judgment, because this language was the most intelligible symbol by which He could convey the truths which He revealed. But it was not more than a symbol, and ought not to be understood as a literal statement. If we wish to penetrate deeper into His meaning—His inner teaching about resurrection and judgment and the world beyond—we must look to the Fourth Gospel. And this, of all books in the New Testament, is most free from the influence of traditional eschatology.

We have seen that tradition told of two Kingdoms, one earthly and temporary, the other heavenly and eternal. If Jesus used language which was consistent with the acceptance of the latter, it is quite certain that He emphatically rejected the former. As Harnack pointed out long ago, there is not a single saying of His which can be quoted in support of the notion that the Messiah would appear in order, by miraculous means, to set up a Kingdom upon earth such as that which stood in the foreground of all Apocalyptic pictures, from the stone cut out without hands, which destroyed the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, to Jerusalem the Golden, the bride of the victorious Lamb. His conception of the Kingdom of Heaven differs from these traditional pictures in almost every essential. Instead of appearing suddenly, after a cataclysm, it is to grow up almost unseen, making its way gradually but irresistibly like leaven. Instead of being reserved for a future date, it is already present, manifest in the words and deeds of the Master, and in the faith and love of His growing band of disciples. Instead of being an organization imposed from above by regal autocracy, it is built up from below by the unconscious influence of those individuals who have attained membership by their humble and simple adherence to the law of love. If any organization is suggested (and that may be doubtful), it is only such as might be the natural expression of the new type of character.

'The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman *hid* in three measures of meal, until the whole was leavened.' Wherever Christians have remembered that saying and acted upon it—wherever, that is, they have trusted to the gradual influence of individual thought and example—they have in fact leavened the society in which they lived. We have

seen in our own day the anti-parallel to this truth. What is called in the political slang 'peaceful penetration'—the quiet invasion of a country by individuals of another people, who gradually and unostentatiously take hold of the threads of its social and commercial life—has proved a more permanent means of acquisition and less liable to reaction than any formal conquest: for while the latter merely imposes outward fetters, the former brings the spirit into bondage. Not bondage but liberty is the gift of the Spirit of Christ: but none the less is its power to transform the society which it penetrates. On the other hand, where ambitious programmes of rapid reconstruction have been imposed—whether by Pilgrim Fathers, or French Cyclopaedists—enforced reform has been followed by reaction, so that the last state of that community has been, if not worse, at least little better than the first.

Old conceptions once established in popular estimation have an immense power of resistance. The Christian Church suffered for many centuries from the recrudescence of Jewish traditions which the Gospel had set aside. The Messianic Kingdom of Jewish speculation, repudiated by our Lord and condemned by the leaders of the early Church, was revived in a new and daring form by the genius of St. Augustine. He maintained that the Catholic Church, which he celebrated as the City of God, was itself the fulfilment of all the prophecies of the Kingdom. A strange doctrine! What could less resemble leaven than a highly-organized religious community, set up in opposition to the world, powerful, exclusive, self-righteous and minatory? Yet St. Augustine's authority has largely prevailed. From his time down to our own, countless writers have followed his lead. Dr. Milligan, for instance, maintains that the Church realizes the visions of the Apocalypse. Yet even if we were to grant this, and accept the Vatican as a passable substitute for Jerusalem the Golden, should we be any nearer to allowing that such a Church wears the main features which Jesus assigned to the Kingdom of Heaven? The question answers itself.

Augustine's theory, which set up the Church against the world, has exercised a sinister influence by encouraging the leaders of the Church to assume a wrong attitude. Instead of working with the State for the amelioration of society, the hier-

archy have tended to leave all social questions to the Government, as being political, and to exploit existing institutions, good or bad, for its own supposed interest. How could it be otherwise? When once a static conception of the Church was adopted—as a divine institution complete in an organization ordained by its Founder—what more could be desired for it but an increase of territory and a more absolute authority?

I cannot help in my own mind connecting this theory with the corruptions of the mediaeval Church. Think for a moment of the thirteenth century, an age of genius which is often held up as a model by our 'Catholic' friends who have not read its contemporary records. There is all sorts of evidence, from Dante's great poem to the gossiping chronicle of Salimbene, an obscure Franciscan Friar. So far as I know, it all points to the love of power as the canker which ate most deeply into the life of the Church. Roger Bacon, after denouncing the vices of popes and cardinals at Rome, went on to say:

> 'If this is done in the Head, how is it in the members? See the prelates, how they hunt after money and neglect the cure of souls . . . Let us consider the religious orders. See how far they are fallen, one and all, from their right state: and the new orders—the Friars—are already horribly decayed from their first dignity. The whole clergy is intent upon pride, luxury and avarice: and wheresoever clerks are gathered together, as at Paris and Oxford, they scandalise the whole laity with their wars and quarrels and other vices.'

The flagrant corruptions of the official Church helped to produce repeated outbreaks of that Millennarianism which had never lost its hold upon the popular mind. Perhaps the most important was that which arose from the teaching of the Abbot Joachim in the twelfth century. Beginning with the usual phenomena of popular revivals, dramatic confessions and picturesque self-torture, the movement passed into almost unlimited licence, and ended in a threat of revolution. All Western Europe resounded first with the laments and then with the disorders of sanguine Joachimites.

It is strange how uniformly demoralizing is the influence of a belief that the end of the world is at hand. From the letters of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, in which he rebuked the excesses produced by a misconception of his own teaching, all through the centuries to the history of the Anabaptists and Fifth Monarchy men, the record is much the same. Condemned

by the Councils of the Church, but often provoked by its abuses as well as by the social injustices which it failed to correct, the wild hopes of Chiliasm have thrown the ignorant multitude into a fever of hope and despair, self-torture and gross indulgence, which left them at last weakened and demoralised. 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' Surely these facts alone show the folly of confounding the teaching of Jesus with the inebriating speculations of His contemporaries.

Happily there have always been those whose writings and whose lives have borne witness to the truth of His real teaching. Living apart from, and often in ignorance of, both the Augustinian claims of the hierarchy and the Chiliastic hopes of the so-called spirituals, millions of simple Christians have commended the Gospel by their conduct, have leavened human society, and have indirectly produced a long series of reforms in its organization. It is they who have brought us nearer—but yet how far!—to the Kingdom of God on earth.

The teaching of the Gospel, intended for all time, deals with the principles of personal conduct, which do not change, but not with institutions, which are relative to the changing conditions of human society. The responsibility rests upon each generation of so remodelling its institutions as to fit them to express the spirit of the Gospel.

> 'The old order changeth, giving place to new,
> And God fulfils himself in many ways,
> Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.'

Change does always come: but it matters much in what way it comes—whether by the pressure of circumstance or by intelligent anticipation. The former is slow and entails much suffering: the latter is quicker and gives joy. For the reasons which I have mentioned, the official Church, from the days of Constantine to those of Charles V, neither contributed nor encouraged ideas of social betterment. To Millenarians, again, any such plans for the future appeared impious, since the world was to have no future. There was another obstacle to melioration, which both alike helped to erect. Religious thought in the early and Middle Ages was so concentrated upon the world to come that it treated the present life as of no account. Ascetic theory, built up by abnormal enthusiasts, denied the connexion between

physical conditions and moral life. The miserable were told that their compulsory asceticism was a blessing, which would secure them comfort in the world to come. Perverse in conception, and cruel in operation, this theory was generally accepted in the Middle Ages, and social reforms were only made when extorted by the force of the desperate or the bribery of a wealthy class.

It was not from the Church, but from outside, that guidance came for the application of Christian principles to social betterment. Some three centuries after Isaiah's death, another great poetic idealist, stirred by the miseries and corruptions of his time and country, drew a picture of an ideal state which was, like Isaiah's, to be inaugurated by an ideal king. Plato's Republic has had an incalculable influence upon human society, which may be compared with that of Isaiah's prophecies. But there is a wide difference. Isaiah's vision implanted hope: Plato's stimulated thought, and founded a long line of thinkers. He taught men to challenge existing institutions by asking: Why are they there? What do they do? and to forecast new ones by asking: How can this evil be cured and that good attained? He was not afraid to go to the roots of institutions. In his philosophic state there was to be no private property, no marriage or family life. He has not persuaded mankind that either of these pillars of society can safely be removed: but he has made men think again and again about reasons why they should be retained or reshaped. His greatest imitator, Sir Thomas More, wrote as a Christian, and aimed at constructing a truly Christian state. He would retain the family, but abolish private property. His citizens should not bear arms, but employ mercenary savages. Both of these great men would establish a State Socialism of a most oppressive character: they would cure poverty by enforced labour, and vice by the abolition of personal freedom. We need not follow out their paradoxes. For plainly no community of virtuous and intelligent automata could be regarded as realizing the Kingdom of Heaven.

But if Plato and his followers fail to supply us with what I may call social flour, they do bring the ferment which is necessary to convert flour into wholesome bread. They apply the stimulus to social thought which the official Church has never

yet supplied. It is to their influence that we owe most of the conscious and intelligent advance which has been made since the Reformation. For not only do they stir men's minds; they both supply warnings and offer fruitful suggestions.

They warn us that no man can escape from the mentality of his own age, and therefore no man can hope to devise a social order which will satisfy many future generations. Their failures indicate that while Utopias are admirable as stimulants to thought, schemes for practical reform must be in close relation to present conditions, and must always be regarded as provisional. In other words, they confirm the truth of the great saying that 'The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto leaven.'

Yet while their ideal constitutions have obviously failed to meet the needs of later times, their writings teem with observations and suggestions which have borne valuable fruit. Their criticisms of the evils of society in their days often hold good still, and are models of sympathetic insight. And some of their isolated proposals anticipated, and perhaps originated, reforms which have been found useful in later times. It was Plato who first advocated the claims of women to an equal status: it was Sir Thomas More who set religious tolerance before the eyes of a generation which burned its heretics alive: it was Dante who demanded, under the form of a revived empire, what was in fact a League of Nations.

These great men have contributed not a little to the advance in opinion and in social order which Europe has gradually made in the direction indicated by the teaching of our Lord. They have often seen the goal clearly while their contemporaries, absorbed in the problems of the moment, forgot it altogether. But they did not often see the right path to the goal. They tried to devise short cuts instead of making roads adapted to the features of the country. And there are no short cuts to the Kingdom of Heaven.

Yet millions of men to-day believe in nothing but short cuts to a satisfactory social order, which they would not, however, describe as the Kingdom of Heaven. I pointed out in this room, six years ago, that in every so-called Christian country there had grown up an anti-Church which challenged not only the doctrines but the ethical principles and social ideals of the Gospels,

and which (in some countries) was ready to break a way to a socialistic Utopia by fire and sword and dynamite. The history of those years, especially in Russia, reads like a lurid commentary upon my text. The Soviet in Russia have tried to do for themselves what other 'idealists' two thousand years ago thought Jehovah would do for them—to make a clean sweep of the existing order and create a new one in the blank space. We see that they fail, and must fail, and that the cost of failure, in degradation and suffering, is beyond all calculation. But we must remember that their disastrous idealism, and no less that of our own less powerful revolutionaries, is in large measure the result of the Church's supineness and apathy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is therefore more than ever the duty of Christians to point to the true ideal, and to seek out the better way for its attainment. If only we have the energy to think steadily, the generosity to make sacrifices, and the unity to work together, what might we not accomplish? For we have advantages which our ancestors lacked. We are the heirs of many ages. The longings and the intuitions of 2,600 years: the searching speculations which date from Plato: the slow spreading of Christian influence, like a leaven: even the impatience of the sufferers who from time to time have invoked divine intervention or human violence to bring about a new and better order: the rich experience and knowledge which the centuries have accumulated for our service: all these are aids and impulses towards the fulfilment of the law of love which would make human life what it is meant to be—a manifestation of the divine.

Never was there a more earnest or more universal desire for some such transformation. We might say now, as St. Paul did, that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together, waiting for the revelation of the sons of God. We are all crying out for the ideal, however differently we conceive it. We Christians are sure that there is only one form of the ideal which can satisfy the longing of mankind. We have long seen it from afar, where the Saviour points. We are now beginning with a new earnestness to seek the path which will lead us to it. The Church has more and more turned from the pursuit of heretics to the search for human welfare. Church Congresses resound

with discussions of this and that social need and its satisfaction. But the time has come for something more. The problems must be faced not singly, but as a whole, and in relation to each other. It is to make such an attempt that we are here to-day, in pursuance of the eighth object of the Churchmen's Union, which is 'to study the application of Christian principles and ideals to the whole of our social life.'

'The whole!' It is an ambitious programme: it makes large demands upon patience and imagination and charity. Obviously our discussions must be inadequate and inconclusive. But they need not therefore be futile. Nay, they must be fruitful if we regard them only as an effort to draw the outline of a picture showing what England might become if the principles of Christ were really applied to all the main branches of our social life—and that not a picture of ultimate perfection, but of such an approach to it as might conceivably be made by the next generation.

May I, in conclusion, briefly state three principles which I hope we shall all take for granted, as conditions of a profitable discussion?

(1) Christ's proclamation of the Kingdom of Heaven has as real a meaning for our generation as for His own: for human society is susceptible of continuous improvement, in proportion as His teaching is put into practice.

(2) Any such improvement must affect the whole life of man: for between the various spheres of life, intellectual, moral, and physical, there is an intimate relation.

(3) We are all conscious of much ignorance, and desire to learn from each other: and therefore we shall not be intolerant of any new suggestions, but be ready to prove all things.

It we can maintain this attitude: if we can discuss the foundations of social life as well as the superstructure in a spirit at once brotherly, adventurous and reverent: if we can help each other to form a true conception of a better England, as it might be were its social order truly Christian: then we shall all go away fitted to act as a part of the Christian leaven. And surely we shall have something to tell our fellow-Churchmen and fellow-citizens of the inspiring vision which has blessed our eyes.

THE SEXUAL BASIS OF HUMAN SOCIETY

By Douglas White, M.D.

I COME before you in a chastened mood, for a heavy responsibility has been placed upon me. It has rightly been deemed absurd to start on a broad discussion of the social implications of Christ's religion without some consideration of the great fundamental instinct of sex, through which all human society has its origin, and without which its history, its thought, its art would have no flavour, and possibly even no significance. We may indeed chide at nature that it is so; but that were as silly as for a watch to chide at the nature of its mainspring. It were better to try to understand than to find fault; fault-finding is a refuge of ignorant incapacity. If there is one thing which civilization needs to-day, it is a philosophy of sex. Towards such a discovery many of us are groping our way. Light is gradually filtering through, and to-day we can already see some things that were hidden from our fathers.

Sex has been commonly regarded, even by men and women of spiritual aspirations, as inherently evil, and treated accordingly; eschewed, repressed, buried, by every conceivable method, it still surges up, even in total solitude, making life one long misery. We may smile at the curious views of the Middle Ages, but have we really changed our outlook? By the less well-meaning of mankind, on the other hand, sex is regarded mainly as an instrument of fleeting sensual pleasure, mostly indeed vicious, yet affording relief to the monotony of life. These two divergent views are both rooted in the same belief that sex is in itself an evil thing. This is what most of us have been implicitly taught from our cradles. The mother is asked how the child came into being; she does not give a true answer, because to her also (saving a few bright exceptions) the sexual process is unclean; the child sees there is something to hide, and on going to school, finds that the mystery of sex is (according to the admired knowledge of the older boys) something dirty and nasty—the tree of evil know-

ledge, identified for them with the tree of life. Thus most of us have grown up to think that the processes of sex, being essentially evil, are incapable of co-ordination with the spiritual life: we tend to drift into a scarcely conscious dualism, whereby man is compounded of two principles: a body which has come from Nature, substantially evil, and a soul from God, substantially good. Such a philosophy is impossible to the biology and psychology of to-day, where the unity of individual life is a postulate, if not an axiom of thought; it is also morally disastrous; and it is essentially unchristian. As regards sex, at any rate, it can hardly be disputed that Christian teachers from the earliest times have tended to regard the processes of sex as unclean; and this, not because Christ so taught, but because Christian thought inherited the outlook of past ages. That the processes of conception and birth involved impurity was deeply imprinted on the mind of both the Jewish and the Christian Church. 'In sin hath my mother conceived me,' says the psalm; while to-day the Churching of women (now reduced to a thanksgiving) represents the 'purification of women' in the first prayer book of Edward VI. The exaggerated and misapplied reverence for virginity, as against the married state—a view with which the earlier epistles of St. Paul concur—have led Christians to conclude that all sexual relations partake, at least, of the nature of sin: and, however regrettable it may be, the doctrine itself of the Virgin Birth has tended to confirm the same impression. What wonder, then, if we still regard the impulses and processes of sex as in themselves unclean, when the influences of both good and bad men's thought converge to that conclusion? The cloud of witnesses serves but to obscure the light. For the truth is not so. Sex is not a foul cellar in the house of our lives; the sexual impulse is not an evil imprisoned monster, whose chains are always being torn asunder. Like all human instincts, it is capable of disastrous deflection and misguidance, but it is essentially beautiful, noble and good —and that not only in its spiritual, but also in its physical manifestations.

Nay, I go further, and say boldly that sex is the foundation of all that is fine, sweet, and inspiring in life; it is the golden key that opens the door to all that makes life worth

living. Look at the babe just born; it is placed at its mother's breast—a sexual manifestation on both parts; yet where is a more beautiful picture to be found? It is but the earliest manifestation of the maternal instinct—that great sexual instinct of mother-love, without which civilization had never emerged from savagery. Not for nothing has man evolved along the mammalian line; in mammals, above all others, firm insistence is placed on the close intimacy of male to female, and mother to child; and this mother-love, at first limited to the earlier days after birth, has gradually extended and amplified till now it fills with its colour the whole after-life of both mother and child. And while this instinct—a sexual instinct—is primarily feminine, it is not now strictly sex-linked, but is experienced to a variable extent in the male too, so that happily even the merest man finds himself some way softened and inspired by this gentler female virtue. It is this instinct—stronger than any intellectual estimate of profit or loss—that demands care and gentleness towards the sick, aged, infirm, insane, feeble-minded, and those anyways afflicted. All this is largely, if not wholly, a shoot from the tree of sex.

But let us return to the child. After infancy comes childhood with presages faint or clear, gradual or fitful, of the manhood or womanhood to be. For the sexual glands, though present in the body from birth, have not yet started on their race to maturity, nor yet exercise a profound influence on the life of boy or girl. But suddenly comes a change. In the middle of the teens, earlier in the girl than in the boy, when their bodily growth (in height) is nearly complete, there comes a crisis. The boy's voice breaks, the down appears on his face. He is becoming a man; because his sexual system is maturing. So too with the girl; the eye brightens, the hair enlustres, the skin blooms velvet, the breasts swell. She is becoming a woman; her sex glands are ripening, and nature's processes develop. These are all physical signs of maturing sex. They are visible; but there are others too—impalpable yet evident. The boy and girl develop the mind and spirit of the man and woman. With the deepening of his voice, the character deepens too; initiative, courage, self-reliance, self-control, show the parents that he is becoming a man; so too with the girl, the

modest self-regard, the gentle regard for others, specially for the weak and feeble, is the blossoming of potential motherhood, with its beautifying irradiations. But not only in the sphere of character is shown sex-influence, but in the spiritual sphere as well; for there now develops in both a personal religion. Till this event the religion of the parents was good enough; not so now; they must have their own. Would that good parents could learn that it is well so, and not well otherwise. Let them grow. Give them air and space; the danger lies in the not-growth. You will note, then, that in each of the three spheres, bodily, mental, and spiritual (for these three are all one life), puberty is the time of rapid independent growth to manhood and womanhood. And the process is rooted in sex.

I do not wish to place sex on a pinnacle by itself, separate from all other function and influence; other influences contribute their quota to the total product; but I do say that the gold thread of sex runs its interlacing strands through the whole warp and woof of life.

The early beauty of manhood and womanhood remains for us the criterion of all beauty in nature; in the history of art it was the first perceived; the rest was ushered in, first as a background to man and woman, and then as things of beauty in themselves. Even ethical grandeur is a cold and austere thing unless warmed, softened, and inspired by some warm living passion.

Are these only my enthusiastic fancies as regards the vital influence of sex, in creating beauty of body, mind and spirit? They are supported by the best thinkers in this sphere. Maudsley, for example, goes so far as to say: 'Were man robbed of the instinct of procreation and of all that spiritually springs therefrom, that moment would all poetry, and perhaps also the whole moral sense, be obliterated from his life.' In like manner Havelock Ellis: ' . . . The development of sex is seen to be indissolubly linked with all that is most poignant and difficult indeed, but also with all that is best in human life.'

The very friendships of life are not independent of sex. Every man and woman is a delicate balance of male-femaleness which finds its natural attraction towards some otherly blended person, perchance of the same, perchance of the opposite sex

it may well be that every friendship, which oversteps mere intellectual converse, though normally unrelated to physical desire, is still created and maintained by some hidden sex-affinity. Do we fear to admit the intrusion of sex into the less passionate realms of human affection? Let us examine ourselves whether this fear too is not rooted in the old falsehood—the uncleanness of sex.

But so far we have only considered the developments of early puberty. What of that exquisite flower of sex, the full-hearted and full-blooded love of man for woman or woman for man? It is the most beautifully spiritual thing the world has ever seen. In its finest manifestations, which of us has not seen it in others, or felt it in ourselves, to be so? One way or the other we are all witnesses to the truth. Go back to the boy and girl who have become man and woman. Before long they will become lovers. What is that? Lovers are seers. They see in each other what others do not see; they often do not see what others do see. They see what is potentially fine and beautiful, and their vision calls it into life; they do not see the evil and their blindness makes it languish. This great critical event draws all the finest out of men and women, and makes all the world love them too. And seeing, each in other, that which is beautiful, they learn a new meaning in all the world around them, animate and inanimate—the sunset, the trees, the pageantry of birds and flowers; for all things are made new. Is it all make-believe—a pleasant illusion? To men and women all I say, and specially to the younger (myself being neither old nor young). Never despise your highest moments These are the moments when we see right through to the truth of things; when we thrill to the great heart of Nature, of which indeed we are a part; nay, these are the moments when we come into sympathetic and all but immediate contact with that great love which we believe lives at the centre of the universe, and which we call God. For love is the university of souls. There is no other.

But how to turn the passing glimpse into the steady vision? Ah, there's the rub. And this depends on the relation between the spiritual and the physical elements in the attraction. The physical surely is necessary, normal and right; but with it, the

finer and subtler spiritual affinity must co-exist—nay, must be the predominant element, just as in all civilized life, the higher senses, albeit latest acquired, must control the humbler. In proportion as this is done, the love will be lasting, or as not done, ephemeral. In the love which approaches perfection, the whole nature of man and woman must have its due share; that which is left unheeded will have its sure revenge. For man is complex, and no portion of his multi-coloured life will brook starvation; if we look for the white light, none of its component colours can be left out; the colours too have their own order. Only a refined and all-enfolding love can endure. And this all-enfolding love must be mutual. What wonder if the perfect blossom is rare?

What then is the real difference between what we call love and what we term lust? Each includes physical desire; but in lust, the physical element is anarchic, like a cancer-growth, not only inco-ordinated with the spiritual element, but a menace to its very existence; in love the whole being is irradiated with the white light of entire sympathy, affection and desire. Its test is the orientation of self; lust and selfishness walk hand in hand; love lives with sacrifice, always and everywhere. And so we get back to the starting-point of all religion; for love is the only fundamental virtue, and selfishness the only vice.

Having heard me so far, perhaps you will call me a vaporous idealist. I am an idealist; but a sane idealism is the root of social progress. And this idealism has its application. We are going to discuss the problems of social life, marriage, divorce, the family. Before we can do this intelligently, we must ask ourselves (and answer) the question: What is the essence of human marriage? Is it an ecclesiastical ceremony? or is it a legal contract? or is it something higher and deeper than either of these, inherent in the relation between the persons? The Church and the Law can only forge an outward bond. The real bond must be inward and spiritual—the magnetic force of love which the Church and the Law recognise, but cannot create. The Council of Trent declared otherwise; the marriage depends on the ecclesiastical rite. This seems to imply that a permanent register of marriages is kept in heaven. But heaven's record registers spiritual facts, not stereotyped fictions. The

real essence of marriage is a love which has issued in mutual promise of lasting partnership. An entire human love, including all up to the highest (a variable highest) of man's powers, is the only justification of sexual relationships. Nothing else can give the union any justification or hope of permanence.

Mariages de convenance (political or social) are so far unreal, though sanctioned by Church and State; therefore they lead to extra-marital liaisons. Nature has been flouted; deprecate as we may any supplementary affection, the fault lies in the loveless marriage; in some such cases we must admit that it may preserve, for the persons concerned, a finer expression of the true spiritual significance of marriage than the recognized bond. For in the last resort men and women will seek for the reality of human love; marriage by barter (financial or social) lacks the essence of permanence. Let us think boldly and clearly; let us admit that there are many unions sanctified by real love, which yet may lack sanction of Church and State; and contrarily, many sanctioned unions which are wholly unsanctified. Shall we say then that civil and religious sanctions are superfluous? Assuredly not. In the interest each of other, lovers will naturally desire that their relations should have public and religious sanction. For the State also that is necessary; for the State is profoundly interested in the foundation of a family, which is the basic social unit. But marriage itself is rooted in mutual love, issuing in the mutual promise; it is a spiritual relation (the spiritual including the physical); the depth of its spirituality is the measure of its permanence. Both Church and State rightly aim at permanence; but the ideal of both is a lasting reality, not an interminable sham.

The Western Church has sought to foster the permanence of marriage, by declaring it indissoluble. Herein it encounters difficulties. For a sanctioned marriage does also involve a contract, and this contract implies the exclusive right of sexual relations (at the least) to each party. From a legal standpoint, as Westermarck points out, such a right cannot exist, unless adultery is regarded as an offence entitling the other party to dissolution. Nor do I wish to suggest that adultery is the only thing; there are other things which in spiritual fact dissolve the union even more deeply and irreclaimably. That marriages

are in fact dissoluble is only too patent, and the Church has been forced to find escape from its own doctrine. It has found every sort of 'impedimentum dirimens,' and where such cannot be found it has had to grant divorce 'quoad torum,' the equivalent of our 'judicial separation.' This latter as a permanent measure is clearly indefensible and is subversive of social ethics. The doctrine of indissolubility in fact debars thousands of young, good and vigorous people, who have contracted early, unwise marriages from ever founding a home based on love. I shall be told, 'Hard cases make bad law'; but these people have yet to learn that 'Bad law makes hard cases.' The failure of marriage, someone has said, lies in the failure to recognize its failures. If we want to reach spiritual ideals, we must recognize spiritual facts, and try as far as may be to approximate our laws to them.

Most of all am I anxious that there should be no breach between Church and State in this matter. Both are aiming at permanent monogamy. Yet it must be confessed that their methods of reaching that goal are much at variance. The one school wishes to recognize that certain marriages no longer exist, and to give relief accordingly. The other school fears that any such recognition will tend to bring marriage into contempt. I do not believe it. Monogamy was the result, not the cause, of human love; so long as men and women love they will desire monogamy. Again I will quote Westermarck: 'It is a widespread idea that divorce is the enemy of marriage . . . I look on divorce as the necessary remedy for misfortune, and as a means of preserving the dignity of marriage, by putting an end to unions which are a disgrace to its name . . . If marriage is an institution based on deep-rooted sentiments, conjugal and parental, it will last as long as the sentiments last. And should they cease to exist, no laws in the world could save marriage from destruction.' The real question is whether permanent monogamy is the natural goal of human love, or whether it is an institution to be enforced; these are also the two interpretations placed by different schools upon the fragmentary sayings of Christ.[1] It may very well be that the Church, by

[1] *Mt.* xix, 1-9 and 21, 32. *Mk.* x, 1-12. *Lk.* xvi, 15. Cf. *Gen.* i, 27; *Deut.* xxiv, 3; *Rom.* vii, 3; *I Cor.* vii, 10, 11.

insisting on indissolubility and its corollaries, is placing a stumbling block before the feet of men, instead of helping them towards spiritual ideals.

What then about prostitution and promiscuity? They are an insult to civilization. They destroy the spiritual nature by dissociating the spiritual from the corporeal. They are habits of sensory-indulgence, very easily contracted in early maturity, and very hard to break. What is their origin? It has been widely held that marriage itself grew up as a modification of general promiscuity; but this is denied by Westermarck, our greatest authority. He holds that marriage, at least of a quasi-permanent type, is primitive; it obtains also among many birds and in some anthropoid apes, and is visible back to the dawn of man's history. Side by side with it there were seasonal orgiastic festivals, where general sexual laxity was allowed. Later on, as I conceive it, the women of higher modesty found the latter system incompatible with a growing self-respect, while the men continued the practice with inferior women. As the seasonal periodicity of sex diminished, the irregular habits became constant; this formed the origin of prostitution. But now the sentiments of self-respect and respect for women has come to be inherent in men also. There is a growing feeling of disgrace in respect of sexual relations which are not even excused by a passing personal attraction. And, lamentable as is the type of temporary liaisons which has grown up during and since the war, it may not represent an unqualified deterioration in sexual ethic, inasmuch as it has put mere prostitution into partial abeyance. For, of all social evils, prostitution, and specially commercialized and state-regulated prostitution, is destructive of self-respect and respect for women. In this respect Europe needs a change of national mind—of public opinion rather than of laws. Men's sexual irregularities have largely been hidden from public sight; a healthy light is now being thrown on them.

What then is the relation of prostitution to marriage? It has been held by many, from St. Augustine down to Lecky the historian, that prostitution is the necessary safeguard of marriage. This would involve us in the terrible hypothesis that marriage is carried on the shoulders of prostitution. Havelock

Ellis, on the other hand, holds that marriage and prostitution are both part and parcel of one system; not a pleasing hypothesis for Churchmen—but not, for that reason, to be scoffed at. But a third view is possible; namely, that (whatever their origin) they are two competing sexual systems—competing not only as between social groups, or between individuals, but even competing within the mind of the same individual—the one taking cognizance of spiritual ideals, the other not. If the marriage system is to prevail, it must investigate the causes which lead to the prevalence of prostitution, and eradicate any such causes from its own system. The mere presence of the first-mentioned hypotheses, even if they lack justification, ought indeed to spur Churchmen to reform. For that the two systems are in fact closely inter-related nobody can deny.

Whatever our present opinions be, let us endeavour to face the facts. Make-believe as regards marriage fosters make-believe as regards prostitution. The object of this paper is to combat make-believe; to insist that sexual relationships are only justified by a deep and abiding spiritual love; that such a love must include sacrifice and exclude selfishness, and that both inside and outside marriage.

You must not think evil of sex because it has been abused or degraded; every great natural force can destroy as well as uplift. Sex in fact has been, of all the great human forces, that which has brought man to the dignity in which he stands to-day. Sex indeed presents a vast human problem; it remains for us to try to understand its terms; for it is our own problem —the problem of each one of us. Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν; let us try to understand ourselves. I am convinced that, for each age and nation, its attitude towards matters sexual is the real criterion of its civilization; that where this is unhealthy, a nation cannot be sound; that the spiritual view of human love is the only one which can inspire men and women to a true social idealism, and the only one which can make for permanent monogamy. And human laws with regard to marriage can only be good in so far as they conform to spiritual principle, not by way of enforcing an ideal, but by fostering it; not by closing the eyes to evil but by recognizing truth; not by creating despair, but by showing men and women the way to happiness.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL OF MARRIAGE

By the Rev. T. F. Royds, B.D., Rector of Haughton, Staffordshire.

ACCORDING to the Prayer Book, matrimony was 'instituted of God in the time of man's innocency,' and this has been re-asserted lately by Canon Randolph in an Anglo-Catholic Congress booklet on Marriage. Unfortunately there never was a time of man's innocency, and it is just as arguable that polygamy was instituted of God. Nature certainly points to monogamy by making the numbers of the sexes approximately equal, but at the same time she implants polygamous instincts and leaves things to adjust themselves. There is no apparent reason why the red grouse and the partridge should be monogamous, while the black grouse and the pheasant are polygamous. Nature refuses to make things easy for polygamists; the superfluous males must fight it out. Even in that triumph of applied science, the bee-hive, with its one wife only and thousands of contented maiden aunts, most of the males are in the way. In our own species Nature encourages promiscuity, or else early marriages and large families. But Nature is content with an animal, and Christianity aims at turning him into an angel. If polygamy is natural, monogamy is supernatural. Whether it is the more primitive form, or was evolved from polygamy, need not trouble us. It is clear that no other form of marriage is compatible with the mind of Christ. Polygamy degrades women, robs other men, and interferes with the rights of children.

In the Gospels we find our Lord quietly but firmly setting aside the current Jewish view of women. Apart from the uncertainty of what precisely He taught about divorce, I find nothing in His teaching so clearly above criticism as His attitude to women and marriage. Even the doubtful *pericope adulteras* in John viii, 1-11, seems to me to bear the stamp of truth. No evangelist could have invented it. Christ alone saw women through the eyes of a woman, because He alone could triumph perfectly over the passions and prejudices of a man. In Jesus Christ 'there can be no male and female' (*Gal.* iii, 28). They are 'joint-heirs of the grace of life' (I *Pet.* iii, 7). Marriage is compared to the mystical union betwixt Christ and His

Church (*Eph.* v). Fornication is expressly condemned in *Acts* as well as by St. Paul. But there is a good deal in St. Paul's teaching of which the modern mind is rightly critical. In I *Cor.* the husband is a kind of mediator between the wife and God. He is made in God's image, but she is made in his image. She is made for him, as he is for God. The whole point of view is masculine. It is good for a man not to touch a woman. Marriage is a good refuge from sin. Celibacy is a higher state, and marriage is apt to hinder the service of God. We note also the strange and unnatural custom of living with a spiritual bride. In vii, 36, we should read 'virgin' with R.V. margin, not 'virgin daughter.' In justice to St. Paul we must remember the extreme difficulty of escaping from the atmosphere of his day, and the fact that the single life is sometimes the better way, as missionaries often remind us. But he dwells too much on the subjection of women, and too little on the social and ethical value of the married state, 'the mutual society, help and comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity,' a very important object of matrimony. He is divided between the Old Testament and the spirit of Christ. In I *Cor.* the former has the upper hand, in *Eph.* the latter. We must take him at his best, and not forget the low sexual morality of the pagan world, and the expectation of the end. In detail he is often ascetic, but in principle he is not. 'All things are yours.' 'God giveth us all things richly to enjoy.'

The Fathers developed the ascetic side of his teaching, and their view of marriage is, as a whole, deplorably low. Even the great Origen pronounced it profane and impure, and proceeded to mutilate himself. Tertullian advocated celibacy, even if the whole race should perish. Chrysostom said virginity was as superior to marriage as heaven is to hell, or as angels are to men. Jerome speaks of cutting down the wood of marriage with the axe of virginity. Marriage fills the earth, he says, but virginity replenishes heaven. Augustine says unmarried children will shine like bright stars in heaven, but their parents like dim ones. Worse still, he says original sin is transmitted through sexual desire, which is implanted by the devil!

To the Fathers generally sex was essentially sinful and unclean. If there had been no Fall Adam would have remained

celibate. We find an echo of the patristic point of view in our Ninth Article: 'The Apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin,' a passage which has given Bishop Gibson some trouble. It is neither fair to St. Paul, nor is it true, but it is not surprising. The belief that sexual union is essentially sinful is widespread. Westermarck quotes a missionary in Chota Nagpore, who put to a native the question, 'Can a dog sin?' The native replied, 'If the dog did not sin, how could he breed?' The Greeks were too sane to entertain such foolish notions. The repression of a natural instinct was foreign to their view of life. But there could be no truce between pagan morals and those of the Gospel. A strong reaction was needed, and the Church supplied it. So much sin was traceable to sexual desire that sexual desire itself came to be regarded as inevitably sinful, and the melancholy story of sacerdotal celibacy began. Those who care to study it in detail can do so in Lea's *History of Sacerdotal Celibacy*. It has been a failure, and there is no reason to suppose that it will ever be a success. It is interesting to notice that the Jansenist Church of Holland, which has been separated from Rome since the end of the seventeenth century, gave it up in 1910. For many centuries it saddled the Church with a ghastly burden of unspeakable crimes; and if the inner history of it could be written, it would be wet with the tears of faithful women banished by unnatural husbands, or stifling noble and romantic passions in obedience to the supposed will of a heartless and cruel God.

'It is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves.' To treat the marriage of a priest as a greater sin than concubinage, which is what the Roman Church still does, is to fight against God. Celibacy, like matrimony, may be an honourable estate and a real vocation; but when it is imposed upon a large body of men, it condemns a corresponding number of women either to virginity or to a life of shame. Asceticism and sensuality have been called the two great enemies of women. Nor must we forget the great loss the world has suffered in the past through thus sterilizing large numbers of the intellectual classes, especially Fellows of Colleges: and this is the more conspicuous when we set against it the honourable record of clerical families in the Church to-day. It is sometimes urged, as it was by Dr. Dollinger in 1878, that the celibate priest is a father to all the

children of his parish. Be this as it may, the priest who becomes a husband and father sometimes finds his efficiency greatly increased by his enlarged experience and powers of sympathy. Marriage is a venture of faith, and may turn out a hindrance to good work, but everyone is the better for being happily married and knowing the blessing of young children.

Here I insert a somewhat florid passage from Papini's *Story of Christ*, p. 229, which will, I trust, be forgiven for the beauty of its thought.

> 'Perhaps the only joy that is not a delusion among all the delusive joys of man, is that which enables him to hold in his arms a little child whose face is rosy with the blood that flows in his own veins, whose eyes light up as he smiles at him, who lisps his name, who reawakes all the tenderness of his youth; to touch that flesh that is like the warm and quivering petals of a flower, to feel that it is ours, moulded within the flesh of the woman who is our very own, and fed at her breast; to watch the dawning and slow development of the soul that dwells in this flesh that belongs to us, and to her who is our own; to be the father of this unique child, of this flower opening to the light of the world; to see ourselves in him, to see our gaze reflected in his wondering eyes, to hear our own voice issuing from his fresh lips,—in a word, to become a child again in this child, that we may be worthy of him and draw closer to him; to become better and purer, and to forget all the years that have been silently drawing us towards death; to forget the pride of manhood, the vanity of learning, the first wrinkles upon our brow, all the obligations and stains, and all that is shameful in life, and renew our primal purity beside that sweet, tender and virgin infant; to become serene again in the aura of that serenity; to become good, better than we have ever been before; to be, in short, the father of a little child, that is growing from day to day, in our home, in the arms of our own woman, is—without any "perhaps"—the highest human happiness it is given to man to experience.'

This brings me to the question whether the size of families should be scientifically controlled. Are the words of Genesis still to be received as a Divine command? 'Be fruitful and multiply to replenish the earth.' Are the Psalmist's words true for all time? 'Happy is the man that hath his quiver full of them; they shall not be ashamed when they speak with their enemies in the gate.' Would St. Paul have dared to say, 'It is better to beget children than to burn'? I read with some amazement the other day that a Frenchwoman had been awarded a gold medal for bearing twenty-four children in twenty-five years. I am afraid it is chiefly international rivalry that makes a nation anxious about its birthrate. Over-population is undoubtedly one of the causes of war, and also of unemployment.

We are often told that there is plenty of room outside England, but you cannot compel people to emigrate. Here are a few recent statistics. The birthrate for the last June quarter was the lowest on record for that quarter, but so was the infant deathrate. The birthrate is still well above the deathrate. In Sheffield last year there were 4,704 more births than deaths. There were 3,774 marriages, and only 979 new houses built. Four thousand families are waiting for municipal houses. The county of Durham in 1921 showed an increase of over 109,000 since the previous census, and in this total there were 10,000 more women than men. But mere numbers are not the only problem. The worst stocks tend to increase at the expense of the best. Everyone should read Mr. Lothrop Stoddard's disquieting book, *The Revolt against Civilization.* He shows convincingly the great need for the science of Eugenics, which implies some kind of birth-control.

In discussing this subject I shall try to avoid unnecessary details, which should be left to medical experts. They are best dealt with in cold print or in private conversation. In these days of outspokenness it is well to remember the need for reticence in dealing with such matters, not only on account of the strength of the sexual instincts, but also because of the danger of being misunderstood and of conveying wrong suggestions, which may be received as unconsciously as they are given. I only wish to express my conviction that to condemn all artificial methods of birth-control without exception and in all cases is extremely short-sighted. *Abusus non tollit usum.* The subject was fully treated by Dr. Killick Millard in the *Modern Churchman* for May and June, 1919. The other side may be studied in 'The Misuse of Marriage,' a pamphlet privately issued by a committee of bishops in 1914, with the consent of the whole body of diocesan bishops of England and Wales. In 1920 the Lambeth Conference of 250 bishops issued another solemn warning of the same kind. The Bishop of Birmingham does not entirely agree with them. In 1919 he said, 'What a nation needs is not an unlimited number of citizens, but a sufficient number of the best quality. Morally, as well as eugenically, it is right for people in certain circumstances to use harmless means to control the birthrate' (*Modern Churchman*, May, 1919). My impression is that the other bishops do not regard man as under

the same natural laws as animals. They believe, if I understan them, that artificial birth-control is a kind of coercing Goc whereas natural methods or partial continence leave Him a loop hole for intervention. They speak of 'the blessing of childrer be they few or many, to be welcomed as from Him.' And agair 'if it should be God's Will shown through Nature that th family should be large.' Yet on the same page they speak o wages which 'do not permit of rearing a family decently,' an of *prohibitive* housing conditions. In other words, they believ in chancing things to some extent, and if they go badly wron they may be put down to that inscrutable decree of Providenc which is usually held responsible for earthquakes. They woul not think much of a farmer who applied such methods to hi stock. Nor do I wish to suggest for a moment that eugeni principles can be applied to human beings as they can be t cattle; but I do suggest that in the holy estate of matrimony w are too apt to follow blind instinct and call it the Will of Goc Parents should be held responsible for the number of childre that they produce, instead of being taught that it is someon else's duty to provide food, education, work and houses for a many as God sends. If they are conscientious people an earnestly desire to do what is best for one another and the family, the rest must be left to them and the doctor. It is cru to frighten them by talking of 'deadly sin' or 'tampering wit nascent life' before any separate life is nascent. Nature has n fear of waste. 'Of a thousand seeds she often brings but on to bear.' And that one must be given a fair chance. Qualit and quantity tend to vary in inverse ratio. Large families mea a high infant mortality. The Dean of St. Paul's has pointe out that in 1710 the population of England and Wales was quarter of a million less than in 1688, and that a period of pro perity immediately ensued. 'It would be far better,' he say 'if our birthrate were as low as that of France, as it would b but for the reckless propagation of the submerged tenth' (*Ou spoken Essays*, 1st Series, pp. 91, 99).

I think these arguments would have more weight with th bishops were it not for the fact that knowledge of birth-contr is dangerously easy to obtain, owing to the public sale of lite ature, and is freely used by selfish people and also by the u married. It is also capable of causing grave injury to healt

Those who use it should remember that the first object of matrimony is 'the procreation of children to be brought up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord,' and that nothing must be allowed to degrade the spiritual union which the physical union sacramentally expresses.

It follows from the strictness of the Christian ideal that many women who have a real vocation for marriage must be content with a substitute. If some of them fail to sublimate their sexual instincts by devoting themselves to some congenial work, they deserve the prayers and sympathy of more fortunate people. Nature knows nothing of any right to live or right to marry. There cannot be equality of opportunity, and sexual selection must take its course. But there are always compensations for those who look for them, and those who are torn with longings for what they cannot have must try to offer their lives a willing sacrifice to Him Who denied Himself a home of His own that He might be the Elder Brother of the whole human race. By preserving their purity they are helping men to reverence the dignity of womanhood, so often trampled on in the past by the stronger and more selfish sex. 'The history of human marriage,' says Westermarck at the conclusion of his great work, 'is the history of a relation in which women have been gradually triumphing over the passions, the prejudices, and the selfish interests of men.'

Great efforts are needed to-day to counteract the demoralizing influence of erotic novels and the cinema. The deliberate idealizing of seduction and adultery in modern fiction is without parallel in antiquity, says Lecky (*Morals*, Vol. II, p. 346-7), and is one of the most mournful facts in history. There are, as he says, certain eternal moral landmarks which can never be removed. The pollution caused by centuries of sin cannot easily be remedied, and the task is made harder when so many popular writers and entertainers aim at making sin look attractive and amusing. The best way to help young people to preserve their purity is to set before them the Christian ideal of marriage as a true sacrament and an incarnation of the divine: 'They twain shall be one flesh.' To the pure this also is pure. As pure as Virgil's marriage of the sun and rain with our mother, the earth (*Georgic* ii, 324-7). For God has made nothing common or unclean.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE MODERN STATE

By Claud Mullins (Barrister-at-Law).

I

THERE can be no doubt that marriage and divorce laws are fundamental in any community. At the present time the agitation for a reform of the divorce laws is a growing one, but, although there has been an enormous change in the attitude towards the subject, mainly among the middle and richer classes, even now there is little realisation of the supreme importance of the subject. England would probably survive the efforts of most of her many political quack doctors; if we gave in to the Socialists, Protectionists, Single Taxers, &c., we should probably pull through in the end. But once we tamper foolishly with our marriage laws, the results will be far more serious and lasting. To a very great extent marriage laws set the tone of public morals and, if the level of public morals is low, no amount of grandmotherly legislation or national education is going to have much effect. Nations have fallen to ruin in the past because of moral disintegration and, looking at our own nation to-day, I should regard the possibility of moral disintegration as by no means the least of the dangers that surround us.

To my mind the present is not a particularly suitable time for any amending of our marriage and divorce laws. To-day we concentrate on individual happiness far too much and on national and family progress far too little. Again, this is not an age of deep thinking. Fifty years of national compulsory education, followed by five years of war, have given us a public that is eager, it is true, for knowledge in tabloid form, but which is ill-disposed to think out any problem to the bottom. Reality and the truth are apt to be abhorred and despised in art; discord is promoted to an art in music; in politics history and experience are ignored, and quackery of every kind is fermenting in domestic circles; all this threatens to lead us in the name of progress back to a state of barbarism, from which our ancestors painfully emerged. Were it not for one consideration, it would be best to postpone for twenty years at least any question of altering our marriage and divorce laws;

but that one consideration is vital, namely, that conditions are really bad as things are. To oppose reform blindly is to put one's head in the sands, for nobody can study the working of our present laws on this subject without being convinced that we ought to make a real and strenuous attempt at improvement. This is now widely realized; in fact so widely that there is a danger of our being rushed to the other extreme. A shrewd man once said that when everybody is agreed that something should be done, something foolish is sure to be done. As I will show in a moment, something foolish has just been done by our legislature.

Before entering upon details I would urge one general warning. It is my sincere belief that in the great majority of cases it is a delusion when people reach for happiness out of misery by means of divorce. The untried always has an attraction, but the idea which is so prevalent to-day, that the unhappiness of one marriage can be wiped out by either matrimonial freedom or by a second marriage, is usually false. It is impossible to unwrite our own history, and the majority of those who look to divorce to make them happy are building their future on very insecure foundations. This is my fundamental belief. Divorce is very seldom a means to happiness. But none the less divorce is now and, the world being what it is, must remain a part of our social system.

II

The first principle which should, I think, guide us in attempting the work of reform is that our marriage and divorce laws should be the nearest practicable approach to the Christian ideal. It is true that to-day but the minority of the population is attached to any Christian Church, and that the proportion of church or chapel goers must be very low. Accepting these regrettable facts, I still say that we are a Christian country, ruled by Christian standards. It is largely the fault of the Churches that so many of the finest Christians among us do not 'profess and call themselves Christians.' The vast bulk of the men and women in this country who are outside the Churches, even among those who, like the Jews, are definitely outside the Christian pale, accept consciously or unconsciously the Christian standard of ethics and personal life. With sincere conviction, I say, in the opening words of the recent public

statement by the Churchmen's Union (*Modern Churchman*, June, 1923), that 'no proposal to amend our marriage laws would be likely to find general acceptance if it were thought to be inconsistent with the teaching of Christ.' But this very fact compels us to study closely the teaching of our Lord upon the subject. We, as thinking Christians, cannot merely look up 'Divorce' in the Concordance, read the few texts concerned with the subject and then imagine that we know what Christ taught. Personally I doubt whether the maximum study of these few texts on divorce will help us as much as, for instance, the fifth chapter of St. Matthew as a whole. It is in the general spirit of Our Lord's teaching, rather than in any express declarations on the subject that we shall find most guidance. However, let us for the moment confine ourselves to the specific recorded sayings.

As a layman, unversed in theology, I am not competent to do more than reflect the teaching of others and to use my own common-sense and experience in applying what the experts in biblical study tell us. But the merest layman must be struck by the remarkable difference between the versions of Our Lord's statements as given in *Mark* and *Luke*, on the one hand, and twice in *Matthew* on the other. In the earliest Gospel (*Mark* x, 11 and 12) the text reads: 'Whosover shall put away his wife and marry another committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband and be married to another, she committeth adultery.' In *Luke* (xvi, 18) the statement is equally uncompromising. 'Whosoever putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery; and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.' These sayings appear to be mainly a condemnation of re-marriage after divorce, and into the great controversy on that subject I have no time to enter here. But so far, at any rate, we have no authority for saying that Our Lord expressly sanctioned any ground of divorce. When, however, we turn to Matthew, we find the important qualification of 'fornication' introduced. 'Whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery' (v, 32). 'Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and

whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery' (xix, 9). Whether 'fornication' is an accurate translation I do not profess to say. Dr. Charles, in his book on *Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce*, p. 25, maintains that this translation 'is absolutely wrong,' and uses 'unchastity' in its place; Dr. Gore agrees with him (*Divorce in the New Testament*, by Dr. Gore and Dr. Box, p. 15), while Dean Inge has gone so far as to say that the Greek word translated 'Fornication' 'might cover all immodest conduct.' Be that as it may, there is no doubt in the minds of many scholars that these words, which appear alone in Matthew, were not uttered by Christ himself. When one finds Liberal Churchmen like Dr. Charles in full agreement with Dr. Gore, one is fairly safe in accepting their theory. Both agree (Dr. Charles, p. 22; Dr. Gore and Dr. Box, p. 18) that the exception given in Matthew's version is an editorial addition. Dr. Gore is explicit: 'This clearly is a case of editorial addition or modification. It formed no part of Our Lord's teaching in its original form, which is preserved correctly in Mark and Luke.' Nor, let it be added, is the exception found in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (vii, 10-15) which many scholars regard as the earliest exposition of Christ's teaching on the subject.

To extract the full light from these passages in the New Testament would require far more theological scholarship than I possess. But this at least is clear: Christ condemned both divorce and the re-marrying of divorced persons. This deduction is elementary, but nevertheless the fact is that both the law of this country and the official attitude of our Church is based upon the contrary assumption, namely, that the exception of 'Fornication,' introduced by Matthew, has the authority of Our Lord Himself. Dr. Charles argues (pp. 20-22) that the exception was correctly added because at the time that Our Lord spoke 'the sin of adultery of itself dissolved the marriage bond and entailed, according to the recognised law of the day, capital punishment. . . . Even if the extreme penalties of the law were evaded, divorce became compulsory and re-marriage could follow divorce.' This law, says Dr. Charles, was abrogated a few years later, so Matthew added his words to show that Christ was only referring to divorce on lesser grounds than adultery. This view is disputed by other scholars, but, even

if it is correct and if Our Lord did mean to accept adultery as a sufficient ground for divorce, it is certain that adultery in those days meant really 'living in sin' and not a fleeting episode at a hotel, carefully stage-managed with legal assistance, which is all that our law, as at present administered, demands. But the fact remains that the acceptance of adultery as either in itself a sufficient or as the only permissible ground of divorce rests upon an editorial addition to Christ's words, even the translation of which is in dispute. Yet, as I have said and will now show, that doubtful exception has been and is the keystone of both our present system and of the position of the Anglican Church.

The old rule of both Church and State was in accordance with the teaching in Mark and Luke. Marriage was absolutely indissoluble—in theory. Then, to quote Lord Birkenhead's speech of March 24th, 1920: 'Towards the end of the seventeenth century it was recognised that, by the procedure of a private Act of Parliament, divorce ought to be obtainable on the ground of adultery.' A private Act of Parliament remained the only method of obtaining divorce until 1857; it remained so in Ireland till Home Rule came, and is so, I believe, to-day. In 1857 Parliament introduced our present system of granting divorce in the civil courts, but still adultery was made in practically all cases an essential, and, in the case of a petition by a husband, a sufficient ground of divorce.

The leaders of our Anglican Church are reconciled to the granting of divorce for adultery. Dr. Gore has written: 'I cannot deny to any "national" church the right to avail itself of those exceptive clauses,' and more categorically, the Archbishop of Canterbury said in the House of Lords, on June 22nd, 1920: 'We believe unhesitatingly in the great principle of the Christian marriage law, a bond unbreakable save for unfaithfulness. . . . Christ forbade divorce on any lesser ground than adultery.' This attitude of the leaders of our Church is due solely to the texts in St. Matthew's Gospel, and this was made clear by the Archbishop of Canterbury in his speech in the House of Lords on June 26th last. 'There was,' he said, 'one principle by which they must stand and that was that the sole ground upon which marriage could be dissolved was to be found in Our Lord's own words in the Gospel according to

St. Matthew—unfaithfulness to the marriage vows by fornication and adultery alone. That principle was in accordance with the Christian faith.' But is it? It seems to me that both our law and the views of the leaders of our Church are founded on an illusion. Our Lord taught the absolute indissolubility of marriage. To make the law, as the Roman Catholics would have us do, enforce this ideal is far more logical and on a far firmer foundation, wrong though I believe it to be, than to accept the view that Our Lord Himself agreed to adultery as either a sufficient or the sole ground for divorce.

III

If, then, divorce even for adultery has no definite Christian sanction, does that settle the question for Christians? Are the Roman Catholics right in demanding laws to refuse all divorce? Before answering, let us not forget two important facts. One is that, while repudiating divorce *a vinculo*, the Roman Catholic Church tolerates divorce *a mensa et thoro*, in other words, judicial separation. Secondly, that, in the words of Dr. Hensley Henson (*Marriage and Divorce*, p. 8), the 'prohibitive law was conditioned by so large and liberal a system of dispensations and admitted such strange applications of the doctrine of nullity, that in practice marriages were cancelled with scandalous frequency.' This inconsistency between principle and practice is a warning to us to-day.

But the main problem is whether Christ's teaching on divorce was intended to be an enunciation of the ideal or the laying down of a compulsory code. Even Dr. Gore and Dr. Box (at p. 36) say that Christ's answer to the Pharisees was 'that marriage from an ideal standpoint is indissoluble.' As the recent statement of the Churchmen's Union so clearly expresses it, 'the undying power of His utterances is largely due to the fact that they state principles of action, but never laws. . . . The author of St. Matthew's Gospel . . . who ranked the prohibition of divorce among these paradoxes ("Swear not at all!" "Resist not him that is evil"; "Give to him that asketh thee") implied that it was no statute, but an ideal which was to be approached as nearly as the hardness of men's hearts would allow.' This seems to me the fundamental guiding principle.

It seems to me that, while the absolute indissolubility of marriage must ever remain the Christian standard and while, as I will try to show later, no Christian Church can have any part in lowering that standard, even the most ardent Christians have no cause to insist that our compulsory laws shall enact the full rigour of the Christian ideal. To transform Christ's declaration of the ideal into a compulsory law is to misunderstand Our Lord's message and to invite subterfuge and, as is shown by the words that I have quoted from Dr. Henson, subterfuge has always followed laws which refuse all divorce. Christ did not attempt to legislate. On the contrary, while incessantly setting the ideal before men, he recognised the validity of existing laws. When the Pharisees asked—not in good faith, let us remember—about the divorce rules of the Law of Moses, Our Lord (*Mark* x, 5) did not denounce these rules as invalid, but answered 'For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept.' Have we not here the key to our actions and opinions to-day? The earnest and loyal Christian knows that he cannot do all the things that the law does not disallow. There is, for instance, no punishment by law for the strong man who stands idly watching a child drown. But the corollary is equally true, namely that the earnest Christian knows that compulsory laws cannot be entirely on the exalted level of Christian teaching. Thus, lying, drunkenness, slander are all un-Christian, but the compulsory law cannot and does not make these sins punishable unless other circumstances accompany them. The Church does not demand a unity between sin and law-breaking. Nor does the Church refuse its ministrations to repentant sinners. This thought, I submit, helps us in forming our views about divorce laws to-day. As Dr. Henson has written (p. 17) 'The conditions of divorce are properly to be determined by the State in the light of Christian principle, with reference to the actual necessities and circumstances of men.' This is, I submit, our duty as Christians and then, in the words of the present Bishop of Gloucester (*The Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ*, p. 227) 'The more it is possible to act according to the precept and example of Christ, the better society will become. . . . The more we act as Christians, the more Christian society will become; and when society is Christian the only possible rules of conduct will be Christian.'

Meanwhile, as Dr. Headlam tells us, on the previous page: 'The Christian rule of marriage is, perhaps, one which it would be impossible to impose absolutely in a state of society such as exists at present, but it is the ideal basis of a happy society and may well be the self-imposed rule of a section of the community.' But we do not hasten the attainment of the Christian ideal by so misunderstanding that ideal as to confuse it with compulsory laws, binding upon everybody.

Is it pure opportunism for us to say as Christians that our laws must be as Christian as is practicable? When the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce (1912) criticised the recommendations of the Majority, the Minority Commissioners wrote:

> 'Proposals like these are frankly opportunist, designed to meet what are supposed to be the practical needs of the moment.'

I confess that for a long time this criticism troubled me; we all long to have a sheet anchor of definite principle to cling to and the recorded texts about divorce do seem at first sight to give us this anchor. But on examination, some element of what will be termed opportunism is found to be inevitable. The recommendations of the Minority Commissioners themselves, if analysed, are opportunist. Thus fresh grounds for decrees of nullity are recommended, and nullity is a merely artificial and opportunist procedure; secondly, the death of an absent husband or wife is to be presumed after a certain interval, which is merely desertion rather clumsily cloaked. No, we must not be frightened at the cry of opportunism. Our principles as Christians should, I submit, be two-fold; (1) to keep the Christian ideal of an indissoluble marriage ever before us and (2) to base our laws upon the nearest practicable approach to that ideal. This attitude is in reality in full accord with that of the Archbishop of Canterbury himself. In the same speech from which I have quoted (June 26th, 1923) he said that 'they all recognised the Christian obligation and the fundamental principles of their religious faith and training, but they admitted that there were a great many people who did not regard the Christian standard as that which they desired to respect and those people were entitled to claim some recognition.' In other words, the Law cannot merely enact Christian teaching; it has to be the nearest practicable approach to it. It is really only

in the application of this principle that the Archbishop and the Churchmen's Union are in disagreement.

IV

We must now ask whether our laws to-day are the nearest practicable approach to Christ's teaching. I unhesitatingly say that they are not, and for two main reasons.

(1) In the first place by accepting the erroneous view that Christ specifically sanctioned divorce for adultery, we have allowed divorce to be so easy that divorce by consent and conspiracy takes place to a most disturbing extent. Divorce to-day is too easy as well as too difficult. On June 30th, 1919, the *Times* published a letter by a Labour M.P. who boasted that he had been divorced by his wife for desertion and adultery by camouflaged evidence under both headings. The only unusual thing about this unedifying episode was the public avowal.

(2) Secondly, by refusing divorce on grounds other than adultery, while allowing wholesale judicial separations, we invite and obtain conditions which are a disgrace to any Christian community. To-day our Courts, mainly police courts, grant thousands of judicial separations every year, the possible grounds being adultery, cruelty, desertion for two years and habitual drunkenness. Judicial separation is the modern equivalent of the ecclesiastical divorce *a mensa et thoro*, but surely this is just as much a 'putting away' as divorce in the full degree. As Dr. Henson has written 'the whole conception of marriage is degraded by the assumption that the marriage bond is patient of perpetual voluntary separation between husband and wife.' This mediaeval doctrine, he wrote, 'has no basis in Christian principle and is deeply mischievous in many directions' (p. 15). People generally do not realise how mischievous this system of judicial separation is.

But, whatever our views of reform may be, there can be no doubt that present conditions are profoundly evil. It is my earnest belief that the false assumption that Our Lord expressly sanctioned divorce for adultery, and the belief that He condemned laws which give divorce for any other ground, is responsible for much of the evil which exists to-day. This is the description of present conditions given by an ex-Lord Chan-

cellor, and it refers only to some of the existing evils. Speaking in London on April 11th last, Lord Birkenhead said with much reason that 'the divorce laws of this country were the worst that were known in any civilised country. There was no chicanery, no trick which our judges had not been compelled to employ in administering the laws of divorce.' The ex-Lord Chancellor was perfectly correct in condemning what he termed 'a series of humiliating compromises for which the Legislature alone was responsible' (the *Times*, April 12th, 1923). As a practising lawyer, I could give many instances which have come under my own notice to show that, not only are divorces now arranged with scandalous ease, but that the law as it stands to-day invites such arrangements. Unfortunately, advocates of Divorce Law reform concentrate upon the need for extending the grounds upon which divorce shall be obtainable. They ignore the much-needed tightening up of our laws. Personally I would never lift a finger for the Buckmaster Bill,—though I recognise the necessity for accepting grounds other than adultery—until it is part of the proposed changes to stiffen up our marriage and divorce laws, to stiffen the interpretation of adultery and any fresh grounds for divorce so that, before granting a divorce, the Courts should have the duty of ascertaining that reconciliation is impossible and that the parties really have finally broken their marriage obligations. That divorce should now be possible for a stage-managed appearance of one isolated act of adultery is to my mind one of the worst features of the existing system and until our laws are stiffened up in this respect, I consider that any changes will be extremely dangerous.

This question is more than ever important now as Parliament, in its sentimentalism, has just passed an Act, nominally to give women an equality with men, but actually to facilitate divorces by collusion and divorces which are merely the product of hasty and ill-considered action by the parties. A wife can now divorce her husband for one act of adultery only; she need no longer prove cruelty or desertion. Our sentimental legislators have been thinking, of course, of the unhappy wife whose husband is really 'living in sin' and so far I sympathise with them. But I think more about the increased temptation now offered to married couples who have passed through the

first romantic stage of matrimony into the more lasting, though less exciting, stage of ordinary married life and perhaps drudgery. The fact that a husband has merely to place himself for a few minutes only in a suspicious position in order to enable his wife to divorce him is going to be a terrible inducement to divorce and is sure seriously to discourage temporarily disillusioned couples from pulling together. As Sir Ellis Hume-Williams, K.C., M.P., one of the leading counsel in the Divorce Court, warned the House of Commons on June 8th last:

> 'One of the saddest things of our age is the tendency of young people to rush into the Divorce Court. A measure which held out further temptations to rush into the Divorce Court is deplorable.'

He truly said:

> 'The right way would have been to make it as hard for a husband to divorce his wife as it then was for a wife to divorce her husband.'

Yet 257 votes were cast for the Bill and only 26 against it, and in the House of Lords the Archbishop of Canterbury voted for it—such is the mesmeric effect of the unhistoric texts in St. Matthew's Gospel. It is a tragedy indeed. Now that this Bill is law, every effort should be made to make people realise that, although in many ways divorce is too difficult, divorce to-day is also scandalously easy. The remedy can only come from stiffening up the test of adultery upon which our Courts shall act. And for this we must get Christians to realise that the idea that Our Lord expressly sanctioned divorce for adultery is a dangerous illusion.

V

It is time now to consider briefly what grounds for divorce the law should accept. The Majority Report of the Royal Commission recommended the acceptance of the following:—

Adultery, without making any recommendation to stiffen up the present interpretation of adultery by the Courts.

Wilful Desertion for 3 years and upwards.

Cruelty, being such conduct 'as makes it unsafe, having regard to the risk of life, limb or health, bodily or mental' for the petitioner to continue to live with the respondent.

Incurable insanity where the insane spouse has been continuously confined under the Lunacy Acts for not less than 5 years.

Habitual Drunkenness, where the respondent has been found incurable after 3 years from a separation order granted on this ground.

Imprisonment under a commuted death sentence.

The Buckmaster Bill declares in its Memorandum that it 'is based on the recommendations contained in the Majority Report of the Royal Commission.' It includes all the grounds recommended in the Majority Report except that it omits the last, namely imprisonment under a commuted death sentence. My own opinion is that it would have been better to include this ground and to omit incurable insanity. Divorce in my view should only follow the personal act of the other party and should not be available in case of mere misfortune. Insanity is a disease, not a matrimonial offence and the unfortunate victim may need the care of a wife or husband in his or her affliction. The parties have married 'for better or for worse' and divorce should only be possible as the consequence of a matrimonial offence.

But I confess that I regard the standard of evidence upon which our Courts are to act as of far greater importance than the inclusion or exclusion of any of these grounds. I want it to be part of our law that before divorce is granted the Courts shall be honestly satisfied that the offending party has really and finally broken his or her marriage vows. Evidence about a few minutes indiscretion is not in itself adequate. I have said that I regard the present interpretation of adultery as hopelessly loose and as opening the door to wholesale collusion. The same applies to desertion. The Courts have accepted as desertion the refusal by a husband to obey an order of the Court for the Restitution of Conjugal Rights, and this was the ordinary way before the new law in which a wife proved desertion. This order is granted to a wife on production of an ineffective letter (which is usually written by a solicitor) in which the wife begs her husband to return to her—usually the very last thing that the wife desires. This farcical procedure is expressly continued under the Buckmaster Bill (Clause 9). My sincere belief is that, if the Buckmaster Bill should become law, with its very loose definitions (Clause 25), the present horrible state of affairs will not only continue, but will be made far worse. It

should not be beyond the capacity of lawyers to incorporate in the law definitions and tests so that divorce shall only be granted where there has really been a permanent and irreparable breach between the parties.

I believe, therefore, that the immediate duty of Church people and of all earnest Christians is to work for the improvement of the Buckmaster Bill. To oppose reform blindly is to tolerate existing evils. We must accept the view which was expressed by Lord Birkenhead, that 'the spiritual and moral sides of marriage are incomparably more important than the physical side.' But at the same time we must do all that is humanly possible to prevent hasty and frivolous applications for divorce—and to-day, as I have tried to show, plenty of hasty and frivolous divorces are obtained. That must be put right before the existing law is extended.

In my opinion, it would be a sound check if it were part of our law that under no circumstances whatever should a decree of divorce be pronounced within seven years of a marriage. Most divorce cases arise, as the last ten years have specially shown, because marriages were hastily contracted and the easier divorce becomes, the more reckless marriages shall we have. Not long ago a decree was pronounced in July to end a marriage contracted the same year. It is scandalous that this should be possible. To my mind it would be a healthy check if the law laid down that, come what may, a marriage shall last for seven years at least.

I would suggest, too, that a reform of our marriage laws should be an integral part of a reform of our divorce laws. I have no time here to examine this question fully, but I would quote the opinion of the present Bishop of Norwich. In a discussion in the *Times* on the prevalence of bigamy, the Bishop wrote (July 28th, 1919) that 'neither marriage after banns nor marriage by licence really provides for the identification of the parties nor for the requirements of full publicity. . . . In no case is there demanded a verification by a third person of any particulars supplied.' And the Registrar-General followed with a letter (August 1st, 1919) saying that 'the marriage laws of this country afford less security against bigamy than those of almost any other civilised state'—and I would add that our marriage laws should be carefully examined from the point of

view of the prevention of divorce as well as for security against bigamy. Our marriage laws need overhauling as well as our divorce laws. The Law, it is obvious, cannot prevent hasty and reckless marriages, but something can, I am convinced, be done to check them.

VI

A final question remains. What should be the attitude of the Christian Churches towards those who make use of State facilities for divorce? The Churches would be false to our Master if they departed from the Christian ideal of indissoluble marriage. To say that the Churches should not oppose laws which compel only the highest practicable approach to that ideal is by no means to say that the Churches should themselves depart from that ideal. I say frankly that in my opinion no divorced person should be re-married in Church, and personally I should be glad to see a definite rule to that effect propounded by ecclesiastical authority in all Churches. Many enlightened Churchmen have contemplated with approval the re-marriage by the Church of the 'innocent party' to a divorce suit. Dr. Henson (p. 18) and our own Union (*Modern Churchman*, November, 1919, p. 391) have done this on the assumption that the Church can accept the decisions of our Law Courts as to who is the guilty and who the so-called innocent party. I challenge altogether this automatic segregation into 'innocent' and 'guilty.' From the standpoint of the Christian ideal, and therefore of the Church, there are no 'innocent' parties to a divorce suit, and only too often those whom the law decides to have committed matrimonial offences are more innocent than the petitioning party; and the converse is equally true. I contributed an article on this point to the *Modern Churchman* of April, 1921, and I believe as firmly as ever that the Churches must apply their own standards of personal responsibility and repentance when faced by questions of ministering to divorced persons; to rely upon the decrees of the civil Courts is to degrade Christ's own standards. In my view the Church should refuse to marry anybody whose husband or wife is living. But my whole soul revolts against a refusal by the Churches to offer their ordinary ministrations to those who have availed themselves of the State divorce law merely because they have done so. As Dr. Henson has said (p. 13) 'How could it be

tolerable that citizens who contracted marriages permitted by the law of the State should be excluded from Communion in the National Church as "open and notorious evil livers" by the rule of the Church?' Surely we can trust the discretion of the individual priest as to whether a divorced person really is an 'evil liver,' and personally I would recommend him to pay little attention to the decision of the Courts of Law as to who is the guilty party. If the individual priest remembers the words of Our Lord: 'I am come not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance,' he cannot go far wrong in deciding who is fit to receive the ordinary ministrations of the Church, apart from the marriage service itself.

To sum up, I would urge that Christians should use their influence to make our marriage and divorce laws the highest practicable approach to Christ's standard of an indissoluble marriage. We should begin with a realisation of the fact that divorce is too easy to-day. If we stiffen up the standard of evidence upon which our Courts are to act, both as regards the existing ground of adultery and the new grounds which it is proposed to add, then I do not fear that a reasonable extension of the grounds of divorce will result in any loosening of the marriage tie. Personally I would strenuously oppose the Buckmaster Bill as at present drafted. Until divorce for adultery is made more difficult I, for one, would oppose the recognition of any additional ground. But my main plea is that the Church, while ever teaching the indissolubility of marriage, should use its influence to make our laws the highest practicable approach to that standard. A realisation of the evil conditions that exist to-day under our present marriage and divorce laws should stir us all to work, not for the prevention of changes, but for the securing of enlightened and sound reforms. To my mind it would be tragic if Disestablishment should come, as is threatened, because of a conflict between the State and a bigoted Church which ignored the evils of our present conditions. At present every honest Christian ought to be ashamed both at the ease with which divorce is obtainable for adultery and at the conditions which result from its refusal on other grounds. A realisation of this should make him labour to obtain State laws which will bring conditions nearer to the ideal standard of Christian teaching.

IS THE FAMILY THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL UNIT?

By F. B. Jevons, Litt.D., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Durham.

IN considering the question, whether the family is the fundamental social unit, the first thing we have to do is to note that the word 'family' is an ambiguous term. It is a term which, in different societies, or in different stages of the same society, has many very different meanings. It may mean a group consisting of one husband and one wife, with their children, or a group consisting of one husband, several wives and their children, or consisting of one wife, several husbands and the children, or a group which consists of the mother and her children alone and from which the father, either because he is not known, or is not recognized, is excluded.

The next thing we have to note is that no one of these groups is essential to society. Wherever society exists one or other of these groups is found, but on no one of them does society depend for its existence; if they change—and they do not always change, for all of them are to be found in existence at the present day—but if any one of them does change and pass away, society still continues. We cannot say that any one of them is fundamental to society, if by 'fundamental' we mean that without it society could not exist. There is no one of them which is indispensable to the existence of society, for there is no one of them without which society has not managed to carry on.

But if no one form of the family is indispensable to the existence of society, it may be that some one particular form is indispensable for the well-being of society; and the question before us is, I take it, whether the family, as it exists in monogamous societies, is 'fundamental' in that sense.

Now, in society viewed as a political community, the family clearly is not the unit: it has no vote. Such of its members as have votes have votes not because they are members of a family, but because they are members of the political community; and so far from the family being in this respect a unit, its members may, and often do, vote different ways.

Again, neither in society viewed as an economic community

is the family the unit at the present day: its members are not all necessarily or commonly engaged in the same industry or the same vocation.

Nor again, if we look at society from the point of view of religion, can we regard the family as the fundamental unit. That is due not merely to the fact that its members may and sometimes do follow different forms of religion, but still more to the fact that for each one of us the question does or may arise, 'What shall *I* do to be saved?'

These and similar considerations may tempt us to believe that the individual and not the family is the fundamental social unit. That view indeed has been put forward, for instance, by Plato in the second book of his great work on society, the *Republic*; and that view is still held, doubtless, by some at the present day. But, from the point of view of history, sociology and philosophy alike, that view is no longer tenable. As a matter of history and as a sociological fact, individuals do not first exist as isolated atoms out of society, and then come together to form society; and, as a matter of philosophy, there is and can be 'no such thing as an individual in the abstract, a human being literally independent of all others.' Always it is in society and as members of society that human beings are found. And always it is in society that the various shifting forms of the family are found. Further, in society where alone families are found, a family, like an individual, is not an isolated atom, nor is it independent of all other families: husband and wife come from different families, and, though by their union they form a new family, yet by their union they bind together, or may bind together, the families from which they come. No family is an atomic unit, self-existent and independent of all other families and of the society in which, and in which alone, any family can come into being. Only in society can families exist; there is and can be no such thing as a family literally independent of all other families; nor does society originate from any such imaginary family. It is in and from society that every family springs. It is within society that every fresh family is formed. It is society and not the family which is fundamental. Society is not a mere collection or juxtaposition of isolated units. Neither any family, nor any individual

exists prior to or independent of society. We are all—all—members one of another. No individual can or does live to himself alone, nor any family.

Perhaps it may be said that any society is what its members make it to be; that what they make it to be depends, partly at any rate, on what they wish it to be, on their ideal; and that they should take the family as offering the ideal which society should strive to imitate and realize. What suggests and inspires this train of thought is the fact that 'nowhere does the unselfishness of man come out more obviously than in matters connected with the institution of the family. Some of the noblest things that have ever been done have been associated with the love of man and woman or with the love of parent and child.' That, however, is but one side of the shield. If we look at the other side, there can be no doubt that selfishness has found in the institution of the family its most pernicious expression. The family is often the centre of mean and petty selfishness. 'Take, for example, what is implied in our word "nepotism," or consider how many of the greatest evils in history have been due to dynastic interests which are simply family interests on a large scale.' It is an undeniable fact that 'nowhere does the selfishness of man come out more obviously than in matters connected with the institution of the family,' and the conclusion forced upon us is that the family cannot be the ideal on which we should strive to model society. If we regard families as the units of which society is made up, then society is made up of warring atoms: family selfishness is a force which is divisive and disruptive of society. It is clannish, and tends to set the interests of the clan or family above the good of society. The family, so far as it strives to be an independent, self-contained, impermeable unit, is not fundamental to society, but makes for the disintegration of society.

It was considerations such as these—in which no one will venture to deny the presence of some degree of truth—that led Plato to formulate the scheme of society which he propounds in the fifth book of his *Republic*. The interests of a family are not co-extensive or co-incident with the interests of society, but it is possible to imagine that if they did co-incide, that is to say if society could be made one family, then in society harmony

and unity would prevail. The purpose which Plato entertains is to make of society one harmonious whole. That purpose is one from which no person who thinks the matter out can ultimately dissent. The method by which that purpose may be attained is therefore a subject of the highest importance, and matter for the most serious discussion. The method, which Plato suggests, for making of society one harmonious whole, consists in abolishing the existing institution of the family. As long as families are regarded as the fundamental units of which society is composed, so long will society consist of atoms in competition and collision with one another—of warring atoms. The institution of the family as we know and practise it is fatal, in Plato's view, to the harmony and the unity of society, and must therefore be abandoned. It must, according to Plato, be replaced by a newer and truer conception of the family, by a recognition of the fact that society itself is the one and only real family. The existing institution of the family therefore must be abolished. No man may have a wife of his own; no woman may have a husband of her own; no parents may call any children their own; no child may point to any man as his own father, or even to any woman as his own mother. Each man is to be father to all the children that there are; each child is to be son to all the men of the proper age. No parents may live with each other and with their children. Nowhere in the State may there be any home. Of home, in our sense of the word, as an abode of love, Plato has no conception. Indeed, from his ideal state love itself has gone: no man may have a wife, no woman a husband to love; no parent may love children of their own; no child may have a mother of its own to love. In fine, with Plato's method of making society one harmonious whole the very notion of love, whether between man and wife or between parents and children, is inconsistent and incompatible. Plato's Ideal State, that is to say, rests on the assumption that the family is not the fundamental social unit, but is that which prevents society from becoming a unity. Yet Plato's object is not to destroy the family bond, but to enlarge it, so that all members of society shall feel that all are members of one family and one alone. That is the ideal which he propounds; and the family is the obstacle which must

be removed, if the ideal is to be realized and all men are to be brothers.

Thus we are brought face to face with the question whether the 'brotherhood of man' is simply a phrase without meaning or something more than a mere phrase? It is, of course, on some lips—and sometimes on our own lips—a mere sound signifying nothing, unless it is intended to deceive others, or—what is worse—unless it is a piece of self-deception. But if it has any meaning, if it means something, it means that the fundamental and the final unity of society is not to be sought or found merely in the family, in any merely physical, animal, sexual bond. Then where else besides are we to look for it? To that question the reply is plain: Where else than in society can we look to find the unity of society? The words of our Lord are definite: 'Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother and sister and mother.' To say that a society so based and formed is ideal, and that being ideal it is unrealizable is inexcusable. To say so is to pervert the meaning of the words: they do not imply that it is impossible for men to do the will of the Father and to become brethren in Christ.

Between the Kingdom of God, or the City of God, and Plato's Ideal State, though there is a difference, there is also a resemblance. The resemblance is that in neither is the family the fundamental social unit. The difference is that the one is based on love, the other is not. Hence the consequence that the institution of the family is for Plato an institution which must be abolished before the foundation of his Ideal State can be even laid, whereas for Christ it is essential to the Kingdom of God on earth, but essential only as a stepping-stone to the ideal, and not as being itself the ideal. To Plato, seeing only one side of the shield, the family appeared as solely an institution divisive and disruptive of society. And it is undeniable that the love which is limited to the members of one's own family is not a form of love which will hold a society together: it is divisive and disintegrative of society. But the love on which the family is based is spiritual and not merely physical; and so neither is nor can be strictly or permanently confined to members of the family. Nor is it necessarily supposed by fol-

lowers of Christ to be so limited. 'Little children, love one another' does not mean 'love only the members of your own family,' neither does it mean that you are not to love members of your own family. Love of others, whether they be of your own family or not, is the first principle of society, even though men know it not. 'First principles of every kind,' as Ferrier said, 'have their influence and indeed operate largely and powerfully long before they come to the surface of human thought and are articulately expounded.'

It is clear that in the Ideal State, the *civitas Dei*, the family is not the fundamental social unit. Then does the Kingdom of God exist only in heaven and not upon earth? Is its existence in the future only and not in the present? If by the Kingdom of God is meant 'the actualization of the rule of God on earth,' then, as Mr. Emmett has said, 'it must be spoken of, as it is spoken of in the Gospels, as both, both present and future' (*The Lord of Thought*, p. 263). The Kingdom of God, for the very reason that it is ideal, is always in process of realization, is always being actualized and is always capable of further realization. Further, the process is always and essentially from love and to love. In society, viewed even as a purely human institution, there is no unit—whether an individual or a family—which is either permanent or indispensable. Society, even when viewed as merely human, is held together by love—if and so long as a society does hold together. It is in love that the family originates and by love that it is maintained, so long as it is maintained. But it is love and not the family which is fundamental. In the family love finds one means—the first and earliest means—of expressing itself. But there it finds neither its full nor its final expression, but too often its mutilation or perversion, and then the family comes to be, as Plato conceived it, an impediment to the realization of the Ideal State. But inasmuch as it is in the family that love finds its first expression, the family cannot be of necessity an obstacle to the love from which it draws its being. Neither, however, can love find its full expression within the circle of the family. The family may be an obstacle, but it may be a stepping-stone here and now to the realization of the *civitas Dei*. And as a stepping-stone, though indispensable, it is neither final nor fundamental.

WOMEN AND THE PRIESTHOOD

By the Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, M.A., Rector of Winford.

OUR Lord was born into, and Christianity made its appearance in, a society—that of the Roman Empire—whose civilization had been built upon the basis of the patriarchal system—a system whose rules had governed the life of Jew, Greek and Roman from remote antiquity. Here the family under the despotic rule of the paterfamilias formed the social unit; sons and daughters, so far as individual rights were concerned, were almost on a level with slaves; but while the son escaped from authority on the death of the father, the daughter, if she had not already passed into the power of a husband, remained under the authority and absolute control of her male relatives. Livy gives the Roman view concisely: '*Majores nostri feminas voluerunt in manu esse parentium fratrum virorum.*' In Classical Greece the position of the woman in the family was even less honourable: 'Courtesans we use for pleasure, concubines for the daily service of the body, wives for begetting lawful children and as trusty guardians of the home,' says Demosthenes, and the words of a public orator may be taken as representing the standpoint of the ordinary Greek. In a society such as this the woman for ages was excluded from the wider interests of a social and city life that developed in extent and complexity as civilization advanced. It is true that the disintegrating influence of the conquests of Alexander and of the Romans favourably affected the status of women in the Mediterranean world, and philosophers of note claimed for the woman absolute equality of status with the man; but the efforts of women to escape from the tyranny of the patriarchal system—partially successful—were generally inspired not so much by a desire for social service as for deliverance from irksome legal and moral restraints, and the result was not such as tended to enhance woman's reputation in the world of those days or to commend the cause of the freedom of women to the Church when it appeared on the scene of history. There were conspicuous exceptions, both in these later times and also in the sterner earlier days, that proved to what

heights a woman, in spite of the restrictions that hampered her, could reach. Clement of Alexandria, who is in the line of liberal Greek thought on this question, gives a long list of women who had won fame for courageous virtue, for practical wisdom, in literature, in the study and teaching of philosophy and science. Yet the tone of the passage in which he pleads for the equality of men and women suggests that the opposite view of the inferior status of women was the prevailing view.

With the Jew the position of women was essentially the same. In the ancient days she was under the despotic power of her father or his male heirs, and when married she was beulah, that is 'lorded,' under the rule of her baal, that is, 'lord.' As the centuries pass there is a development parallel to that in Greece and Rome towards the enhancement of the status of women. The Jew is commanded to honour his mother as well as his father, he can write in the praise of womanhood the words that conclude the book of *Proverbs*, he displays affectionate interest in the stories of the famous women of his race. Deborah and Huldah rank among the great prophets at critical periods of the national history, Judith and Esther are popular heroines. Yet the woman at the time of our Lord was excluded from all active participation in the services of the Temple or the synagogue; she might not pass beyond the boundary of the court of the woman in the Temple, she might not say the Shema, the grand profession of Jewish faith. In the synagogue service of to-day the Jewish man still thanks God that He has not created him a woman. Moreover, this feeling that woman was an inferior being was reinforced and sanctioned by the belief in the divine authority of the Scriptures of the Old Testament. The stories of the Fall of Man and of the Angels had indeed the profoundest influence upon later Jewish thought and upon Gentile thought when Judaism came into contact with the Hellenism of the Roman Empire.

Into this Jewish environment came our Lord—Himself and His Gospel. As with the status of the slave, so with the status of the woman, the teaching of our Lord is not directly concerned; but the seed is sown to bear fruit in due time—the doctrine of the infinite value of, and the infinite love of God for, the individual soul. Women as well as men flock to Him, women as well as men are members of that select band that

follow and minister to Him; women accompany Him on the last journey to Jerusalem, women stand near the Cross whence the men had fled, loving women visit the tomb and receive the angelic message. To women and men are shown equal honour, equal pity, equal love; and in the word on marriage and divorce a blow is struck which shook to its foundation the prison in which woman had been confined. Man still leads—in the circumstances of the times, in face of the prejudices of the times it could not but be so—yet he leads no longer as the lord, but as the brother; in essential value the man and the woman are one, with equal rights in the Kingdom of God.

The Gospel passes into the Gentile world of the Roman Empire. Women are among its most enthusiastic recipients. St. Paul's first convert on European soil is a woman; her home is the centre whence the light first spreads in Philippi. Eight women are greeted among the men as prominent members of the community to which *Romans* xvi is addressed. The house of Priscilla, whom St. Paul in his greeting names before her husband, and the house of Nymphas at Colossae, like the house of Mary, the mother of Mark, at Jerusalem, are centres of Christian teaching and work. From the first, so far as the passive privilege of Christian fellowship is concerned, man and woman stand upon equal footing—equal in Baptism, in the Fellowship, in the Breaking of the Bread. In the active privilege of teaching and prophesying, women also shared. St. Luke feels that in the Christian Church Joel's prophecy was fulfilled, 'Upon my servants and upon my hand-maidens will I pour out of my spirit, saith the Lord, and they shall prophesy.' The daughters of Philip were prophetesses; women prophesy and lead in prayer in Corinth. Whether women also took part in the administration of Baptism and the Lord's Supper we cannot tell, for those were days in which the act of the minister was overshadowed by the corporate act of the community. But we know that from the very first the participation of women with men in such public action met with the most strenuous opposition, and that before the conversion of the Empire women were practically silenced in the Churches; though the earnest denunciations of Christian writers show that the desire for equality of privilege in teaching was still alive among women. We know, too, that at the time of Clement and Origen in Alex-

andria, and of Tertullian in Africa women, had a place in the Clerus of the Christian Church which included bishop, priest, deacon and widow, while in the Far West, according to a writer of the eighth century, the Irish Church of the fifth and sixth centuries still allowed women important public rights '*mulierum administrationem et consortia non respuebant.*' In the Breton Church, too, at the beginning of the sixth century women were allowed to administer the Chalice, a practice that gave great scandal to neighbouring bishops. The existence of deaconesses in the Church of Constantinople can be traced up to the twelfth century. Yet, speaking generally for the whole Church, it is correct to say that by the end of the third century women were debarred from all public teaching in the Church and from any participation in the administration of the Sacraments; save that in the Eastern Church women as deaconesses conduct the baptism of women; they give the first anointing but are not allowed to recite the Baptismal Formula. In the fourth century this privilege is curtailed, for the Apostolic Constitutions enjoin that the deacon must anoint the woman's head and that the deaconess must submit not only to the bishop, but also to the deacon. This rudiment of recognized right to public office fades away. The nun in the cloister succeeds to the widow and deaconess of the early days, and it is only in heretical sects that the claim of women to equal privilege finds recognition, to the scandal and horror of the Church, which especially resented the claim that such women continued the succession of the prophetesses of apostolic and post-apostolic days—a resentment which has perhaps caused that in some representatives of the Western text of the *Acts* Aquila precedes Priscilla and Damaris of Athens disappears altogether.

It must be acknowledged that this attitude of the Church towards the ministry of women is only what might have been expected. The Christian convert would come into the Church as a Greek, a Roman or a Jew, and in such questions as the status of a woman or of a slave would tend to feel and think in accordance with the social environment of his time, unless the leaders of the Church had set themselves in strong opposition to the general opinion of society in such questions. Here it is that the attitude of St. Paul proved to be of such profound importance. That tremendous and most sacred personality

dominated, and still dominates, the Church. But the very secret of its power consisted in its combination of the new and the old; and just as we cannot understand St. Paul's theology apart from the feelings and conceptions of his pre-Christian environment, so too we cannot appreciate his attitude towards women apart from the social standards of his time. In this matter he is in heart in touch with the heart of our Lord; in all his epistles his direct references to individual women breath a spirit of chivalrous and affectionate comradeship. They with the men are his fellow-workers in the Gospel. He recognizes, or at all events does not dispute, their right to pray publicly and prophesy under the influence of the spirit, only stipulating that the veil must be worn; he teaches that in Christ there is neither male nor female, bond nor free. And yet his system of thought in this matter is that of his times. There is doubt as to the genuineness of the direction in I *Cor.* xiv, 34, 'Let the women keep silence in the Churches, for it is not permitted to them to speak, *as the Law also saith*'; but such words are in accordance with other utterances concerning the status of women, in which St. Paul does not rise above the current conceptions of his times. His attitude here is that of the Law; the woman must be in subjection to the man in all things. This attitude was crystallized in the post-Pauline Pastoral Epistles (which were certainly accepted as genuine in the second and third centuries) in the injunction of I *Tim.* ii, 11*ff*: 'Let the woman learn in quietness, in all subjection; I permit not a woman to speak, nor even to exercise authority over a man. For Adam was first formed, then Eve; and Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived hath fallen into transgression.' Such words were naturally of decisive authority for the Church; and yet the historian can see in them only the general feeling of the time, reinforced by Jewish religious tradition. The principles of the patriarchal system are confirmed by a divine authority that is assigned to the *patriarchal* stories of the Creation and of the Fall of man.

It is necessary for us to examine more minutely the character of the polemic of the Church against the admission of women to the public ministry. Two writers stand out here—Tertullian of Carthage, of the early third century, and Epiphanius of Cyprus, of the fourth century. Both of them

develop the Pauline teaching that the woman must be in subjection to the man, and therefore must not teach in the assembly, but they also follow a new line of thought which is only implicit in St. Paul, namely, that the woman is by nature incapable of sacerdotal functions, for as such ministerial functions had come to be regarded by the Christians of those times. Tertullian in his treatise, *De Cultu feminarum*, begins by addressing his feminine readers with affectionate respect as his *consorores dilectissimae*, and then proceeds: 'Knowest thou not that thou art Eve?—thou art the gate of the devil. Thou didst break the seal of that famous tree, thou didst beguile him whom the devil had not power to approach; thou with fatal ease didst dash in pieces the image of God. Your wage, that is death, was the cause that the Son of God must die.' This is rhetoric, but it is rhetoric that expresses deep feeling, and had tremendous influence upon the thought of the Church.

Tertullian sympathized with and seceded to the Montanist sect, in which women were prominent as leaders. He accepts the utterances of Montanist prophetesses as divinely inspired, yet it is only with horror that he contemplates a woman holding public office as a teacher. From his own words it is evident that women in his time did claim to teach, but that she should claim to baptise or perform any sacerdotal function is to him something too dreadful to be imagined ('*Petulantia mulieris, quae usurpavit docere, utique non etiam tinquendi jus sibi pariet nisi quae nova bestia evenerit. De Baptismo* 17'). All such functions are *virilia*—masculine by nature.

By the fourth century the question was practically decided against women in the Church as a whole; it was only in heretical sects that women now occupied positions of authority. Epiphanius, when attacking the practices and doctrines of such a sect, writes: 'They who teach this, what are they but women? And women are by nature slippery, unreliable, and poor in understanding. And so the devil thought well to belch this heresy forth from women. Wherefore the Divine Word allows a woman neither to teach nor to have authority over a man.' Again, writing of deaconesses, who were still in existence in his part of the Church, he denies to them the right of exercising any priestly function, for 'from the beginning no woman has ever acted as priest before God.'

But the books of discipline and order, that have come down to us from the early days, are perhaps more valuable for our purpose, seeing that they express the general feeling of the Church rather than the opinions of individual writers.

The *Didascalia of the Apostles*, a book of Church order dating from the third century, written probably in Syria, and a source from which other orders derive, is very emphatic in its opposition to the activity of women. Women must not teach, for one reason among others lest the heathen should despise the doctrine because it is given by a woman. Another reason is that our Lord commissioned no woman to preach or baptise, though many women were numbered among His disciples. This is an argument that we often hear used at the present day.

In the *Apostolic Constitutions*, dating from the fourth century, it is enacted that a woman must not baptise, for if this had been fitting our Lord would have been baptised by His mother, not by St. John the Baptist. That a woman should perform sacerdotal functions is contrary to nature. The priestess is a heathen creation; the heathen have priestesses for their *female* gods. This statement is, of course, not quite correct, but its implication is most important—the Christian feels that the true God is essentially masculine.

In one of the sources of the Apostolic Canons which belongs, perhaps, to the beginning of the third century, the apostles are represented as deliberating whether any public function should be assigned to women. 'John said: "Ye remember, brethren, that, when the Master asked for the bread and the cup and blessed them, saying: 'This is my Body and my Blood, He allowed not these women to stand with us." Martha said: "Because of Mary, for He saw her smiling." Mary said: "Not because I laughed, for He had told us before in His teaching that the weak shall be saved by the strong."' Again: 'It is not proper for a woman to pray standing, but sitting on the ground . . . How can we then, concerning women, order them services unless perhaps that of coming to the help of necessitous women?'

It is most important to notice the artificial character of much of the reasoning in the foregoing extracts. Women must be excluded from the public ministry of the Church, but it is felt that the exclusion requires justification. Reasons are sought

for, but those that are given do not necessarily correspond with the real cause of the feeling which may lie hid in the unconscious. That the real cause of the feeling was not merely an inherited sense that the woman should be in subjection is suggested by the tone of horror and aversion that at times characterises the polemic of the Church, and is confirmed by an old Spanish Canon which commanded a woman to cover her hands when taking the Sacrament, and by a declaration of three French bishops of the fifth or sixth century that women must not be allowed to assist at the altar lest they should pollute the Divine Sacraments.

I suggest that these two ordinances disclose to us the hidden reason that lies behind the belief that women are incapable of performing priestly functions, and that the other reasons given are simply instances of what psychologists call rationalization.

An experience in my childhood in the North of England has left an enduring impression on my mind. It was New Year's Eve, a time of great festival in the North of those days. In each household a feast was prepared to greet the male friend, the 'first foot' as he was called, who would enter after midnight to bring good luck to the house for the New Year. A friend of ours, a fairly well-educated woman of the middle class, had a maid who had been out for the evening and did not return home until after midnight. Our friend would not allow her maid to enter the house and, as the 'first foot' was late in arriving and the night was cold, she at last persuaded her husband to get out of the window and 'first foot' himself; so convinced was she that the maid, if she had been the first to enter after midnight, would have brought ill luck to the house. Our friend would not have been able to give an explanation of her conviction, which was an unconscious inheritance from the dark days of primitive man. I suggest that we have here an instance of an aversion which is parallel to the aversion that is so generally felt against the very idea of the admission of women to the priesthood, and that this too is a survival from the mind of savage and primitive man.

A belief in the malign and harmful influence of women in certain circumstances is indeed widespread among existing

primitive races. Frazer's *Golden Bough* is full of instances of this belief in all parts of the world. Sacred foods must not be eaten by women, sacred places must not be entered by them. We hear of an Arabian tribe in which a man would rather die than eat food given him by a woman. Warriors on the warpath fear to touch even the garments of a woman. In certain tribes of South Africa a woman is not allowed to enter the cattle kraal in fear that her presence would bring injury to the beasts; when she passes from one hut to another she must use a path different from that of the men. Similar fears and customs are found in primitive tribes of Australia and America. The foundation of these taboos is perfectly clear to the anthropologist, namely, the horror and terror with which primitive man and woman regard certain physiological phenomena in the feminine life which they believed to be the work of malevolent spirits. This primitive belief has had a tough life, and has left deep traces in the customs of more civilized times—in the Jewish Law, for instance. A strange passage in Pliny's *Natural History* and a gloss of Proclus on a passage in Heriod[1] testify to its existence in the crudest form in the popular thought of the Roman and the Greek. Plutarch gives us a piece of Greek folk-lore which is very illuminating and most interesting in that a similar story is connected with one of our own cathedrals. At Tanagra there was a shrine of the hero Eunostos that no woman was allowed to enter. Plutarch tells us that people said that this was because the hero had met his death through a woman, but he also tells us that the hero had once appeared to men and was seen walking down to the sea to bathe himself because a woman had entered into the precincts of his shrine. This story itself proves that the real reason of the exclusion was the defiling presence of the woman, and that the popular reason was merely a rationalizing legend.

In Durham Cathedral a stone in the pavement is still to be seen that marked the point beyond which women were not allowed to approach the shrine of St. Cuthbert. A legend similar in its rationalizing tendency was told to explain this custom.

[1] See Wächter, *Reinheitsvorschriften im griechischen Kult*, p. 37, where both these passages are quoted.

It seems to me that feelings such as these lie at the root of the exclusion of women in primitive conditions from active participation in religious functions that are not included in the sphere of divine possession or of the magical rites of agriculture; and that these feelings explain many phenomena of the patriarchal system, such as the incapacity of the woman to perform the rites for the sustenance of the souls of the ancestors. Such feelings excluded the woman from service at the altar of Jehovah with His peculiar masculine qualities; such feelings passed over into Christianity from its Jewish, Greek, and Roman environment so soon as sacerdotal conceptions developed in the Church. A remark of Balsamon, a writer of the twelfth century, clinches my argument. He declares that the deaconesses of St. Sophia, in Constantinople, were not allowed to approach the altar because of the fear of the *inquinatio menstruorum*.

If one is right, the feeling of aversion and repugnance, with which the admission of women to the priesthood is generally regarded, is simply a relic of primitive and barbarous thought which the Church has unconsciously inherited and of which her members have given many incorrect explanations. This conclusion ought to be pressed home, for the feeling is utterly illogical, mischievous and unchristian.

Women are to-day thrown into the full conflict of the battle of life and are faced by problems, difficulties and doubts quite beyond the imagination of former times. Yet even in the early days the Church, somewhat grudgingly but with a deep sense of seemliness, committed women at Baptism into the hands of deaconesses. Similar feelings of seemliness should govern us to-day. The Church should commit her perplexed daughters into the hands of women to whom they would naturally and trustfully open their souls—women entrusted with her full commission for the ministry of reconciliation, women endowed with that authority which the Modern Churchman also believes to lie behind the words said over the priest:

> 'Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God. Whosoever sins thou dost forgive they are forgiven, and whose sins thou dost retain they are retained; and be thou a faithful dispenser of the Word of God and of His Holy Sacraments.'

THE EDUCATION OF THE CHILD

By Edmond G. A. Holmes, M.A., sometime H.M. Chief Inspector of Elementary Schools.

IF I were asked who was the greatest of educational reformers, I would answer without hesitation, Our Lord Jesus Christ. t is true that the seeds of educational reform which Christ owed have not yet fructified and have scarcely begun to ger-inate. But that does not invalidate his claim to be the greatest f the reformers. On the contrary: the slowness of the pro-esses of germination and fructification does but bear witness o the vast potentialities of the buried seeds.

He who is a revolutionary in the world of ideas is bound o be a revolutionary in his attitude towards each of the master roblems of human life. And, as it happens, there is no prob-em so magisterial as that of the upbringing of the child. For n whatever solution we may find for it there is sure to be mplicit, theoretically a complete philosophy of life, practically he future well-being or ill-being of the world.

Had the word *child* never occurred in the Gospels, we might ave guessed, from what Christ said about the fatherhood of God, what would be his general attitude towards the young. But, fortunately for us, there are passages in the Synoptic Gos-els which tell us of Christ's dealings with little children, of vhat He did to them and what He said about them. These pas-ages are familiar to all of us; but they will bear repetition. The opening verses of the eighteenth chapter of Matthew run as ollows: 'At the same time came the disciples unto Jesus, aying Who is the greatest in the Kingdom of heaven? And esus called a little child unto him and set him in the midst of hem. And said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be con-erted and become as little children ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble him-elf as this little child, the same is greatest in the Kingdom of eaven.' In the next chapter we have the story of the children vho were brought to Jesus to be blessed; but this is better told

by Mark: 'And they brought young children to him that h
should touch them: and his disciples rebuked those that brough
them. But when Jesus saw it he was much displeased and sai
unto them, Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbi
them not, for of such is the Kingdom of God. Verily I say unt
you, Whosover shall not receive the Kingdom of God as
little child, he shall not enter therein. And he took them up i
his arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them.'

The whole of Christ's teaching centres in the conception
a new order of things, which He called the Kingdom of Heave
or the Kingdom of God. What did He mean when He told H
disciples that they must receive the Kingdom as little children
His words are open to more than one interpretation. Those wh
regard the Kingdom of God as an outward and visible societ
a human institution founded by Christ and enjoying His speci
guidance and protection, are apt to assume that to receive th
Kingdom as a little child means to submit oneself, lowly an
reverently, to ecclesiastical authority, to believe whatever th
Church tells one to believe, to do whatever the Church tells or
to do. This is the orthodox interpretation of Christ's memo
able saying. The late Father Tyrrell, in one of his letters, hel
it up to well-merited scorn. A man who signed himse
'*Nobody*' had written to the *Church Times*, emphasizing th
orthodox interpretation and bringing it into line with another
Christ's sayings: 'I thank thee, O Father . . . because tho
hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast r
vealed them unto babes.' '*Nobody*,' says Father Tyrrel
'seems to think that to become as a little child means to acce
bad philosophy, science and history, that the error of the wis
and prudent is departing from scholastic realism. I take it th
Christ meant that what "saves" a man and makes him a Christia
is not science and theology and history, but a spirit and a ten
per. The notion that in blessing babes and ignorant perso
He blessed ingorance and error and fallacy, is very convenie
for an uneducated clergy who have reason to fear the criticis
of the educated.'

Whatever Christ may have meant when He told His di
ciples to become as little children, we may take for granted th
He did not mean to glorify blind, unquestioning obedienc

Had this been His meaning, His attitude towards life in general and education in particular would not have materially differed from the legalistic attitude which is of the essence of the Old Dispensation. In other words, the Gospel would have been no advance on the Law.

If we would understand what Christ really meant, and realize how revolutionary was His attitude towards life and education, we must go back to the Old Testament. When I was a child the words, 'Spare the rod and spoil the child,' were familiar to me, and their meaning was brought home to me by methods which made my apprehension of it not 'notional' only, but vividly 'real.' To the best of my recollection all of us, from our parents down to the youngest child, believed that the words came from the book of *Proverbs*. And I must confess that I, for one, persisted in that erroneous belief until some two or three years ago, when I accidentally discovered that they came from *Hudibras*. But there are four passages in the book of *Proverbs* in which the same sentiment is expressed in equivalent terms:

> 'Chasten thy son while yet there is hope, and let not thy soul spare for his crying.' 'Foolishness is bound in the heart of a child, but the rod of correction shall drive it far from him.' 'He that spareth the rod hateth his son; but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes.' Withhold not correction from the child; for if thou beatest him with the rod he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod and shalt deliver his soul from hell.'

And there is a chapter in the deutero-canonical book of *Ecclesiasticus* in which the efficacy of the rod is insisted upon with at least equal vigour, while the parent is further admonished to give his child no liberty, and not to play with him or even laugh with him.

The 'spare the rod and spoil the child' theory of education follows naturally and necessarily from the legalistic conception of life. In the eyes of the strict legalist obedience is the first and last of virtues, and to enforce obedience by whatever methods is the first and last duty of the parent and the teacher. For, be it carefully observed, legalistic writers such as the authors of *Proverbs* and *Ecclesiasticus* do not take for granted that blind, unquestioning obedience comes naturally to the child. On the contrary, they take for granted that children are by

nature stubborn and rebellious, and that they must therefore be coerced into submissiveness and obedience. Here they overshoot the mark; and they make the fatal mistake, even from their own point of view, of ignoring the constraining grace of sympathy and love. But up to a certain point their psychology is sound. There is a strain of healthy rebelliousness in every normal child; and it is well that there should be. For if there were no such strain, the child would be as clay in the hands of his elders; and, from the point of view of his own development, there is a world of difference between the passivity of clay and the activity of self-evolving life. Growth must prepare the way for outgrowth. The ego must assert itself before it can transcend itself. It must try its wings before it can begin its upward flight.

It is true that in virtue of the unwavering trust with which, as we shall see, the young child confronts the world that surrounds him, his first impulse, when he receives a command, is to obey it. But not infrequently a second impulse asserts itself, the impulse to disobey, to go on doing what he is called away from, or to do something different from what he is ordered to do. The plain truth is that the young child is too intent on developing his own powers, and has too much intelligence, curiosity and initiative, to be ready to obey all commands indiscriminately for no other reason than that he has received them.

Now the child whom Christ had in His mind when He told His disciples that they must become as little children was the little child whom He took up in His arms and blessed. That child, we may safely conjecture, had not felt the pressure of any 'spare the rod and spoil the child' type of education. He had not been coerced into meek submissiveness. He had not been drilled into automatism. He was what Nature, what Christ's Father in heaven, had made him. The fact that Christ was able to take him up in His arms shows that he was very little and very young. His tender years must have protected him from the rod and all that the rod symbolized. And as there were no infant schools in Galilee, he had not spent dreary hours in learning to sit still.

It was this little weak, helpless, or seemingly helpless, being, in terms of whom Christ interpreted the Kingdom of God. And

it was this same little being, this undeveloped and unspoiled man, whom Christ interpreted in terms of the Kingdom of God.

How does the little child receive his Kingdom, the Kingdom of this work-a-day world into which he is born? In the first place with faith, in the proper meaning of the word—with complete and unwavering trust; trust in himself, trust in the world which lies around him, trust in his mother, his nurse and the other persons with whom he has to deal, trust in the whole order of things to which he belongs. It is because of the greatness and the completeness of his trust that his first impulse is, as we have seen, to obey, to do what he is told to do, to believe what he is told to believe.

This, I say, is his first impulse. But other impulses will assert themselves. For his trust in himself and his surroundings is active, not passive. He meets the world in which he finds himself with resolute and persistent activity, intent, not on receiving its life with meek passivity into himself, but on making its life his own, by realizing, by bringing to the birth, the life which is latent in himself. For vast potentialities are locked up in him—physical, mental, moral, spiritual. In and through these the universal life has individualized itself in his being; the Kingdom, which is his heritage, has been received, in promise and potency, into the heart of his as yet undeveloped self. To realize these potentialities is the steadfast purpose of his opening life, from the day of his birth to the day when the shades of the prison-house begin to close in upon him. Except when he is asleep the little child is never still. And in all his activities his one aim, an aim from which he never falters, is his own development. He is ever exercising his limbs, his muscles, his nerves, his senses, his reason, his imagination, his will. His achievements are marvellous. In the first two years of his life he masters the use of his eyes, his hands, his legs, his larynx; he learns to see, to handle, to walk, to talk. He masters a language, an achievement which he will find it difficult to repeat in later years. Then his higher faculties begin to awake—reason, imagination, judgment, curiosity, the desire to know, the desire to understand, the desire to construct, the personal affections, the social instincts. And in all this opening life, with its spontaneous activity, its patient persistence, its

unswerving purpose, he is receiving his Kingdom, receiving what has always belonged to him, but what it is his mission in life to realize and make his own.

As the little child receives the Kingdom of his ever-widening world, so are we to receive the Kingdom of God. We are to receive it, not from without but from within, not as one receives water from a reservoir through a series of pipes and taps, not through the channel of any organized institution, but as an indwelling life which is and has always been ours—ours in promise and potency—but which it is for each of us to make his own. And we are to receive it with the trustful faith of the little child, a faith which is active and aggressive, not passive and receptive; a faith in God and His Kingdom which is so complete that it must needs express itself as faith in our own selves as sons of God and inheritors of His Kingdom—the larger and the lesser faith being, in the last resort, not two faiths but one. For what is the Kingdom of God? Is it not an order of things in which the Will of God is habitually done? The second clause in our Lord's prayer—'Thy Kingdom come'—finds its interpretation in the third—'Thy will be done, in earth as it is in heaven.' But nowhere, for us men, is the Will of God so truly revealed as in the real but as yet unrealized tendencies of human nature; and he who would do the Will of God as the angels do it must try to realize those tendencies, to bring them to maturity, to unfold their infinite possibilities. It follows that the life of him who receives the Kingdom of God in the right spirit, the spirit of a little child, will be, like the life of the little child, a life of self-realization, in the larger and deeper sense of the word self—a life of self-finding through self-losing, a life of rising towards the level of the Divine source of one's being, of growing to the stature of the true-born child of God.

Let us go back to the little child, on whose opening life we who would enter the Kingdom of God are to model our own. How long will his life of self-realization last? How long will he continue to face the demands and the problems of life in the spirit of trustful faith and courageous adventure, which enables the expansion of his being to keep pace with the expansion of his world? That, in the transition from childhood to adult life,

there was an irreparable loss in the days of Christ's sojourn on earth, is proved by the fact that Christ, who said of the little children that were brought to Him, 'Of such is the Kingdom of God,' told His adult disciples that, if they would enter the Kingdom of God, they must, as it were, be born again. Had the adolescence of the disciples been in keeping with their childhood, there would have been no need for their re-birth. For, as little children, they were *in* the Kingdom. What was it that banished them from it, banished them so effectually that they could not re-enter it except through the gateway of another birth and another childhood?

What could it have been but their upbringing? As it is to-day, so it must have been then. There must have been some fatal defect in the upbringing of the child which made him forfeit his birthright before he had consciously claimed it. What that defect was we can guess from what we read in *Proverbs* and *Ecclesiasticus*. Precepts which, after the lapse of more than 2,000 years, are still regarded as authoritative, must have completely dominated the educational aims and ideals of the age in which they were uttered and the people to whom they were addressed. The wet mist of disapproval and distrust which too often envelops the child of to-day must have been even more impervious in those days to the vitalizing beams of the sunshine of love.

In the upbringing of a child there are two chief factors—the direct influence of the training which he receives from his parents and teachers, and the indirect influence of his environment. As the theme of my paper is education, I must confine my attention to the former. In his pre-education days the child belongs, as we have seen, to both the Kingdoms, the Kingdom of the world and the Kingdom of God. For it is a mistake to suppose that the two Kingdoms are separated by an impassable abyss. In the real order of things the Kingdom of God is at the very heart of the Kingdom of the world, being indeed the life of its life and the soul of its soul. It is only when the Kingdom of the world claims to be an end in itself that it forfeits the indwelling presence of the Kingdom of God. The fact that the little child belongs to both Kingdoms proves to demonstration that they have a common centre. Also, it is in virtue of the very

qualities with which he faces the Kingdom of the world, that he belongs to the Kingdom of God—in virtue of the trustful faith in the world which is the outcome and reflexion of his faith in himself, and in virtue of the resolute energy with which he works at his own development. If his faith and his energy should fail him, his spiritual growth would be arrested, he would be imprisoned in the worldliness—the self-sufficiency—of the world, and would therefore become an outcast from the Kingdom of God.

Now what education of the conventional type does to the growing child is to extinguish, or at least to damp down to the verge of extinction, his energy and his faith. For education of the conventional type is on principle dogmatic, dictatorial and disciplinary, in the drill-sergeant sense of the last of these words. On principle it exacts mechanical obedience, represses spontaneous activity, ignores individuality, rebuffs curiosity, starves initiative. On principle it takes away from the child the direction of his own opening life through the free exercise of his budding powers, requiring him, as it does, to deliver himself, body and soul, into the hands of his elders, to believe what these tell him to believe, to think what they tell him to think, to feel what they tell him to feel. It thus weakens, if it does not actually kill, his faith in himself, partly because it is itself based on suspicion and distrust, partly because its repression of his spontaneous activities must needs react on the source from which these derive, partly—and above all—because it adds to all other paralyzing influences the most paralyzing of all influences—that of fear.

It is under the pressure of this, the orthodox, type of education, that the child, cut off from the free, active, spontaneous, self-evolving life of his true self, enters the prison-house of his false self and of the unreal world in which that self is central and loses touch with the Kingdom of God. And it is through the same pressure that each generation in turn, having itself lost touch with the Kingdom of God, stamps itself, with all its defects and limitations, with its fatal confusion between the superficial and the real, between the conventional and the ideal, on the rising generation, on the mind and heart of the child.

I said in the first sentence of this address that I regarded

Christ as the greatest of all educational reformers. The change from the pædagogy of the law to the pædagogy of the Gospel, from the pædagogy of the rod to the pædagogy of the Kingdom, was nothing less than a revolution. But the revolution has yet to be accomplished. I have said nothing as to Christ's own work as a practical teacher. That is a theme on which there is so much to be said that I must content myself with pointing out that in this, as in other matters, Christ practised what He preached. He gave us no system of pædagogy, no formal directions for the training of the child; for He would have been false to His own first principles had He done for us what we ought to try to do for ourselves. What He did for us as educators was to give us an ideal and a central aim. If in his pre-education days the child is in the Kingdom of God, can those who educate him do less than help him to remain in it? But if he is to remain in it he must unfold his essential nature, he must become what he has it in him to be. Through His discernment of the essential nature of the child Christ was able to assign to education the task which it has hitherto neglected, but which, if it is ever to fulfil its destiny, it must take in hand and strive, at whatever cost, to accomplish. He was great as a reformer, supremely great, because, when he took little children up in His arms and blessed them and invested them with the freedom of God's Kingdom, He told us by implication that our attitude towards the child must be one, not of dogmatic direction and disciplinary coercion and repression, but of sympathy and understanding and trust; that we must help the child to preserve his inalienable birthright; help him to go on doing what from his earliest days he has tried to do; help him to walk in the path of self-development, an upward path which leads at last to self-transcendence through self-loss; help him to find his true self by unfolding his limitless powers and possibilities, including his capacity for disinterested devotion, for unselfish love; help him, in fine, to become what he really is, but what Christ was the first to proclaim him to be—a child of Grace, a citizen of the Kingdom of God. Until education takes up this task in the spirit in which Christ set it, we shall repeat to no purpose the too familiar words, 'Thy kingdom come.'

THE AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENT OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

By Dr. Ernest Barker, Principal of King's College, London.

I SHALL assume that there are three absolute Values, which are the ends and purposes of the education of the child, as they are the ends and purposes of all human existence. They are Goodness, Truth and Beauty. Education is intended to give a knowledge of what these are, and not only to give a knowledge of them, but also to instil a sentiment for them which will affect the will, and issue in an effort to grasp and attain. There is attached to the code of regulations for public elementary schools a preliminary statement, which we may call an educational creed, though it is actually called an introduction. 'The purpose of the school,' it is written in the opening words of this creed, 'is to form and strengthen the character, and to develop the intelligence, of the children.' Here two of the three Values are set down, or rather we may say that they are set up as ends and ideals. The one is Goodness, which comes of a formed and strengthened character; the other is Truth, which is revealed to the eyes of developed intelligence. May we not add the third Value, and say that the purpose of the school is also 'to awaken and form the taste,' and to develop the appreciation of Beauty? We are really entitled to say this, for music, drawing and craftsmanship are actually taught in most of our schools. If we make this addition, we shall be clear about the three objects of the education of the child, and we can ask how far each of those objects is achieved in the results which we actually attain.

The formation and strengthening of character. The age of childhood is the age of the formation of moral habits—habits inculcated by an authority, external to the child, which has prestige and power; habits which, when moral self-consciousness is attained, may be freely adopted and continued because they are seen to be good, or at any rate may be continued because they have become part of the fibre of being. The moral influence of the school may be exerted upon the child in three ways—by specific instruction: through the influences implicit in the organization and discipline of the school; and through games.

Specific instruction can be given partly in the form of reli-

gious instruction, and partly in connection with the teaching of subjects such as history. It is a great thing that in England religious instruction is given, in some form or other, in all our elementary schools. The form of the instruction matters much less than the fact that there is some instruction; and we shall do well to concentrate on the fact, and to make it even more of a fact by providing for the proper training of teachers in the methods and spirit of religious instruction. We have at any rate achieved one result in England which the United States has prevented itself from achieving, in all its provided schools, by the adoption of the doctrine that the State has no concern with the teaching of religion. The Bible is in our schools, and the lessons of morality come to our children with the consecration of the Bible. The Bible is still a familiar book among us, much more familiar, so far as my experience goes, than it is in the United States. As for history, it is a record of the moral experience of man; of the noble acts of men and states, and also of their ignoble acts; and it is possible, without any Pharisaism, to give a training in moral judgment as one goes through that record with the child. In the same way the teaching of civics makes possible the inculcation of lessons in civic duty. But history matters more than civics. The State is an abstraction to the child. King Alfred is a reality.

The organization and discipline of the school achieve, and have achieved, remarkable results. It is here that elementary teachers are most wonderful; and elementary schools add an element of discipline to the individualistic life of our country, which gives it a necessary savour. The school, first of all, seeks to lay a foundation of physical health and cleanliness; and by its medical and dental care it does, to the best of its ability, ensure that *corpus sanum* which is an ally, if not a condition, of moral sanity. Next, it teaches manners; and just as we say that cleanliness is next to godliness, so also we may say that manners makyth man. The school means punctuality—no small virtue; it means respect for the teacher, and the ordering of oneself lowly and reverently in one's place in the class; it means proper behaviour in the playground. And finally, there are the games—the organized games of cricket and football—into which masters throw themselves vigorously, and in which they guide and train their boys. Schools now play against

schools; an *esprit de corps* is developed; and though this athletic development has another side, and though it perhaps encourages one of our national defects, it has its value in fostering that spirit of the game, and that rigour and honour of clean play, which is one of the bases of character.

A consideration arises here, which I mention with some diffidence. It is possible that the school has become a rival to the family, and that, in some respects, it is adverse to the life of the family. It is better organized: it has a stronger discipline: and its *esprit de corps* may be more powerful than filial piety. The reply of school teachers to such a suggestion is that the family is lax; is ready to abnegate the care of the child; and does not, in any case, do what, in defence of the child, they are compelled to do themselves. Yet it must be confessed that there is ground for thinking that parental responsibility has been impaired by the development of the school in the last twenty years. A useful correction, which many schools are beginning to apply, is the invitation of parents to visit the school, to watch its work, and collaborate in its efforts. The more the school and the family can be made partners, the better for both.

On the whole, I should conclude that it is on the moral side, in its forming and strengthening of the character, that our English elementary schools do their best work. This is just what one would expect in our country, with its strong practical bias. Exactly the same feature characterizes, and has long characterized, our great public schools.

The development of intelligence. The intellectual results we achieve are perhaps not so high, but they are by no means discreditable. The schools at one time might perhaps have been described—with an exaggeration that had yet some little basis—as manufactories of clerks, working on mechanical methods of mass-production. Such a description would now be very far from the truth. Classes are still too large; but that is not the fault of the teacher. The teaching itself is often admirable. It is adjusted to environment: in the rural schools you will generally find nature-study, outdoor lessons, and a general attempt to awaken intelligence by directing it to the realities that lie at hand. The hand and eye are trained along with the mind: mathematics is made more real, and a more effective instrument of education, by association with woodwork and car

pentry. History and geography are taught with reference to the locality, and become a delight both to teacher and taught. A Lincolnshire woman teacher sent me the other day a number of exercise books done by her girls, at the age of about thirteen. One was a book of notes on the history of Gainsborough, compiled by the girls themselves, partly from lessons, and partly from reading in the school library. The notes began with the ancient Britons: they were illustrated by photographs and cuttings, maps and plans of churches, coats of arms and figures of coins. Another was a book of pressed flowers and leaves, 'gathered around us.' A third was a book of original drawings; but that belongs to another heading. Another was a book of practical arithmetic, which seemed to me to be vivid as well as practical. Altogether, I detect among teachers a spirit of inventiveness and of exploration of fresh methods of instruction. Our English system, which allows each school to try its experiments, is producing its results. For us, at any rate, it is better than the French system of uniform regulation of schools by the central authority in Paris.

It is difficult to measure the results of the work of the schools upon the intelligence of the children. Employers sometimes grumble that the boys and girls whom they take into their employment cannot do a sum properly or write English accurately. But there is really no doubt that the work of offices and of factories is better done now than it was fifty years ago, and the schools must take the credit for the improvement. We were told during the war that our elementary schools had given us an army worthy of a generous admiration. I would not measure the results of education altogether in military terms; but we need not dismiss the testimony of the soldier. Still, the real criterion of the results of education is not the rule of thumb measurement of the practical man. It is rather this—whether the spirit of curiosity has been awakened; whether the children when they become men continue to study, or wish to continue to study; whether they use their leisure time for the things of the mind. To that matter I will recur later. For the moment, I would say that I want to see more of these fruits, which I count as the really valuable results; but I am not altogether unhappy even now. I have met too many working men who love knowledge to be very unhappy.

At the same time I must confess that the general diffusion of education, and especially of the ability to read, has produced one result which is disquieting. We have now an enormous reading public. Sir George Newnes, Lord Northcliffe and others discovered its existence many years ago, and resolved to provide it with reading. They were successful in every sense—except in the quality of the reading which they provided. There is no great harm in the innumerable story magazines and weekly budgets, of the style of the *Strand Magazine* and *Answers*; but there is also no particular gain. I am inclined to think that there *is* harm in some of the daily papers and in some of the Sunday papers. But I would not judge the results of education, or the degree of intelligence which it has developed, by the reading which enterprising business men provide for the public. I think they under-value the mind of the public. I think it deserves something better than it gets. We do not really deserve all these snippets of sensation or these innumerable stories about the rough running of the course of true love.

The awakening and forming of taste. It is in the forming of a better public taste that we may one day find the corrective for some of the results—or rather bye-products, for they are not really results—which we have just mentioned and deprecated. Little has been done in the schools hitherto in this respect. Drawing and singing are part of the curriculum; but the teaching of drawing, at any rate, is a difficult matter, and it has not gone very far. The neglect of the aesthetic side of education is general in England, at Universities and in secondary as well as in elementary schools. Yet attention to this side is very necessary; for we are not naturally a people of good taste, and we tolerate ugly buildings, vulgar songs and mean surroundings with a great complacency. I observe that the official syllabus for elementary schools tucks away 'the appreciation of beauty in nature and art' under the head of moral instruction immediately after 'self-denial' and 'love of one's country,' and puts it at the end of the list of objects at which such instruction should aim. None the less many schools—I believe girls' schools more especially—are awakening to the fact that Beauty has an absolute value in and for itself. I mentioned before a book of original drawings which I had received. They were done by little girls of eight. They had been encouraged simply

to let their imaginations play; to take their crayons (they naturally love colour) and to make something that they thought beautiful. I can say that they made things which delighted me. Childhood has a creative play of imagination. If it is allowed to play in the creation of beauty, it will not readily forget its own creations. But I cannot here speak of results: I can only speak of hopes and promising signs. And the signs are promising. I have seen many drawings done in elementary schools—some especially from Durham—which have shown me that admirable results have already been obtained.

I desire, in conclusion, to return to a matter which I mentioned before. What is the real criterion of the results of education, more especially as regards the development of the intelligence? Is it that it makes men more useful and successful in doing their given work? or is it that it makes them lovers of knowledge—true knowledge, the knowledge which brings wisdom—so that they continue to learn all their days? I take it that it is both, but especially the latter. And this leads me to a further remark, which I confess that I am only too fond of repeating on every occasion. Education is not only a preparation for work; it is also, perhaps even more, a preparation for leisure. It is not only meant, as the introduction to the Board's Code of Regulations states, 'to assist both girls and boys . . . to fit themselves, practically as well as intellectually, for the work of life'; it is also meant to assist them to fit themselves, aesthetically as well as intellectually, for the right use of life's leisure. We may accordingly measure the results of a system of education of boys and girls not only by the efficiency of the work which they afterwards do as men and women, but also by the quality of the uses to which they afterwards put their leisure. In a society which, like ours, is predominantly occupied in mechanical industry, this is a very important matter. Mechanical industry gives occupation and subsistence; but it does not give any full employment of general faculty, or stimulate to any great extent the process of mental growth. Leisure is therefore needed; not leisure in itself, as a form of quiescence or rest, but leisure for the sake of something above itself, something which we may call the cultivation of the mind. We should become mere machines in a system of mechanical industry unless we had leisure given us, and unless we used that leisure,

having been trained in its use, for the sake of the things of the spirit.

The use which we now make of our leisure is not what it ought to be. To play, or more often to watch, games; to attend places of entertainment in which not the drama, the opera, the concert, but the revue, the variety entertainment, the film, are the staple; to do some promiscuous reading in the fields of fiction—this is too often all. We are inferior as a people to the French, the Italians, the Germans, and far inferior to the ancient Athenians, in the quality of the uses to which we put our leisure. We have no good theatre and little good opera; and though we have a taste for music, we do not give it any great chance of development. This jejune and negative result is partly the fault of the education we give, but it is much more, if we may use the phrase, the fault of the education we do not give. The education we give has been directed too much towards knowledge of facts, and too little towards appreciation of beauties. Something is now being done, as we have seen, on the aesthetic side of education—the side of drawing and singing and music and dancing—but I believe that more might be done, and should be done, because, if it were done, it would give such a precious possession and such an opportunity of joy and growth in later years. But it is the education which we do not give that is really at fault. A child can learn the lessons of the elementary school by the age of twelve. He needs four years after that—four years spent in a post-elementary school, growing, learning, acquiring tastes and appetites for higher things. That is an education which we must one day give. Beyond that there is adult education; but of that I cannot speak here. And beyond that again, or rather besides that, there is another thing. Public libraries are good things; but they are not all. Public theatres, public opera-houses—these are also good things; and these, like schools and libraries, are places for the habitation and growth of true mind. There is more for the community to do than it has yet done. When it has done more, we may have a nation purged of the rawness which is still upon us—the rawness of an industrialized society which has not yet learned to correct the evils of industrialism; the rawness of a Northern stock, with rude energy and rude delights, which has not yet entered fully into the higher pleasures of the mind.

GOD AS KING AND FATHER

By the Rev. Oliver Quick, M.A., Canon of Carlisle.

As Mr. Emmet so strikingly reminded us, our Lord never spoke of God by any other title than that of Father. Of all the names for the Godhead which Jewish devotion had provided he used that one name only. The word Father must have seemed to our Lord to sum up and express better than any other the full and fundamental reality of the Divine Nature. And the leading suggestion of fatherhood to Jewish ears must unquestionably have been kindliness and love. To the Roman mind, no doubt, fatherhood was associated with the idea of an authority stern and even tyrannical. In old Roman law the *patria potestas* was a power of life and death, which carried with it but little of what we understand by family affection. But the Jews have always been distinguished among the parents of the world as affectionate to the point of indulgence. To them the relation of father to son has always been normally a relation of intimate kindliness and fellowship. Such a relation of family affection was undoubtedly connoted by the promise, 'I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son.' And our Lord was purposely making theological use of the natural feelings of the Jewish family when He said, 'If ye then being evil know how to give good gifts to your chlidren, how much more shall your Heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him?' If He spoke of God exclusively by the name of Father, He must have intended to convey in more concrete form substantially the same truth as that which St. John expressed in those three tremendous words, God is love.

And yet, true as it is that our Lord always spoke of God as Father, it is no less true that he always expressed God's purpose towards the world as the establishment of a kingdom, the victorious consummation of a kingly rule. There was no element of easy indulgence, no possible suggestion of weak acquiescence or failure to vindicate authority in our Lord's conception of the divine fatherhood. He never spoke of God

as King, but always of God as Father; yet He never spoke of God's family, nor even of God's fellowship with men, but always and constantly of God's Kingdom. 'Our Father,' He taught His disciples to pray, 'Thy Kingdom come.' The heavenly Father is Father indeed, but He is to reign as King. And if it be true that the Jewish conception of fatherhood was one of kindliness and familiar intimacy, it is equally true that the Jewish conception of kingly rule was one of forceful and coercive authority. Fatherhood and kingly rule, love and irresistible sovereignty, those are the two great ideas which our Lord associated with Godhead. How are they to be reconciled with one another? This is the central problem of theology. Our Lord's teaching provides no explicit solution, nor has human wisdom yet found a solution which is finally satisfactory. Yet there is always for Christian theology progress in the present and hope for the future, so long as it perceives clearly that this is the true problem with which it has to grapple, and that to sacrifice either the divine fatherhood or the divine rule is to throw away the very substance of the Christian revelation itself.

For practical purposes the antithesis has very commonly been reconciled by regarding the range or area of God's kingly rule as wider and more extensive than that of His fatherhood. In other words, God has been thought of as the King of all men and the Father of some. This implicit principle has been given various applications by Catholic, Protestant and mystical theology. Catholic tradition has certainly taught that only those persons who have been received into the Church by baptism can properly be regarded as children of God. God created and rules over all, and wills to make all men His children through incorporation into His Church. But the unbaptized are not yet His children; they are under the sway of His regal authority but are definitely not yet within the circle of His fatherly love. The historical identification of the Church with God's Kingdom has not in practice been found to conflict with this distinction. For the Kingdom of God, in the sense in which it has been identified with the Church, has never been thought to be co-extensive with God's kingly rule. That rule in the strictly kingly sense is universal; the Kingdom, in the narrower con-

ception, denotes the special relation of God's rule to His chosen people, and its meaning would perhaps be more intelligibly expressed to modern ears by the word family. In the traditional theology of Catholicism this distinction of status between subjects and children of God corresponds to a distinction between two degrees of divine self-revelation. Natural religion shows God as universal King decreeing a moral law of universal authority; revealed religion shows God as the Father bestowing all the privileges of the family upon those who accept His gospel in Jesus Christ.

Protestant theology has of course been far less completely systematized. But it too not infrequently suggests that the true fatherhood of God is confined to a certain circle of converted persons, whereas His rule is over all; and at times it has gone much further than Catholic orthodoxy in maintaining that His rule spells not even moral justice so much as eternal wrath for all those who are outside the family of the converted.

Now, however rightly Christians must be concerned to maintain that the Christian fellowship is meant to be indeed in a very special sense the family-circle of God's children, yet it must be confessed that this whole attempt to distinguish between the spheres of divine rule and fatherhood as between wider and narrower circles is at least dangerous, if not necessarily misleading. It suggests inevitably that the power and authority of God in their widest and most general relation to human souls are something other than and different from the power and authority of fatherly love itself. This suggestion seems not only from a Christian point of view unsatisfactory, but even metaphysically considered to raise more problems than it solves. We cannot imagine that the world as a whole is governed by the caprice of some heavenly tyrant. On the other hand, to suppose that the throne is occupied by a merely and strictly righteous ruler raises difficulties of theodicy so notorious that I need not even mention them before such an audience as this. It may be that the thought of Almighty God as wholly and purely love, love universally active and infinitely enduring, ineffably patient because utterly strong, present in all things yet in all things undefiled, may in the end unravel the perplexities which at first it seems to complicate. The very

paradox may be the door by which the mysteries of the cosmic reason are concealed, but through which they must be approached.

Let us, however, go back to the Gospels in order to ask whether any doctrine which restricts the fatherly love of God within narrower limits than His kingly rule can adequately represent our Lord's mind. It is commonly assumed by those whose intellectual presuppositions naturally tend in that direction, that the universal fatherhood of God and brotherhood of men are ideas which occupy a central place in our Lord's teaching. Eschatological critics, on the other hand, have made it clear that this is not quite self-evident. And those who have made the assumption without question often find themselves in difficulties when they are called upon under cross-examination to state the evidence precisely. Nevertheless in such cases inferences which may be drawn from the general tone and tenor of a teacher's language are often more convincing testimony as to his real mind than the most explicit and articulate assertion. And it is at least remarkable that in the only passages in which the promise is explicitly made, 'Ye shall be sons of your Father which is in heaven' or 'sons of the Most High,' the condition, given in different language by Matthew and Luke, is definitely made to consist in a certain attitude and behaviour of love towards those who have no apparent claim to be sons of God at all. Christ's disciples are expressly told that they will show their family-likeness to their Heavenly Father most clearly by showing an invincible kindliness to those who appear to deserve it least. The suggestion clearly is that the special and full sonship enjoyed by the saint itself consists in the realization that God is the loving Father of sinners also, and that His behaviour in point of love is the same to all.

If this be so, it must be contrary to our Lord's mind to affirm that members of the Church or converted people possess any essentially superior status as children of God to that possessed by other men. The Christian Church is a community distinct from the world, not in the sense in which children of God might be said to be distinct from His subjects, but only in the sense in which children at home may be said to be in a position different from that of those who have wandered away.

This very elementary truth of evangelicalism throws a fresh light on our Lord's conception of the divine fatherhood, a light which Catholic and Protestant orthodoxies have not seldom tended to obscure. Contrast our Lord's image of God as Father with Hosea's image of God as Husband of His people. The relation of father to children differs from that of husband to wife in two respects. The first is a natural relation, the second a contractual. Again, the first is a relation of one person towards an indefinite plurality of persons, which relation implies a further relation between the persons who make up that plurality. The second is an absolutely exclusive relation of one person towards one other. In both these differences we see an essential reason for our Lord's use of the term Father. (1) He was implicitly setting aside the idea of God's relation to His people as one of mere covenant or contract. Its proper analogue is rather the natural relation which it is inherently impossible to break or destroy. And that indestructibility of spiritual sonship is based upon the fact that its origin is not a mere contract between God and certain souls which thereby enter on a new relation to Him, but is rather to be found ultimately in an inherent relation between God and human souls as such. There is undoubtedly a 'new birth' for those who realize in a new way their sonship towards God through the Gospel; but this new sonship consists essentially in the realization of the fact that God behaves in fatherly love towards all: and apart from this fact the new birth would be impossible. (2) Again, by speaking of God as Father, not Husband, our Lord purposely selects a relation which is inclusive, not exclusive. The Father has many children, and their brotherly relation to one another is implied by the fact that the father is father of all. Thus it becomes true in principle to speak of a universal brotherhood of men, which cannot be restricted even to those who repent and believe the gospel. For in proportion as the fatherhood of God is not created by contract but is inherent from the beginning, it appears also that it is in principle universally inclusive. Those who accept the gospel of repentance and new birth realize something which they and all men from the beginning have been. The family-fellowship of Christians realizes a relation in which God stands to all men, and has always stood.

We conclude therefore that to interpret God's fatherly love as narrower in range than His kingly rule conflicts in the end not only with the principles of Christian metaphysic, but with the main intention of our Lord's doctrine concerning God; and for that reason it is highly dangerous, if not actually false, to allege any actual difference of status in the relation to God of various human souls. We can only appeal to men to change their behaviour towards God on the ground of a status towards Him which they already possess.

All this has been clearly enough stated by the liberal theology of the last century (notably, of course, by F. D. Maurice), whether or not its criticism of older orthodoxies has been unfair. But at first sight to insist upon the universal range of God's fatherly love only darkens still further the mystery of His kingly power. The difficulty is so familiar that I need only allude to it, and it has in effect led many of our most characteristically modern thinkers to abandon the idea of God's universally-ruling authority altogether. Instead of the firm assurance of the faith that nothing can finally withstand the will of God we are constantly offered, in various forms, the more or less uncertain hopes of the type of philosophy which William James expressively called *meliorism*. God is indeed the loving Father of men, but He is having a hard struggle for the future good of His family. If we do our best to help, there is a good chance of a successful issue. It takes of course a very courageous or else a very ill-informed thinker to exalt meliorism into a metaphysic, as has been done in different ways by James, Bergson, H. G. Wells, Bernard Shaw and others. But its influence, in forms not so fully thought out, is very subtle and pervasive. The idea of going to God's help is one which appeals both to the Pelagianism and to the sentimentality of the Anglo-Saxon mind; and which is therefore often emphasized in the most orthodox of pulpits.[1] Nevertheless, psychology and history are combining to warn us how ineffective in the end that appeal is likely to be. It may be a paradox in logic, but it is undeniably true in experience that man's best and most sustained efforts are called out not by mere hope, but by faith; not by chance

[1] I do not mean to suggest that this method of appeal is always wrong, but that it is commonly overdone.

of success, but by assurance of victory. From the psychological point of view, assurance of faith can alone save us from the operation of the law of reversed effort—a real phenomenon whatever name be given it. History reminds us that those who have been most effective in working change are men who pre-eminently have believed in destiny. All real revolutionaries tend to be determinists. Moreover, reason itself recoils inevitably from regarding the inmost nature and ultimate reality of the universe as strictly indeterminate, a truth to which Mr. Wells' Veiled Being is an eloquent, though rather inarticulate, witness.

Melioristic determinism, and the circle of theological ideas associated with it, are really as unsound a basis for Christian philosophy as Calvinism itself. And it needs no demonstration that it is absolutely without support in the New Testament. Nothing really could be more emphatic and explicit than the language in which our Lord and His apostles confirm Jewish belief in the absolute control of God.

What then remains? Apparently we are left with two possible alternatives.

(1) One is the Platonism which in its Christian form has been so impressively expounded by the Dean of St. Paul's. This philosophy regards this world of time and space as inherently incapable of fully expressing either God's fatherhood or His sovereignty. But the conclusion to be drawn from this defect, according to Platonism, is not that God's Fatherhood and sovereignty are strictly limited, but rather that this world of time and space is really a sort of dream-world, which can be only a very imperfect and partial expression of the real world of eternity. The practical objection to this view was implicitly stated by Prof. Gardner yesterday, when he told us that the duty of Christians is to fashion this world as nearly as possible after the eternal pattern which is also reality. The difficulty is that this philosophy provides no rational ground for that hope of achievement, without which the fulfilment of its precepts cannot even be seriously or systematically attempted. If this world is going from bad to worse, and is likely in any case to continue doing so, is it worth while to make enormous efforts and sacrifices to prevent it? If it be contended that this world

is in any case largely a dream and its fate not of supreme importance—which contention is the only plea by which the Platonist can justify his faith in God—the answer to the question just asked is clearly No. Neither Plato nor Dean Inge has yet succeeded in inspiring in others an effective enthusiasm for eugenics, because their own enthusiasm for it seems to be but a mask for their despair of this world. And, to press our point further, why, if the eternal world of ideas is not merely a pattern but already existent as a fully and finally satisfactory reality, should this dream-world of misery and sin ever have come into being? To suppose the final failure of this world is really to convict of irrationality and imperfection the eternal world which must on this view be its source.

(2) There is, however, another alternative conceivable. We might begin by revising radically our conception not of the quantity, as it were, but of the quality of God's power. The great mistake of the attempt to make God's kingly rule wider in range than His fatherly love lies, as we saw, in the suggestion that His power is something other than and different from the operation of His love itself. It seems that both the melioristic philosophy and the Platonism of the moderns, in rejecting this older view, have really implicitly assumed its distinction between love and power. In other words, they mean by power in the last resort the power of force or compulsion, qualified no doubt by righteousness, but still inherently coercive. Thinking then of God's power as of this quality, they have been driven by the facts to conclude that either it must be very strictly limited in quantity, or else that this world is largely an illusion.

There is another line of thought possible which has not even yet been sufficiently explored by theologians. Suppose we take our Lord's constant reference to God as Father and to God's rule as Kingly to mean that the rule, universal and almighty, is yet entirely and wholly qualified and determined by the fatherly love which is its source. Have we here the conception of a power different in kind from that of force or even autocracy, a power which because it works in a different manner may be vindicating its supremacy just in those very circumstances and events which would spell defeat for any power of the coercive type? How far is it possible or justifiable for us

to dissociate our conception of the divine almightiness from that of autocratic rule, and to re-associate it intact with that of the fatherly love displayed in the infinite patience and self-sacrifice which bring good out of evil and victory from failure? How far was such a re-organization of the religious sentiment the ultimate purpose of our Lord's teaching? That this was His purpose I imagine to be the main conclusion of Miss Dougall's and Mr. Emmet's book, *The Lord of Thought.*

These are profoundly difficult and searching questions, and assuredly they cannot be met within the scope of any conference-paper such as this. All I can hope to do is once more to direct attention to the problem. May we say quite deliberately that the almightiness of God is displayed and vindicated supremely in the self-sacrifice which, as far as we can judge, is dependent upon defeat and failure for the peculiar quality and range of its triumph? Are the beneficent and life-giving elements of nature, which are so impartially distributed by the Creator's will, nevertheless limited and even in part vitiated by a real force of evil, so that ultimately in and through death and failure on the natural plane the full glory of eternal life may be realized and fulfilled? Are we to take our Lord's Cross and Resurrection quite seriously, not as any kind of thaumaturgical display, but as facts which reveal once for all how God's power can and does normally save to the uttermost? Is the whole place of time-process within eternity to be explained by the inherent relation of sacrifice to eternal life? Eternal life transcends time, yet its very glory is derived from the self-sacrifice which requires temporal limitations and even failures for its fulfilment. The philosophies, Platonic and oriental, which have no use for time, are just those which have never appreciated the full value of self-sacrificing service. Is that very value, which our hearts acknowledge, the manifestation of an almighty power which has made this world such as to create it?

Here, if we give the discussion a metaphysical turn, we shall soon find ourselves brought up against the difficult problem of the relation of value to power. How can that which is felt as supremely valuable be other than supremely important and therefore supremely determinative of all else? And if we really acknowledge the sovereign *value* of love even in defeat,

how far does that ultimately drive us to acknowledge a further sovereignty of love in all things? There seems to be a possibility here of a valid form of ontological proof.

But this is no place for further metaphysical subtleties. I will conclude simply by recording a suspicion, which amounts almost to a conviction, that the only true reconciliation of the fatherhood with the kingly rule of God lies in carefully considering the characteristic quality of the operations proper to love.[2]

Is this the key to the riddle of the universe, that love only achieves the highest fulfilment of its purposes by first revealing the unconquerable majesty of redemptive suffering to death, in a world vitiated by evil, and yet even in its own proper character made out of love and able for that reason to reflect or to foreshadow that perfection of the world beyond, to which by the ordinance of love even its own struggles and failures are made to contribute? Is it true that God's fatherly love will by its own might be found to have established His eternal Kingdom, when all the hopes and struggles of time have been fulfilled, and all its sins and horrors redeemed, through sacrifice? 'Who is this that cometh with dyed garments from Bozrah? I that speak in righteousness, mighty to save.'

[2] We must, of course, be quite clear that by the term love, when used in this connection even of men, we denote what the psychologists call a sentiment rather than an emotion. The emotion, says MacDougall, is a mode of experience, a way of functioning, and a fact of activity; the sentiment is a fact of structure, an organized system of dispositions, which endures . . . between the occasions on which it is brought into activity. (*Introduction to Psychology*, p. 418). All the emotions, tenderness, anger, fear, and the like, may be organized within a human sentiment of love. And when we speak of God's love, we do not at all necessarily deny the applicability to the Divine character of terms which properly denote emotions other than that of tenderness. I find it very difficult to sympathise with that partial and arbitrary use of the *via negativa*, which shrinks from attributing wrath and severity to God on the ground that He is loving. This reluctance very often seems to mask a confusion between love as a sentiment and love as an emotion. Yet a sentiment of love, when it is the dominant sentiment of a human character, undoubtedly controls and limits and guides all the emotional activity and external behaviour of the person—in a word, it characterizes him completely. And if we suppose that, so far as human language can be used of God at all, love characterizes the divine nature, we must infer that, however truly and terribly severe God's action may be, it is nevertheless entirely controlled and determined by love in its fullest purity.

THE SONS OF THE KINGDOM:
(1) THEIR RELATION TO GOD

By Prof. Percy Gardner, D.Litt., F.B.A.

NO one can speak of the relation of the sons of the Kingdom to God without touching, whether explicitly or implicitly, on many of the deepest and most difficult questions in Christian psychology and ethics: and the shortness of my time must, I fear, prevent me from doing so satisfactorily.

In works recently published I have pointed out how the modern decay in the idea of fatherhood has made much of the Gospel language as to the Fatherhood of God less intelligible. A father is in our days so nearly on the level of his children that the relation between them does not seem at all closely to resemble that between God and man. And many of our writers and preachers have been apt to dwell almost solely on the love of God to man and to say much less as to the sternness and justice of God. Certainly God is not a merely kindly and indulgent father, but one who is also severe and will be obeyed.

Such considerations are also applicable when we speak of the Divine Kingship. The only kings known to the ancient world were not constitutional, but absolute rulers. But the king in the parables is always supremely righteous and just.

In the Synoptic Gospels, the king is always God. But soon after their Master's departure, the Christians began to speak of Christ as their King. I do not propose to enter here into any questions of doctrine; but one may in speaking of the Kingdom think primarily of the headship of God, or primarily of the headship of Christ. And thus one may treat the whole matter from somewhat varied points of view. I notice that my subject is rather the headship of God, and I will direct my observations accordingly.

I must briefly consider the relation between the King and His subjects, first from the psychological and secondly from the ethical point of view.

There has been a tendency among philosophers, whether Christian or not, to speak of God as the Absolute, and then to

analyze the idea of the Absolute so as to reach the divine attributes. The result has often been to put words and notions in the place of the realities of experience. I shall not venture into a discussion for which I feel my powers inadequate, but confine myself as far as possible to what can be known, and what is actually experienced. In the speech at Athens St. Paul puts it very clearly when he says, 'They should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though He is not far from each one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being.' But in what sense is the God of the Christian experience a king, an absolute ruler?

Truth is many-sided, and usually the New Testament dwells first on one side of it and then on another, so as to produce, not a system, but an approximation, an adumbration of that which cannot be fully expressed in any phrase. Truth, even in science, but especially in all higher and spiritual matters, admits of infinite approach, but is never fully reached, because, as Bacon said, words can never match the subtlety, the complexity, of things. So in the Lord's Prayer itself there are two phrases as to the kingdom which seem at first inconsistent, yet which, when put together, bring us nearer to the truth than either taken apart. The great aspiration of that prayer is, 'Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done.' Yet towards the end of it we find the phrase, 'Thine is the Kingdom,' as if it were already there. In one place, Christ says, 'The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand' or approaching,' and in another place, 'The Kingdom of Heaven is within or among you.' How can we reconcile the futurity of the Kingdom with its present existence?

I think that the very phraseology of the Lord's Prayer gives us the solution. The Kingdom already exists in heaven, in the realm of spirit: our business is to make it materialize on earth. In the higher sense it exists: in the lower sense it has to be brought into being. Probably by far the greater part of our discussions here will be devoted to the realization of the Kingdom on earth. It seems incumbent on me to say something as to its present existence.

The same intermingling of the ideal and the future runs through the sublime utterances of the great Jewish prophets. When they foretell the destruction of Babylon or Tyre, the

prophecy on the face of it refers to the future, often to the immediate future. And they so fully realize that future, that sometimes they seem to speak of what is actually taking place. But such attempts to foresee the future are seldom literally accomplished. The real basis of the prophetic utterances was a sense of spiritual realities and of ideal values. The oppressive cruelty of Babylon, the materialist commercialism of Tyre had already condemned them; and all that Israel had to do was to wait and watch, to see the condemnation already pronounced in the judgment of God carried out in the world of sense. Exactly when or how it would be carried out the prophet could not always see: but it was always on the way.

There is much of this mixing of the future and the ideal in the first preaching of the Kingdom of God. Plato would have said that it already existed as an idea in the divine mind, but the earthly copy of the idea was only to be slowly formed, and could never be a perfect copy. Of course the Founder of Christianity knew nothing of Plato; and His mind moved on the lines of prophetic utterance rather than on the lines of Greek philosophic thought. But the belief in the divine ideas did not start with Plato; he took it over from earlier thinkers. And the scheme of mysticism, though expressed in many ways in various countries, is at bottom the same. It rests on the recognition of the superiority of the invisible to the visible, it feels that spirit is more real than matter, that man develops from within, and that the point from which he develops is in contact with a nobler and more exalted life, which inspires it. It believes in the possibility and the reality of inspiration and revelation.

And inspiration bears upon both sides of a man, the active and the contemplative, the emotional and the intellectual. When he has risen to the contemplation of the eternal ideas, his next duty is to produce copies of them in the world of sense. This he feels to be the main purpose of his life, the thing which he was sent into the world to do. But alas! the practical problem is not an easy one. His vision at the best is but slight and partial. His intellect, however devoted he may be, is but a poor instrument, and he may make fatal mistakes of judgment as to the course he should pursue. And when he tries to work,

a thousand oppositions and hindrances, a constant clashing of interests and ideals vex and blind him.

So the Divine Kingdom on earth can never be more than a poor adumbration of the Kingdom in heaven. Or rather, there will be on earth a multitude of weak and partial copies of the ideal Kingdom. In every great and noble impulse on earth, in every society which seeks ideal ends, there will be something of the Kingdom; but it will always be mixed with materialism, with ignorance, with selfishness. Since the days of the Apocalypse, the heavenly Jerusalem has been descending, but it has never arrived. Sometimes the vision of it grows more dim for whole periods of history, 'Clouds will intervene, and all our prospect flies.' I think many of us, especially of the older among us, feel like Hood, that we are further off from heaven than when we were boys, that the world in many ways has deteriorated. Order is heaven's first law, and we cannot say that the world has become more orderly.

But I will not continue in this strain. I must return to the special subject with which I had to deal—the relation of the citizens of the Kingdom to its Ruler. And here there is not much room for doubt or hesitation. The duties of the children to the father, of the subjects to the king are two, love and obedience. If there is one matter in which all the writers of the New Testament are unanimous it is this, that goodness, happiness, final salvation, depend on a man's doing the will of God. This is the practical outcome. But there are two preliminaries. A man must learn to know the will of God, otherwise all his efforts will be vain. And he must learn to love the will of God for unless there is this source of energy and enthusiasm, all his endeavours will be faint and feeble. To rouse and stimulate the love of God is the chief object of all great preachers. They necessarily appeal to the emotions. But in this place an appeal to the emotions would be inappropriate, it is thought and intelligence which we have to consider. In fact in the churches there is a constant, perhaps an excessive appeal to the emotions. I think it is made more extreme by the great stress now laid upon the Sacraments. Against this stress I shall make no protest here. Every wind which fills the sails of the Church is of value. I would only urge that emotion without thought and wisdom is

an evanescent thing, and may in fact often be turned in a bad direction.

At present the need of a wise and reasoned view of the will of God is of the utmost importance. I think there never was a time when it was so difficult to discern what the will of God is. Amid the hurry and stress of modern life, and its constant search for amusement, any quiet search for the will of God is apt to be driven out or obscured. In the past people did not doubt as we do what was the course set for them by the divine will. They went to the authorized exponents, to the ministers of the Church or to its sacred books as generally understood. Their difficulty was not in knowing what they ought to do, but in doing it when known. But we see about us many men who are most keenly desirous to do what is right, who really love the will of God, but who find it most difficult to see where it leads.

Of the methods by which we may search to find the will of God, it is evident that I have no time to speak in detail. In sum, they are five. First, we have the laws of the visible universe, which offer us analogies on which no one has dwelt so effectively as Christ Himself. In the facts of sunshine and rain, of the growing crops, of the working of leaven in meal He found analogies for the processes in the realm of spirit. Second, we now analyze and study more completely and directly the facts of mind and emotion and human nature generally. Third, we may find written large in the history of the world the results of opposition or obedience to the will of God, not in mere outward prosperity, of course, but in higher development and the place nations take in the world. Fourth, the great revelation of God comes from the lips or the pens of those whom He has strengthened and inspired to help and teach mankind, especially, of course, in the Bible. Fifth, there is the influence of the Christian Church, which is in a sense a personality, and exercises a right and proper sway over the individual, though the degree of that influence varies much from age to age and from country to country. These five are the ways in which we can study the divine will.

It is these facts which make such conferences as ours appropriate and useful. We are all more or less emancipated from

merely conventional and customary morality; and we are here to discuss the great questions of right and wrong in the light of science and of history. Not that the mere intellectual consideration of these matters will by itself suffice to guide us into the path of the divine will. It must be combined with love of the divine will, an enthusiasm for the ideal. But where that enthusiasm exists, the discussion of the laws of the divine kingdom and of the will of its Ruler is an indispensable necessity. Only so can we avoid the fanaticisms and the impostures which in our day are so rife.

But the basis of the relation between man and God does not lie either in emotion or intellect, but in fact and reality. Whether we like it or not, whether we understand it or not, our souls stand ever in a close relation to God. Occasionally, in our better moods, we realize this; but the relation does not in the least depend on our realizing it. There is a constant process of giving and taking, of welcoming or obstructing, going on within us, sometimes in the dim regions of the unconscious, sometimes in the light of consciousness. It was the realization of this truth, of the constant presence of a Divine Ruler, which was at the roots of the religion of Israel. And by the life and death of Christ the relation of God to man was, I believe, made actually closer. Thus though the visible Church is not, and never has been, an adequate embodiment of the invisible Kingdom, it has been its best representative in the world of sense.

THE SONS OF THE KINGDOM:
(2) THEIR RELATION TO THE STATE

By the Rev. C. S. Woodward, M.A., M.C., Chaplain to the King.

THE subject of my paper is the Sons of the Kingdom in their relation to the State. This means, I take it, that we are to consider the part which Christian men should play in the life of the community—social, industrial and political. It is, I am sure, unnecessary in such a gathering as this to insist upon the fact that our membership of the Kingdom is bound to set the standard for all our relationships; it is the fundamental factor in our lives. Our life is governed by the loyalties we owe in a variety of directions, but loyalty to the Kingdom is supreme; with this nothing can conflict. The law of the Kingdom must be our law on the personal and individual side of life, and not less in our relationship to the community at large. Our citizenship in the world must be moulded by our citizenship in the Kingdom of God. Our primary duty as citizens is to bring down the Kingdom from heaven to earth.

This is a truism to-day, but it was not always so. The outstanding failure in nineteenth century Christianity in our land was the failure to recognize this fact. The Evangelical revival concerned itself exclusively with the salvation of the individual soul; the Oxford Movement devoted all its enthusiasm to the corporate life of the Church. Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution was taking place, and modern England was evolving itself with little or no regard to the principles of Christ. The Church was too interested in the other world to notice what was happening in this, and the twentieth century is reaping the sorry harvest. It is good to remember that amongst the little band of men who laboured to apply Christian principles to the social and industrial life of their day, and were the founders of the Christian Social Movement, a leading place was taken by that great prophet of nineteenth century Modernism, Frederick Denison Maurice.

It is perhaps worth while to remind ourselves of the fallacy which underlay the indifference of religious men in the period

we are considering to the social and economic conditions which pressed so heavily upon their fellow-countrymen. Their fundamental mistake was the unreal distinction which they made between the spiritual and material sides of life. The two spheres were regarded as entirely separate, almost indeed as mutually exclusive. The spiritual, it was held, could not invade the material sphere without serious, perhaps fatal, loss. The parson who was interested in drains and housing and rates of pay was dubbed 'unspiritual' by his more orthodox colleagues. These things were the province of politicians and vestrymen; the parson's sphere of duty was the soul, let him concern himself with the life to come and leave the affairs of this world to his secular brethren. And so it was that the Church was silent in the face of conditions at which we shudder now, and had no voice to condemn injustices which have permanently embittered the souls of working-men. To-day we think differently; we have come to see that the spiritual and material sides of life, so far from being independent of one another, act and re-act upon each other at every turn. We can hardly disentangle spiritual problems from their material environment; there is no material problem which has not its spiritual effects. The housing problem is on the surface a question of bricks and mortar, of the thickness of walls and the cubic contents of rooms; fundamentally it is a spiritual problem, a matter of human lives, of the conditions under which immortal souls are to grow up, a conflict between the sordid surroundings of the slum and an environment into which some gleams of what is beautiful, some faint intimations of the divine are allowed to penetrate. Similarly with wages and the uncertainty of regular employment. In a sense they are material problems, but in a deeper sense they are spiritual, for where there is the crushing burden of financial anxiety, such as is the normal experience of hundreds of thousands of our fellow-countrymen, there is little hope of the growth of spiritual life.

It is, then, no longer possible to separate the material from the spiritual side of life and to say that the Kingdom of God is concerned only with the souls of men. It *must* enter into their bodily conditions, just because its main affair is with the soul which dwells within. But having established this point

we are bound to go on to ask two questions. What is the ideal at which the sons of the Kingdom should aim, and in what way should they make their influence felt?

First, what is to be their ideal? Are they to be reformers pure and simple, seeking to improve conditions merely for improvement's sake? In other words, are we to practice a religion of philanthropy and to limit the Kingdom of God to the ensuring of a better time all round? Is the greatest happiness of the greatest number to be our Gospel? I do not think so. As citizens that is a worthy enough object. We ought to want our fellow-citizens of every class to be as happily circumstanced as we are ourselves. It would be difficult to deny that this is a Christian ambition. But as sons of the Kingdom, in our capacity as Christian men and women, we must go deeper. It is not enough to provide decent houses and adequate rates of pay merely in order that men's comfort in this world may be increased. We need to go further, and our ideal should surely be to remove whatever hinders our fellows from entering upon their membership of the Kingdom. That is the standard which we are bound to set before ourselves—to ensure for all men such conditions as will make it possible for them to develop their spiritual life and to live as sons of God. Those who have worked at any time in the poorer parts of a great city know how much there is which is a positive hindrance to spiritual growth. I doubt not there are many here who have stood to preach the Gospel at the street corner of some crowded industrial parish, and have felt as they spoke that their words were wasted and that they would have been far better employed in trying to persuade the local authority to deal with some of the evil conditions which were making it impossible for the love of God to penetrate the darkness of the place. The social policy of the Church, then, is to fight without quarter for conditions of life in which men may know and love and serve their Heavenly Father. In countless places those conditions do not exist to-day.

And secondly, what methods are the sons of the Kingdom to employ? Here we touch upon more difficult and controversial ground. It is possible for Christians to agree in denying

that 'there is any region of human life where religion is an intruder,' and yet to differ fundamentally as to the way in which its influence is to be brought to bear upon the events and policies of the day. Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought in the matter. On the one hand there are those who hold that it is only as individuals that the sons of the Kingdom should attempt to apply the principles of Christianity to the life of the community; on the other there are those who demand that they should take corporate action to reform abuses and eradicate evil conditions. Those who hold the former view maintain that it is impossible to touch politics, municipal or national, without becoming partizan, and that it is essential that the Church should not ally itself to any party. Apologists for corporate action protest that the Church will never advance the Kingdom of God upon earth until she is as outspoken in denouncing the evils of the day and as fearless in seeking to alter the conditions which underlie them, as she is apt to be when questions of disestablishment or the control of elementary education are to the fore. She is ready then to seek political alliances and to risk the charge of partizanship; she should be no less ready for the risk when it is a question of the lives of men and women, or at least of the conditions under which they are forced to live. Opinions will doubtless differ in this Conference upon the point; for myself I am bound to say that I incline towards the latter view, though possibly not in its extremest form. I do not wish to see the Church allied to this or that party in the State. I do not desire her to represent 'the Unionist Party at prayer,' nor on the other hand to adopt the rôle of 'Court Chaplain to King Demos.' But I do believe that she is the instrument by which the Will of God is to be fulfilled upon earth, and I can see no way in which she can rise to that high calling, but by the corporate use of her influence in the solution of the problems with which it is the province of Parliament and Borough Council to deal. I hold that in all questions which affect the life of the community the Church should seek to arrive at a Christian policy, and should urge its adoption in season and out of season upon those whose special responsibility it is to deal with such questions Especially at this time I would urge that the voice of the Church, not only from

Lambeth, but in every pulpit, should utter no uncertain sound on the question of international relationships.

The Church has, of course, no right to invade the sphere of the economic or any other expert, but I would have her adopt the rôle of the prophets of the Old Testament and take as her watch-cry their slogan, 'Thus saith the Lord.' You will remember the commission of Ezekiel:

> 'I heard a voice of one that spake . . . and he said unto me, Son of man, I send thee to the children of Israel, to a rebellious nation which hath rebelled against me. . . . I do send thee unto them and thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God. And they, whether they will hear or whether they will forbear, yet shall know that there hath been a prophet among them.'

I do not think that the Church can ever take its rightful place in the national life, or do its duty to the community at large, until it assumes in fullest measure the rôle of the prophet and delivers such a message as men must recognize to be the expression of God's will in relation to the affairs of our common life. Some of us have lately been reading the *Life of W. S. Rainsford*. This is how he sums it up, 'The Church should show the way to all sorts of betterment. She cannot do the doctor's work, or the policeman's, or the teacher's or the mayor's, but she can and should protest when these agencies fail in their manifest duty.'

In doing this she may sometimes find herself bound to take a line in opposition to the opinion of the day as interpreted by those set in authority over us. The conflict between the things of Cæsar and the things of God may quite conceivably arise. The conscience of the Church may refuse to approve of what the State prescribes. This happens not seldom in the case of individuals, and if the conscience of the Church could be galvanized into life, there is little doubt that it would sooner or later happen to the body as a whole. Can there be any doubt as to which loyalty must then claim the allegiance of the Church? 'My country, right or wrong, my country,' can never be her motto. She must be prepared to suffer persecution rather than acquiesce in a policy of which her conscience is unable to approve. Loyalty to the Kingdom must be supreme: with that nothing can conflict. And we in particular who claim the right of private judgment as against the traditions of the Church,

must be not less ready to claim that right both for the individual and for the Church as a whole in matters which affect our common life.

I have been bound to touch very lightly upon a large and difficult problem. Let me close by stating my conviction that, if in the last hundred years the sons of the Kingdom had ranged themselves boldly alongside of such men as Shaftesbury, Kingsley, Maurice and the like, the national life would be far healthier and the Church a far stronger force within it than is to-day the case. Our fathers missed their opportunity. Is history to repeat itself? The whole future of the Church in England may depend upon the answer.

THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM

By the Rev. J. W. Hunkin, Dean of Caius College, Cambridge.

WHEREVER and whenever the sovereignty of God is realised in actual fact, there and then the Kingdom of God begins to be.

In accordance with one of the fundamental truths of the Christian religion we have learned to look for the clearest revelation of the character of God we are capable of receiving, not so much in what we call the world of nature, as in a perfect human life: a life, that is, which fulfils our ideals of goodness and beauty and love. These ideals we see as through 'a dome of many-coloured glass,' broken and fragmentary constituents of the absolute ideal, one radiant perfect whole as it exists in the mind of God. Incomplete as they are these fragments are real. Our moral judgements, for instance, so far as they go give us truth.[1] The question is how to make them go further, and how to bring the world into conformity with them.

It is plain at once that individuals working in isolation and each starting *de novo*, even if that were possible, would accomplish little. In actual practice the most original workers depend, at any rate for their materials, upon the work of others. Painters do not commonly manufacture their pigments or sculp-

[1] See Dr. Rashdall's *Conscience and Christ*, pp. 7 ff.

tors their tools. It is through well-directed co-operation that the best results will be always produced. Living traditions are passed down from generation to generation and grow and bear fruit. Mathematical knowledge, for example, gradually accumulates; and so do moral knowledge and every other kind of knowledge; and men learn, often slowly and painfully, to use and apply what they know.

Moreover it is clear that goodness has no proper sphere if it is limited to the individual alone; and as for love it cannot exist at all.

The sovereignty of God therefore can be realized only in society, and its realisation is obviously partial and incomplete while it is not realised in society as a whole.

Now it is true to say that the ideals of beauty and goodness and love are, as a matter of fact, realised here a little and there a little throughout the world; in the sublime reverence of the mosque, in the honesty of the Chinese merchant, in the love of every mother for her child whether it be red or yellow, black or white.

But is there anywhere any sign of a concentration of these particles? Is it possible to indicate any line of progress or of advance? In a tidal estuary when the flats are covered with water and here and there are pools and depressions and minor creeks, somewhere there is a main channel. And if there is a main channel by which the realisation of God's sovereignty has flowed onward during the last two milleniums, it is the society founded as the result of the life and death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.

Into that channel flowed the elements of permanent value in the faiths of Greece and Rome: from it, especially in our own day, fresh waves have washed into the more sluggish currents of other religions.

It may be well to glance a moment at these remarkable processes.

There has recently been a curious revival of paganism amongst us, a revival which seems to have reached its height just before the war. It was partly due to the failure of Christians themselves to do justice to a portion of their inheritance. The Alexandrian fathers did well to claim Plato as a Christian

before Christ; the unknown painters in the catacombs did well to decorate the chambers of their cemeteries with figures taken from pre-Christian art, little cupids, the seasons, Orpheus himself. But too often the representatives of the Church have treated as aliens under suspicion great natural forces like Beauty and Sex, created by God to be brought, like all powers and dominations whether in heaven or on earth or under the earth, into subjection to the obedience of Christ. It is not surprising, therefore, if from time to time there is a movement on the part of the votaries of Art to leave the Church and go in search of the mighty and mysterious agencies which were worshipped under many names in the groves and temples of the ancient world.

But Apollo and the Muses and even the great god Pan himself are destined to be baptized into Christ: and will eventually lead those who seek them faithfully and with pure hearts home to Church again.

Of the other phenomenon to which reference has been made; the influence of Christianity upon other religions, the best instance is to be found in connexion with the religions of India. There can be no doubt that reforming movements within Hinduism itself like the Brahma Samaj and the Arya Samaj have arisen as a direct result of the contact of educated Hindus with the Christian Church.

'While the shaping forces at work in the movements have been many, it is quite clear,' says Dr. J. N. Farquhar, one of the leading authorities on the question, 'that Christianity has ruled the development throughout'[2] . . . . 'While most of the material used in the reconstruction is old, Christian principles have guided the builders. In every case the attempt is made to come up to Christian requirements. Frequently the outcome is extremely slender; yet the purpose can be seen. Christianity has been the norm; and no part of the most orthodox movement is fully comprehensible except when seen from the Christian point of view.'[3]

Dr. Farquhar quotes the following remarkable words of Sir Narayana Chandavarka, of Bombay:

[2] *Modern Religious Movements in India* (1919), p. 433.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 434.

'The ideas that lie at the heart of the Gospel of Christ are slowly but surely permeating every part of Hindu society and modifying every phase of Hindu thought.'[4]

But to return to the Christian society itself. The great aim of the society is to produce the fruits of beauty and goodness and love in a community, the members of which enjoy true fellowship with one another and, through Jesus their head and in the spirit of Jesus, with God. In so far as this aim is realised, in so far as the Christian society actually produces these fruits and enjoys this fellowship, the society is not merely a means to a further good, it is a good in itself. It is an 'earnest,' a 'first instalment' of God's Kingdom. In it units, as for example individual units and national units, without losing their individuality, are knit into a larger but still organic whole: and its boundaries are planned eventually to extend to the limits of the human race.

But if the Christian society, in so far as it is really alive and performing its functions and achieving its aim, is an end in itself, it certainly does not follow that the separate items of its arrangement and of its constitution at any given time are more than means to an end. The ordinances of the Church and its methods of government must in the last resort be judged according to the value of their contribution towards the realisation of its central ideal.

For a long time, according to a dogma hardly challenged throughout the whole of Western Christendom, it was held to be of the nature of things that the Christian society should have one head upon earth. You could no more think of the Church without the Pope than of the Empire without the Emperor. This over-emphasis upon external unity led to many abuses, and eventually, by a natural reaction, to the formation of 'national Churches' at the Reformation. Not that the army was destroyed: it was merely that the phalanx was felt to be unwieldy and past its work and was broken up into what, it was hoped, would be more efficient units. No doubt this division has involved loss as well as gain, but at any rate it has shattered the dogma of the necessity of the formal and external headship of the papacy. No form of ecclesiastical institution has neces-

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 445.

sarily the same permanence as the Church itself. Form after form may be changed and yet the Church may still remain one organic whole, truly and vitally linked with its past.

Many questions of course arise with regard to the future. But we can only consider two or three of those suggested by what has already been said.

It may be instructive to inquire first into the prospects of the reformed or reforming religion already referred to, a religion still distinct from, although profoundly influenced by, the Christian religion. Will Hinduism now inoculated with Christian germs and given thereby, let us suppose, a new lease of life, henceforth maintain a separate existence. The Hindu has learned that of all divine incarnations of Krishna, the incarnation in a human life, is incomparably the most important. He now cultivates towards Krishna a devotion similar to that which the Catholic pays to Christ.[5] He finds in that devotion a real source of inspiration and spiritual power. Will he henceforth rest with Krishna as a substitute for Christ?

That can hardly be. For, the more fully he understands that God is revealed in a perfect human life, and the more clearly he sees what is involved in such a life of beauty and goodness and love, the more certainly will be developed in him a love of truth and an openness to the reception of it. He will have no desire to deceive himself, and at length he will be glad to recognise, not only that the impulse which has driven him along the road he has travelled came from the historic Jesus, but also that as a matter of bare fact the supreme revelation of God's character to mankind has been given in no one else.[6]

We must pass on to a question which arises nearer home. What is the relation of the Church to her children who have left her, or think they have left her, in order to do her work better? What is the relation of the Church to the various organisations for social improvement which have been set on foot by persons who were at one time members of her family?

The attitudes of these persons and societies towards the Church are, of course, very varied. We may distinguish two

[5] A Calcutta Hindu has published a little devotional volume under the title, *The Imitation of Shri Krishna* (Farquhar), *op. cit.*, p. 440.

[6] See Dr. Farquhar, *op. cit.*, p. 440.

types. The first is the anti-religious. Not only the cult and the institutions of Christianity but even its ethics are rejected. A new moral code is demanded based on naturalistic principles, a kind of scientific egoism. But it is painfully obvious—and the events of recent years have only made it more obvious still—that any attempt to reconstruct society on these lines invites the attack of some of the worst enemies of the human race, brutality, tyranny, violence, materialism. And it is not surprising that this type of thought is chiefly confined to coarse and uneducated minds, and shows little or no sign of gaining better ground in the future.

The second kind of reformer is the reformer who sees little or no value in the Church, but accepts a certain selection of Christian principles. These persons are very often not so far from historic Christianity as they imagine themselves to be. They have borrowed more than they have taken account of. People hard of hearing have been known to sit devoutly through a socialist meeting, under the impression that they were at a Church service.[7]

Here again we find the utmost variety. Two stages may be noted. There are those who accept what they believe to be the fundamental Christian view as far as it concerns practical social life but reject both the theory and the practice of Christian worship.

Mr. Bernard Shaw, for example, speaks with profound admiration of what he conceives to be the distinctive demands of Jesus in relation to social life, and believes that 'they are turning out to be good sense and sound economics.'[8] But Mr. Bernard Shaw appears to attach little value to the Christian conception of Almighty, *i.e.* All-sovereign God, transcendent, immanent, whom men, his children, adore, with whom they have secret communion and fellowship. And yet, so long as men are conscious of an infinite world around them, so long as they aspire to something higher than they can ever attain to,[9] this is a conception that must naturally appeal to them. It is a conception moreover which gives to efforts directed to the improvement of social conditions and the betterment of social

[7] Dr. E. F. Scott, *The New Testament To-day* (1921), p. 65.

[8] *Androcles and the Lion*, p. viii.

[9] E. F. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

life an inspiration and romance, a patience and balance, which apart from that conception seem often to be lacking.

But if there are a considerable number of people whose attitude towards Christianity resembles that of Mr. Bernard Shaw, there is a much larger number who have reached a rather different stage. They are the people who sympathise with the general idea of the Church, but find themselves out of harmony with various doctrines and practices in all existing branches of it and therefore hold themselves aloof. They may often give trivial reasons why they never attend public worship, but the real reason is that they find that the services of the Church contain a few things they dislike and more they do not understand, and as for what remains, they do not find it really appeals to them or helps them.

Now, as members of the Church we must be on the look out for adaptations and developments which will make its services more effective means of grace to those who attend them. The modern science of psychology may have much to teach us in this respect. And we have before us a striking model in the primitive church which, in its eagerness to advance its mission, adapted itself in every possible way to the varying conditions amidst which it was thrown.[10] But we must be patient.

Even as it is, the Church is a better instrument than is commonly supposed by those who never use it.

As they gather week by week Christian men and women do realise a fellowship with one another which transcends all differences of body and estate. In his *Tales of Talbot House* Mr. P. B. Clayton tells us that on one occasion at Aldershot at a celebration of the Holy Communion a man stood aside to let a great general go first to the Communion rails: but the general did not move: 'Not here, lad; not here,' he whispered.

In prayer, as the Church has taught us to pray, whether it be in private or in the great congregation, when our spirits stretch out towards God, it is not in vain: there is a real response.

When we meditate, as the Church helps us to do, upon that perfect life, that which was the light of men gives light to us.

[10] E. F. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

And when as members of the body of Christ we re-enact the sacred drama and with the whole company of faithful people in heaven and on earth offer ourselves united with Him in the one oblation and sacrifice, the experience may be indescribable but it is none the less blessed. At such a moment there rises before our enchanted eyes the vision of a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, the ideal Church, the Church as she is to be.

For a prose study of the Church's future we may refer to the monumental works of the late Professor Troeltsch, a convenient introduction to which will be found in Dr. Bouquet's *Is Christianity the Final Religion?*

For the poetry of its future we turn to St. Paul. In his Epistle to the Ephesians he finds words again and again fail him, and again and again he is driven to prayer;[11] that the God of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give unto you a spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him . . . that ye may know what is . . . the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe, according to that working of the strength of his might 'which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead, and made him to sit at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule, and authority, and power, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come: and he put all things in subjection under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the Church, which is his body, the fulness of him who all in all is being fulfilled.[12]

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> 'God did not make the World as a meer Exercise of his Almighty power, or to trie his own Strength, and then throw it away from himself without any more minding of it.'[13]

The word of God is not bound to any system or to any institution.

> 'And not by Eastern windows only,
> When daylight comes, comes in the light.'

And where the Eastern windows are blocked the house owes its light to other windows. But the Sun is in the East for all that.

[11] *Eph.* i, 17-23.

[12] The last clause is given according to the rendering of Dr. Armitage Robinson.

[13] John Smith, *Select Discourses*, p. 145.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF RACES AND NATIONS TO THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST

By Canon Tollinton, D.D.

OUR subject seems to suggest a certain ideal condition of human society, in which the following features would be found.

The Kingdom would be wide enough to include humanity, for we could hardly be content with an ultimate order in which all races and nations did not find their place. The Kingdom would be harmonious, adequately unified, and yet its different constituent elements would retain all that had been of permanent value in the way of racial characteristics and of national achievement. The spirit of the Kingdom would so possess its members that the life not of the individual alone, but even of the race and nation, would be recognized as being essentially a contribution to the fund of common welfare, such existing obstacles to this as private or corporate selfishness, or racial antagonisms, or the like being *ex hypothesi* eliminated.

The Kingdom would be Christ's in the sense that the principles which He taught, operative under all the shifting variety of human conditions, and yet retaining their validity and identity, would be recognized as supreme and dominant throughout its extent.

Should a day ever dawn when these conditions are fulfilled it would be possible to adapt the language of the Apocalypse and to say that the kings of the earth had brought their glory and honour into Christ's Kingdom; or to use the more prosaic words of Tennyson and claim that we had arrived at 'the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world'; or, in still more modern phrase, to assert that the League of Nations was an accomplished fact.

It is likely, however, that the picture of such an ideal state of human society will arouse in the minds of most of us more question than expectation. We should be inclined to ask, for example, whether the limitations by which man's existence upon

this planet is circumscribed, admit the possibility of his ever reaching such a stage of well-being and attainment. Is it not after all another Utopia, like Plato's ideal Republic, laid up as a pattern in heaven? Or like the city of which it was said that it is built for ever, and therefore never built at all? Or we might raise again the question whether this, like all other visions of the goal and term of human endeavour, does not leave us with the problem inherent in every conception of completed attainment, 'When man has fully and finally attained, what is he to do next?' For we can neither rest mentally satisfied with a process of development that goes on for ever, nor yet with one which comes to an end; and so we are left wondering what St. Paul meant when he said that 'God shall be all in all,' and what the Buddhist means when he talks about Nirvana. Further, the critical will be inclined to ask whether the measure of synthesis demanded by the conception of all races and nations contributing harmoniously to a common stock is even theoretically attainable without the surrender of some of their most distinctive characteristics. For the Hebrew and the Hellene really to understand and appreciate one another, must they not in some sense first cease to be Hebrew and Hellene? Certainly when the lion lies down with the lamb, he is no longer the 'Felis Leo' we have known.

But these are ultimate questions. They do arise, as it seems to me, so soon as we try to picture the state of human society which is implied by our subject, and therefore they may be worth asking, even though it will be the part of prudence not to attempt to answer them. For indeed, curiously synchronizing by a sort of paradox with the great interest taken now in the subject of the Eschatology of ancient Israel, a marked reticence has fallen of late upon Christian theology in regard to all last things. As to the goal and end of human affairs, most of us are frankly agnostic. It is a subject we relegate to the domain of Faith, Poetry and Vision, and they, after all, are among our best and greatest teachers. For the rest, then, of this paper I propose to come back from these remoter issues and to discuss points of more present and immediate concern. In particular let me name three subjects of enquiry and say a word or two on each.

May we consider, first, to what extent we can regard races and nations as contributory—contributory rather than competitive—in the world as we know it to-day.

May we consider, second, the right and desirability, or otherwise, of the more advanced races and nations imposing their standards and methods upon those which are regarded as less advanced.

And may we consider, third, what manner of further contributions to the common stock of human welfare the sane-minded will expect to be made by Western Civilization as a whole.

As to our first point, there is a sort of *locus classicus* to be found in the well-known essay of the late Archbishop Temple in *Essays and Reviews*. Written more than half a century ago, its main thesis that Rome, Greece, Asia and Judea have each made their contribution to the education of the world remains so obviously true that it may be mentioned without further comment than the remark that to-day we should probably draw less distinction between Judea and Asia. Again, what is best in literature, what is best in art, is really the common heritage of the race. The Sistine Madonna is in the Dresden Gallery, the Mona Lisa in the Louvre, but the one does not really belong to Germany nor the other to France. Even during the war Shakespeare's plays were performed in Berlin. East is East and West is West, yet English readers can appreciate what is written by Rabindranath Tagore. Science, even more than art and literature, knows no limits of nationality. Antiseptic surgery is for every hospital. It is from commercial, not from scientific motives, that a nation will keep to itself such discoveries as the secret of aniline dyes. And even commerce, however competitive, has also a contributory character; the ocean which to Horace was 'dissociabilis'—Matthew Arnold's 'estranging sea'—is a highway for the ships of every flag and a link between the continents. The more we learn other languages than our own, the greater our power of sharing what other races have to contribute, while the debt of the common intellectual life of the world to the translator has indeed been great. There is value also in the increased facilities of travel which have come with recent years, and it would be interesting to speculate upon the spiritual consequences of such a business

enterprise as that of Messrs. Thomas Cook. If Hobbes was right in believing that the natural and primitive state of man was one of war, all against all; if Huxley's contention in his well-known Romanes Lecture be valid and the ethical movement is at variance with evolution, so that 'social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step,' all the greater is the significance attaching to the fact that on the whole, as the centuries have gone by, the common elements in human life have tended to increase; the contributions of the various races and nations have been more widely shared; the claims of humanity, as distinct from those of nationality, have gained in theory at any rate a more general recognition.

Yet there is another side to this, as to most accounts Competition and conflict, rather than contribution, still seems inevitable in wide areas of human activity. After reading that in Christ Jesus is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Greek nor barbarian, it is disappointing to know that in the United States the white and the coloured Christian worship the common Father in separate churches and travel in different cars upon the train, and still more disappointing that the white man tells you with conviction that this must be so. Meredith Townsend wrote of the mutual contempt of the European for the Asiatic and of the Asiatic for the European; would he alter this view, I wonder, if he were alive to-day? National and racial qualities are sometimes so distinctive that they seem to refuse to be merged in any unity. It is often said of the Eurasian that he has the faults of both races and the virtues of neither. So too the difference of languages constitutes without question a barrier between people and people, but would anyone suggest that the world on the whole would gain if we all spoke Esperanto? It has been said that the Old Testament is the Gospel of nationality; the New the Gospel of humanity. It is probably a good thing that we have not yet scrapped the Old Testament, but nationality has some qualities which can hardly be described as contributory. In the cheerless years of disillusionment which have followed the termination of the war, the policy of the nations has in the main been selfish, with little regard to the common needs of a shattered world. You feel that as you look across the Atlantic; you feel it when you look across the

channel. The situation in Europe to-day is ultimately domi
nated by the fact that the French are determined to take thei
own course without any regard to its consequences to othe
peoples, and would drop bombs on London, as they could do
rather than modify it. When that fact has been recognized
we may proceed to talk of unity of purpose and common sacri
fices and neighbourly goodwill to any extent we please. Th
project of a League of Nations—I call it a project deliberately
a project, I will add, which, if it was realized or realizable
would amply deserve every word that has been said in its prais
—has received about as much or as little enthusiastic suppor
as has been accorded in Christian circles to the Lambeth pro
posals for re-union, or in industrial circles to the principle
surely sound, of profit-sharing.

To sum up. It may be claimed that, if the survey cover
wide enough period, the degree to which races and nations con
tribute to a common stock of human welfare does tend to in
crease. Yet it must also be allowed that for the immediat
present the opposite, divisive, competitive, antagonistic ten
dencies are far more in evidence. The end, however, is not yet

We pass to our second enquiry: how far are the contribu
tions of any given race or nation to be enforced on others wh
do not possess them. Our instinct is to answer, 'Not at all!'
We recall Seeley's chapter in *Ecce Homo*, in which he inter
prets our Lord's refusal of the kingdoms of the world as mean
ing that His kingdom is not to be extended by the methods o
earthly power. On the other hand, the Kingdom of Heave
was likened once by Jesus to a banquet which the guests eventu
ally were compelled to attend: 'compel them to come in.' An
indeed the gifts of civilization have not always been voluntaril
appropriated. The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink
but it does include at any rate such elements as good order
justice, sanitation, the education of the young, daily work fo
daily bread and other equally recognizable elements of huma
well-being. These have in the past been very largely not chose
but imposed. Greek culture, it is one of the commonplaces o
history, was spread by Alexander's conquests; the ancient in
tellectual centre that bore his name reminded the world per
petually not of a philosopher, but of a soldier. The Roma
Empire on the whole was a contribution to the Kingdom of Go

Paul apparently thought it could be utilized for religious purposes. It was, at any rate, a preparation. If the alternative to the *Pax Romana* was the supremacy of Carthage and its commerce, well, the data are not sufficient to allow us to answer the interesting question as to what Carthage would have made of the Mediterranean, but in all probability things were better as they were. Which means that the subject peoples accepted the gifts of Cæsar's rule, because they had no option and also for their gain. We are liable no doubt to judge too favourably of our own achievements, but I will risk the assertion that British administration of dependent countries, India and Egypt especially, has been no mean contribution towards the Kingdom. Yet it would be hard to justify its early stages either by the principles of the law of nations or by the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. The races that have done most for the peace and order and justice of the world have in the main said to the subject peoples, 'We can manage your affairs far better for you than you can manage them yourselves, and we intend to manage them.' The last attempt so to enforce higher gifts upon unwilling peoples we have witnessed only recently, and seen it fail. For Germany, along with all her reckless ambition and militaristic creed, did really believe in her own mission. Sincere and enlightened people held with conviction that a German hegemony would promote the welfare of the world. The free peoples said 'No,' and I have never wavered in my assurance that our share and achievement in the war was right. But the present plight of Europe makes it interesting to speculate as to what would have happened if Prussian efficiency had won the day. We can imagine them at their task, policing the Balkans, teaching the Turk to be a good European far more effectively than he is likely to learn that lesson under the tender tuition of the Allies, exploiting but also administering Russia, absorbing Austria and the Low Countries, dominating Italy, largely increasing the commercial productivity of the world, showing every man, woman and child from Belgium to Baghdad, or perhaps to Vladivostok, exactly which pathways were 'verboten' and exactly which were not. Considered, not of course from the standpoint of the British Empire, but from one more disinterested and detached, the dream had its magnificence and its possibility, and once again a race or nation would

have enforced its gifts upon subject areas of life. *Aliter visum est.* These methods, we have said, belong to ages that are gone. Such high-handed procedure accords not with the period of Democracy, and if one man is as good as another, so one nationality must be as free as another to assert itself and to make its own contribution in its own manner. Hence come Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia and the Free State of Ireland, Egypt administered by the Egyptians and changes in the Civil Service of India. I do not forget the interesting experiment of 'mandates,' but an experiment it still is; one mandate has notoriously been declined, and some day the question of the use of force will be difficult. The trend of contemporary history is away from all compulsion. We have rejected Treitschke's theory of the state, and have no belief in any super-race or super-nation. The centuries will pass and, after many more have gone, our descendants will be able to answer the question which to-day we can only ask: Whether the contributions of races and nations towards the Kingdom of Christ have been more rapid and more considerable upon the new system or upon the old.

Our third enquiry remains: What manner of further contributions to the common stock of human welfare will the sane-minded expect to be made by Western civilization as a whole? If anyone contends that it is waste of time to raise the point since it is beyond our power to write history in advance, it may at least be said in reply that our attitude towards the future is just one of the most important among present facts. We pray 'Thy kingdom come.' Do we expect it to come? Progress, we have been reminded of late, is by no means an automatic certainty. Our assurance even that the gifts of the past are our without risk of revocation is probably to some extent illusory 'It is,' wrote Sir Henry Maine, 'in spite of overwhelming evidence, most difficult for a citizen of Western Europe to bring thoroughly home to himself the truth that the civilization which surrounds him is a rare exception in the history of the world.' But, in the main, in spite of Bolshevism, these warnings do not cause us much alarm. The surest prophecy for to-morrow's weather is to say that it will be like to-day's, and that is the attitude of the average man in regard to the highest issues of

human life. In one sense he is justified. The very wealth of our heritage contracts the area of future opportunity. Possessing already Homer and Virgil, Dante and Shakespeare, we may still have more poets, but we are not likely to have better poetry. Having built the Gothic Cathedrals, we may add another to their number in Liverpool, but at best it will be just one more of the same kind. Science has the greatest scope. The world may learn the cause and so the cure, or better, the prevention of cancer. We may learn to travel through the air with as much safety as on land. Eugenics or sterilization may do something towards the elimination of the degenerate or unfit. I have myself been much involved of late in the problem of the drainage of country villages in a flat neighbourhood, but even this may be achieved. We might make a list at formidable length of items in which present contributions to human welfare might be in a greater or a less degree improved. It is all very good, very useful, very necessary, and if there is not much glamour or ground for enthusiasm in a good deal of it, perhaps devoted service without enthusiasm is the highest form of service that there is. It sometimes seems as though, substantially, what we call Western Civilization had achieved what it is likely to achieve; as though a somewhat tired aggregate of nations had made its contribution and passed its creative stage, with abundant scope still for amendment, improvement, correction, further experience and the like, but without the assured vision of any Golden Age or Promised Land ahead. I admit I have never crossed the Atlantic; it is for those who have to tell us to what extent a *juventus mundi occidentalis* is discoverable there. In general, however, it seems to me to be an open question, how far our wonderfully increased control over the resources of physical nature has really brought any fuller emancipation of the human spirit from its bondage to material conditions. Industrialism can claim wonderful results, but we remember how in Samuel Butler's satire the traveller to Erewhon was at once deprived of his watch: they did not allow machinery in that queer country, they were afraid it might become their master. On the whole, if we pass in review the most distinctive gifts of civilization as we know it: art, science, literature, industry, trade, government and administration, schools and

museums, Harley Street and the Stock Exchange, we have—I am sure we ought to have—the same sense of wonder and admiration which the Queen of Sheba experienced on her visit to King Solomon. But achievement rather than promise is the dominant feature in our impression.

There is one other direction in which, for our conclusion, we may cast a glance. Here more than ever prediction is impossible, though we may have hope, after the manner of those good people of old who waited for the Kingdom of God. I refer to the possibility of some new movement of the Spirit, a new incoming of the divine life, for which we may prepare, but which essentially is not made but comes. Hegel spoke of history as the successive phases of the spirit, and that was surely no mean act of faith on the part of a philosopher. If we may give his phrase a more religious connotation than he himself would have intended, then some fresh manifestation of the spirit seems to me almost the condition of our hope for the future. There is not much evidence of it as yet, but such events have happened and it is the need of the age. Christianity is not done with, but it has reached the close of a stage in its development. No mere revival will meet the situation. We can imagine something truly catholic, if that grand word could ever be redeemed from its present sectarian sense. Given the reality and its arrival, we need not much concern ourselves whether the new star rises in the East or in the West—the West has never originated a religion yet. It would give our modern world an ideal clear enough and high enough to command allegiance, and cure materialism by some compelling sense of spiritual values. No nation, no race would claim this as their contribution, for these things are not man's handiwork; they are the gifts of God. But from it would flow a new power of creative energy; the Western peoples would renew their strength and make new contributions to Christ's Kingdom not incomparable with the old. Can these things be? 'Son of man, can these bones live? and I answered O Lord God, thou knowest.' The alternatives to this hope seem to be either to go on as we are, which is not a very cheerful prospect; or the yellow races; or Bolshevism; or, more probably, the descent into a second series of Middle Ages. *Nisi Dominus, frustra.*

THE RELATION OF UNIFORMITY TO VARIETY WITHIN CHRIST'S KINGDOM

By the Rev. W. W. Longford, D.D., Rector of Caversham.

THE wording of the topic assigned, 'In the Kingdom of Christ is the ultimate aim to be uniformity or variety of national life?' suggests a view of the Kingdom of Christ which it might be difficult to justify by the letter of the New Testament, though clearly it is in accordance with its spirit. But we must be quite clear that this is not the Kingdom of God or of Heaven in the sense that our Lord speaks of it—well defined by Hort as that sovereignty in which God *is* ruling and blessing His creatures. It is a creation of human endeavour, not a Kingdom actually existing, supernatural and heavenly in origin and character. It is a Kingdom built up through the consecrated effort of Christians who desire to see the rule of Christ acknowledged in all the world. In theological affiliation the conception belongs to the same order as that of a visible Church, and it has had great attractions for the Christian mind, at least since the day of St. Augustine. But while it offers an objective to Christian effort, it has perilous associations, the more so since it has constantly tended to degenerate into an expression in religious terms of a passion for institutionalism clearly more characteristic of the human mind than of the divine purpose. Moreover, its suggestion as to the real character of Christianity may be misleading. It tends to convey the idea that recognition of Christ as King and obedience to His law is what constitutes Christianity; it contains no hint of the divine side—that essential Christianity, while implying all these things, is vital membership in Christ's Spiritual Body, with redemption through grace and sanctification in grace. It contains no hint of the new creation. Actually the idea of a visible Church of Christ is less perilous in suggestion than the idea of a visible Kingdom, and more fruitful in its implication of the actual message of Christianity to the world. Of its adequacy as truly representing the Body of Christ there will be no question; but of its necessity

as supplementing the idea conveyed by the Kingdom few Churchmen are likely to be in doubt.

We come then to consider the conditions under which such a society as we are contemplating may be established. The question before us is of great significance, not only for its own sake, but because it involves the widest problem possible to Christian statesmanship.

Our first effort must be directed towards understanding the bearing of the idea of Uniformity and its relation to the fact of Variety. The actual word 'uniformitas' is of course post classical; but the idea lying behind it has an ancient history, and is not the heritage of any single people. Eliminating for the moment the sphere of religion, we see uniformity gradually appearing in all sorts of practical ways with the development of civilized life. We see it, possibly in its most ancient form, in the art of building; we see it again in military organization, both in the matter of arms, and in general organization of bodies of fighters. Here it was found to increase efficiency, as in architecture it ensured stability. Political administration and the sphere of law come within its grasp. Law, from being a scattered body of unrelated judgments, gradually becomes codified and uniform, leading to ease of administration; and with the growth of empires uniformity of political administration gradually proves its worth. In each of these fields, though particularly in that of architecture, an aesthetic appreciation of uniformity gradually reinforced its practical significance—that is to say, the idea for its own sake gradually took firm hold on advancing civilizations, though with appreciable differences of attitude corresponding to different racial aptitudes—and this not least in the case of Greece and Rome.

On the other hand, we have the *fact* of Variety. It is a fact which could not escape the most primitive observer in his relations with the world around him. It was found in colour, in form, and in sound; it was found also in human temperament. But while to some racial types it was a fact of experience and little more, to one race at any rate it seems to have suggested a problem. The Greek mind, haunted as it was by the idea of form as an aesthetic end, could only account for variety by positing an ultimate perfect arrangement, or, in other

words, a Kosmos. It is here that the fact of Variety and the idea of Uniformity meet and coalesce. But to minds less philosophical an ultimate significance of variety does not occur, with the consequence that an idea and practice of uniformity is embraced which ruthlessly sacrifices variety if it be found a hindrance to the object in view.

As illustrative of these positions we might notice how one of the consequences of the classical revival in England—a revival rather Latin than Greek—which reached a climax in the eighteenth century, was an attitude towards nature almost incomprehensible to us. Formalism, which had re-appeared in a narrow uniformity in the sphere of architecture, demanded straight lines, order and balance in nature. Actually the picture of variety which nature presented was deprecated, if not abhorred. On the other hand, during the Middle Ages, with the gradual breaking away from Roman tradition, we find a flirtation with variety in constructive work gradually becoming a passion, particularly in the spheres of architecture and music. In neither case was it found to be inconsistent with an ordered whole.

Modern scientific discovery increasingly tells upon the side of the Greek idea and of its practical medieval successor. Physical science has posited uniformities of law behind phenomena, and through successful experiment it has gradually justified its premisses. Despite appearances the physical universe as we know it *is* a uniform system. It resolves itself into the atom, which itself is built on precisely the same lines as the solar system. Thus we have an active and essential uniformity from the tiny corpuscle rapidly rotating round the centre of the atom to the planetary bodies circling round the sun.

In idea, therefore, 'uniformity' is suggestive of a true conception—of a principle actually inherent in things as they are. Its emergence in the human mind corresponds with other intuitions of truth, whether in the physical or the spiritual sphere. Human endeavour therefore is not without justification in pursuing it as a practical ideal. But human conceptions have tended, from various causes, towards a 'static' view of uniformity; with the consequence that in some spheres it has been pursued and maintained in ways which are bound to defeat the

end which we to-day can see is its true end. Miscarriage has been most pronounced, and its consequences most serious when the field of endeavour has been advanced into the sphere of human thought and human action.

The advance was inevitable, and at first the ultimate consequences did not appear. Actually it was concomitant with other developments which have already been noticed.

The dawn of history shows us communities, of one type or another, held together by bonds of common interest. Self-preservation entailed certain uniformities of thought and action. Demands were therefore made upon the whole community which considerably abridged individual licence. And the demands were twofold, both political and religious. For the primitive community danger did not threaten solely from within the human sphere. The safety of the community was held primarily to depend upon the due performance of ritual and the observance of custom held to be demanded by higher powers. Variety in thought or action which questioned or neglected these points could not be tolerated. The handicap on the emergence of manifest independence was heavy; the penalties were extreme.

It is here that we begin to approach our problem. It is a problem complicated by its past. Religion is not now so interwoven with the whole texture of life and thought as it was in earlier ages. Nevertheless this original handicap to variety still persists. Even to-day every new type of thought, whether actually religious, or with an ultimate bearing upon religion, has first to overcome suspicion of impiety and to face the actual hostility of those who cleave to older things. But beyond that, the endeavour to achieve or maintain uniformity within the region of mind and spirit has persisted throughout historical times, even after the original motive had lost its force. Gradually the self-interest of the priestly castes took the place of community prejudice, as the latter, under various solvents, decayed. Here is a situation again which still affects the problem. Subsequently, as in the case of Israel and Islam, religious schools set themselves to create and maintain certain uniformities in the actual or supposed interest of religious truth. That is still a policy with reformers. Again, ecclesiastical potentates have aimed at uni-

formity of thought and practice—as the Papacy still aims—in order to facilitate administration and to intensify power. And not infrequently—and our own spiritual history has been largely moulded by this fact—the secular power has seen in a fixed uniformity escape from political dangers and a source of strength to the State. Theology and morals, ritual and church order have all been affected, and in some cases stereotyped by such influences as these.

The total result is that the idea of uniformity within the religious sphere has gathered round itself walls and buttresses which well nigh inhibit any expansion towards true comprehensiveness. Past history has prejudiced the modern situation to such an extent that very few can see the essentials of the matter with minds unaffected by the reactions of the past. The general tendency issuing from the various streams of influence is towards a narrow and static conception, which defeats the end towards which the true ideal is pointing.

For past mistakes do not necessarily destroy future possibilities; we may possibly even profit by them. If our sense of the true meaning of uniformity is right, there can be discovered a way in which variety in mental constitution and outlook can be held together in an essential uniformity, and there can be discovered an essential uniformity in which variety can persist. It will be a 'dynamic' uniformity which is maintained *pari passu* with intellectual and spiritual advance, and it will be maintained, not as in its 'static' form, by authority, but by mutual loyalties. For such a uniformity will not be patient of every type of variety of thought and action. That would mean chaos. There was a sense of truth underlying the practice of ancient society, even though subsequent experience has proved that wider limits of liberty can and should be allowed in the interests of the commonwealth. We have still a commonwealth to consider, and within a commonwealth certain unities must be achieved and maintained. For static uniformity—such as many still long for—the hegemony of person or persons is actually necessary. Law is necessary in any type of uniformity. It is present and active in the physical sphere, so permeating it that diversity in unity cannot but persist. But there is no such *compelling* law within the spheres of thought and conduct.

Such compelling law can be imitated by human contrivance in certain directions, but not in such a way as to hold together a world-wide spiritual commonwealth. Co-operation in love is the only basis of integration here.

Variety in human minds and temperaments is based in the last resort upon psychological facts touching essential differences of development within personality. There are of course types of variety in attitude and custom which are not necessarily fixed and permanent; but on the other hand there are actually ineradicable differences of temperament which will always issue in developments pre-eminently aesthetic, intellectual and practical according to the bent of individuals or nations. A spiritual commonwealth which is clear about its universal claim must find room for all developments which do not run counter to its essential claims. It must achieve an essential uniformity, but it should tolerate, if not encourage, such variety as is not inconsistent with that uniformity. Within a world-wide Kingdom of Christ the controlling fact must be the Truth, as it is in Jesus. The external unities which loyalty must maintain will touch the threefold nature of human personality—emotion, will and intellect. Within the sphere of aesthetic, there is a point at which suggestion and its concomitants are not merely unworthy, but actually inimical to Christian standards. Loyalty will maintain the standard. Actually liberty would be widest within this sphere, whether in ritual observance, or in the general aesthetics of the common life. In the nature of things liberty would be most restricted within the moral sphere, where the test of actions must always lie in the spirit and word of the teaching of Jesus—possibly a wider liberty than Christian imagination has yet risen to, since Christian ethics have been undoubtedly moulded in the past to no slight degree by human prejudices and misunderstandings. Within the sphere of intellect, though liberty of thought would be wide, it would necessarily be loyal to premisses inherent in the Christian philosophical system of thought—its doctrine of God, for example—upon which the actual validity of the Gospel itself depends. Within such limits as these individual and national variety could safely be encouraged both for the sake of nations and individuals, and also for the

promise which it affords of a more complete contribution to the cause of Truth.

We have in our own history a valuable example of how national religious development may bring out and consecrate national aptitudes in ways most advantageous to national character. As to actual vital contribution to theological science, the past history of national Christian systems holds out a wonderful promise for a future in which East and West each throw light to the other upon the central mysteries.

Such a Kingdom would never be co-extensive with the world, even though world-wide. But it should be co-extensive with the Church, as the Church is depicted by St. Paul—a spiritual commonwealth living loyally in the unity of the Spirit. The problem before us, therefore, is complicated with the vexed question of Church order. This is too large a question to deal with within the limits of this paper, though in the writer's view essential unity could be found within the three loyalties which have already been considered. The present ecclesiastical situation has largely arisen out of the older conceptions of uniformity and their present binding force. The most vexed question of all, that of ministry within the Church, will possibly to our children appear less a vital theological question than a question of curious sociological prejudice. The present Bishop of Ripon has lately been insisting that what Christianity needs now is a realization of the meaning of Pentecost as completely thought out as that of the Incarnation has been during the last century. It is probable that when that comes to pass the theologically-minded will not be so prone to limit the grace and power of the Holy Spirit, and will more readily recognize in others that call of God and of His people which are the essentials to true ministry within the Royal Priesthood.

THE CITY OF GOD

By the Rev. W. M. Pryke, B.D., Vicar of St. Aidan's, South Shields.

'REMEMBERED revelation,' says the Dean of St. Paul's, 'always tends to clothe itself in mythical or symbolic form.'[1] The words may serve both as a warning and an assurance—a warning against the vice of unintelligent literalism in the interpretation of New Testament language, an assurance that even the crudely coloured pictures of Apocalyptic may be vehicles of truth, honest attempts to give outward expression to some profound inward experience, points of contact between a temporal and an eternal world.

Clearly a man's deepest convictions must always be impatient of exact definition. When Jesus spoke of the Kingdom of God He necessarily had recourse to parable and simile in the effort to explain His meaning. When the author of the *Apocalypse* desired to impart his vision of the New Jerusalem, he was driven to the same expedient.[2] The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews found himself in a like case. He speaks of 'the city which hath the foundations, whose Architect and Builder is God.'[3] This city God had 'prepared' for the saints of the Old Testament.[4] As a 'city which is to come,' it is thought of as an object of search or desire on the part of Christians.[5] Yet, considered from another aspect, the goal has been already attained. 'Ye are come,' we read, 'unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jersusalem,'[6] and here the thought is clearly of a present fellowship with the eternal world.

Jesus speaks only of the Kingdom or Realm of God, never of the divine City. And any attempt to understand His thought takes its most natural starting-point from the language of the Lord's Prayer. According to the Matthean version of the prayer, we are bidden to ask that the Kingdom or Rule of God may come 'as in heaven, so on earth,'[7] and the coming of the divine Kingdom and the doing of the divine will are repre-

[1] *Outspoken Essays* (Second Series), p. 14. [2] *Rev.* xxi, 2.
[3] *Heb.* xi, 10. [4] *Ibid,* xi, 16. [5] *Ibid,* xiii, 14.
[6] *Ibid,* xii, 22. [7] *Matt.* vi, 10.

sented as interchangeable ideas. Even though we regard Luke's shorter version of the prayer[8] as the more original, yet Matthew's gloss, if it be a gloss, is a valuable and early indication of the thought of the community. The words prove that for the writer of the First Gospel, and for some at least of his contemporaries, the Kingdom, in the words of von Hügel, suggested the idea of 'a social organism . . . coinciding with the totality of those through whom God's will is accomplished.'[9] Moreover, this Kingdom, City, or Social Order (the name we give to the idea is of small importance) is to be established 'on earth as in heaven.' That is to say, the conditions of heaven, however we may conceive them, can be, and according to the faith of this petition, will be, reproduced on earth. Further, unless men are to be thought of as mere automata, or as constrained to an unwilling obedience at the bidding of a superior force, a community in which the will of God is accomplished, pre-supposes the co-operation of human wills in the fulfilment of the divine purposes. Man, that is, must be conceived of as 'a junior partner in the creation of spiritual good.' Having seen the plans of the divine Architect, or (if you will) the vision of the completed City existing already in the heavenly places, it is for man to set his hands to the task of creating a world resembling as far as may be the City of God.

I am of course not unaware that this view which attributes to Jesus the conception of a world-order to be brought into gradual conformity with the heavenly pattern as the result of the joint activities of God and man will not commend itself to the thoroughgoing eschatologist, who holds that the Kingdom, as Jesus conceived it, could be achieved solely by the sudden eruption of divine forces, and not at all by the less spectacular methods of human endeavour. The whole question is far too intricate to allow even the briefest treatment in a short paper. It must suffice to say here that while the entire apocalyptic outlook sprang from a total despair of the present order, and postulated a God impotent to achieve his purposes save by the clumsy device of wholesale destruction, for Jesus such a doctrine of radical pessimism was unthinkable. Fundamental to His whole attitude was the belief in the fatherhood of God,

[8] *Lk.* xi, 2. [9] *Eternal Life*, p. 62.

the sonship of Man, and the splendour of life as a divinely given opportunity for co-operative service. But if such were His creed, then He cannot have looked with favour upon the bungling methods of the *deus ex machina*, nor have lent His support to the desperate hope of divine intervention for the sake of a small minority of the Jewish people. Following Tyrrell,[10] let us frankly admit that 'in the difference between the cruder and more childish sense which the petition 'Thy Kingdom come' would have borne for the least sympathetic of His hearers, and the deeper and fuller sense it has come to bear for the Christian consciousness, we have a revelation of Christ's spirit.'

Dean Inge is fond of reminding us that the emphasis of Christianity has always been 'other-worldly.' And the claim may be allowed provided that the term 'other-worldly' receives adequate definition. For example, the other-worldliness of the New Testament had nothing in common with the cynical temper of the employing classes during the horrors of the Industrial Revolution, a temper which led them to justify the *status quo* in the very name of Christianity by promises to the down-trodden multitudes of future compensations in a world beyond death. When St. Paul spoke of a 'commonwealth in heaven,'[11] or exhorted his readers to behave in a manner worthy of their heavenly citizenship,[12] his outlook was 'other-worldly' only in the sense that unlike some modern reformers he looked not for the Kingdom of Man, but for the Kingdom of God, recognizing that 'not without celestial observations can even terrestrial charts be properly constructed.' But the Dean himself does not seek to deny the doctrine of divine-human co-operation. 'We are at liberty,' he tells us in a recent volume of essays, 'to cherish the inspiring thought that we are fellow-workers with God in realizing His purposes in time.'[13] If this is the truth about other-worldliness as the Dean understands it, then we may admit unreservedly, using his own words, that 'other-worldliness alone can transform this world because the other world is the reality of which this world is the shadow.'[14] Thus

[10] *Lex Credendi*, p. 152.
[11] *Phil.* iii, 20.
[12] *Ibid*, 1, 27.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

we see that the possibility of transformation is frankly conceded. But with that possibility once given, the matter becomes personal, and the individual Christian finds himself pledged to definite undertakings having world-transformation as their immediate purpose. The City of God presents itself as a conception of vital concern to all who bear the name of Christ; the setting up of the divine Kingdom on earth is seen to involve a co-operative enterprise, and the question put by H. G. Wells' navvy to the duchess: 'What are you doing for *it*?' is clearly one which presses for an answer.

For the Platonist the City of God was a conception of central importance. He regarded it as a present reality, built upon the foundation of the absolute values, existing eternally in the heavenly places, independent alike of human admiration and human scorn. Yet Plato, at least in certain moods, believed that his vision of a heavenly city could be realised in time. 'We do not speak,' he says, 'of things that are impossible, though we admit that they are difficult.' At other times he is less sanguine. 'Our city,' he writes, 'is founded on words, for it exists nowhere, I think, on earth.' And again, 'It is no matter whether it exists, or ever will exist in fact, since the wise man can live there at will, having nothing to do with any other.'

It is at this point that the Christian follower of Plato is bound to register a protest. For him the thought of a lonely withdrawal to his ideal city is intolerable. Isolated salvation is a sub-Christian concept. Strangers and pilgrims we may be, 'immortal spirits on our probation,' as Inge puts it, yet 'charged,' as he reminds us, 'with the duty of making earth, which is the shadow of heaven, as much like its archetype as we can.'[15] For unless, he continues, 'our communing with the eternal ideas endows us with some creative virtue, some power which makes itself felt upon our immediate environment, it cannot be that we have made those ideas in any sense our own.'[16] And again, 'if we take these three absolute values, Goodness, Truth, Beauty, and make it our ideal that these shall prevail "on earth as in heaven," we have a definite standard and a goal in sight.'[17]

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 155. [16] *Ibid*, p. 182.
[17] *Ibid*, p. 153.

But this is nothing else than the Kingdom of God on earth to be achieved by methods of divine-human co-operation. We are back again at the Lord's Prayer, and the door is open for that multiplicity of effort towards the betterment of human conditions to which the Christian social reformer believes himself to be committed by his creed. Whether, looking at the world through the eyes of the Platonist who has learned Christ, we see it as a possible sphere for the expression in small things as in great of the absolute values, or whether, adopting the more homely imagery of Jesus, we regard our world as the destined scene of divine sovereignty, and mankind as the object of divine love, the result is the same. We are committed unreservedly to a dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. The more 'other-worldly' our outlook, the more disturbing is the present contrast between that other world and this, its potential counterpart. Once upon a time, so Plato tells the story, all men dwelt in the heavenly places and beheld the vision of the divine city, but having drunk too deep of the river of forgetfulness, they have forgotten what they saw. It is for us to revive our memories, or leaving metaphor, it is our plain business as Christians who share the splendid optimism of Jesus, and his unswerving faith in the capacity of ordinary men to respond to the divine appeal, to exhibit the customary 'deification of the Actual' in its true colours as militant atheism, and a denial of the divinity of Christ.

According to Dr. Bethune Baker: 'The putting off to another life in another world of the hope of the Kingdom and the realization of its conditions is perhaps the greatest apostasy that the history of religion can disclose.'[18] And assuredly the outstanding failure of organised Christianity to-day is seen in the apparent inability of Christians to devise a social and international ethic in essential correspondence with their religious faith. Orthodoxy hitherto has stressed all too lightly the challenging 'Therefores' of its theological creed. *Because* God is Father, *because* men are sons of God and members of a world-wide brotherhood, *because*, according to the faith of Jesus, whose teaching we profess to accept as the expression of the divine mind, life can be rightly understood only when interpreted as a

[18] *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, p. 51.

God-given opportunity for sacrificial service—*therefore* certain consequences inevitably follow. In a word, genuine Christianity must touch life at all points. 'Every part of life,' as Mr. Malcolm Spencer puts it, 'must be inspired by all that we know of God through Christ.'[19]

Here, then, is a call not for impassioned oratory, still less for the windy platitudes of the armchair idealist, but rather for hard and sober thinking under the guidance of 'the Spirit that is called Christ.' All human relationships from the widest to the most personal come up for judgment before the vision, at once splendid and humiliating, of the world-city of God. If hitherto international relationships have remained essentially at the sub-human level, so that History may be rightly defined, in words recently attributed to Lord Balfour, as 'a discreditable episode in the life-story of one of the minor planets,' is not the reason to be found, where F. W. Robertson found it, in the circumstance that Christianity 'has been too much preached as theology, too little as the religion of daily life; too much as a religion only for individuals, too little as a religion for nations and for the world'?[20] Again, if social and economic relationships within the State reflect the conditions of the battle-field, the divorce court or the hen-run rather than those which should characterize the life and activities of a united family of reasonable persons, is not the trouble due to this, that no concerted attempt to formulate the social implications of Christ's teaching in their immediate bearing upon all the complex conditions of modern life has ever been seriously made?

Organised Christianity still lacks the world view, the international mind, the sense of corporate responsibility for social abuses. Hitherto the outlook of Christians has been predominantly sectional. We have been accustomed to view international problems through national spectacles, and social and economic problems through class spectacles. Even a genuine loyalty to our own national group has been but too often vitiated by an attitude of radical selfishness towards the interests of other groups. The clear-eyed patriotism of those who dare to measure their country's greatness by its capacity to contribute

[19] *The Social Function of the Church*, p. 47.

[20] *Life and Letters*, p. 139.

to the greatness of other nations frequently degenerates into th myopia of the mere jingo, for whom the instinct for a her fellowship, formed and cemented by a dominant sense of hos tility to a rival herd, takes the place of a desire for internationa co-operation in the interests of the world as a whole. M Clemenceau has committed himself to the statement that 'peac is but war pursued in another manner.' If he is right, and i the doctrine holds not only as between nations but likewis between economic and social groups within the State, then th profession of Christianity becomes sheer waste of time, and th hope of the City of God on earth is seen to be nothing bette than the empty dream of unpractical idealists.

In a remarkable Essex Hall lecture delivered at the close o last century,[21] Dr. Philip Wicksteed draws an illuminating con trast between the attitude of the mediaeval thinker, to whos mind evil appeared as so integral a part of the eternal order o things that the cries of the damned must always have thei place in the divine harmony, and the attitude of the moder Christian, who fights to win; for whom the thought of an eterna hell is wholly intolerable, and tantamount to a defeat of Go Himself by the powers of evil. Unlike the writers of Apoca lypses and the mediaeval thinkers, we modern Christians canno stomach the thought of a God who triumphs over sin only at th cost of the destruction of the sinner. God is Love, and lov must win by attraction or not at all. It follows that the sol approach to the gates of the City of God is by the way of love That is a revelation well nigh two thousand years old. S Paul's daring assertion, 'Love never fails,' sums up in a singl sentence the faith of Jesus. And yet for many to-day the doc trine is still a stumbling-block. Like Carlyle, who frankl deprecates the attempt to treat those whom he terms 'scounc rels' by methods of love, they persist in identifying love wit weak-kneed sentimentalism, a quality which has the same rela tion to real love that the popular definition of faith as 'believin what you know to be untrue' bears to the unwavering confidenc of Jesus in the power of a loving God.

Let us be clear that to give progressive scope for love unfettered exercise must be the paramount endeavour alike o

[21] *The Religion of Time and the Religion of Eternity.*

religion and education. Let us assert unreservedly that in the divine intention social life, industry, international relationships are so many opportunities for love's expression. As a means to national unity love will be found to outrival war. Love's power to unite mankind in activities of constructive service is greater than all the arts, mightier than the world-fellowships of the cultured or the workers to the bringing of peace. Yet love itself has its tireless warfare against sin and selfishness, pain and sorrow, the low aim and the sectional ideal. The picture of the Christian soldier has elements of lasting value. Those who seek to establish the City of God by the power of love must reckon with the Cross. Here is the great crusade in which nations and individuals alike are called to bear their part; here 'the moral equivalent of war' of which the world is in search. But destruction is not the end. The work of building lies before us. And the builders of the City of God must, in the words of a sixteenth century writer, 'accept the principle of love as a structural principle in the society which Christ is forming.'[22] In proportion as this truth is recognised with growing clearness, and by increasing numbers of ordinary people in every nation, fear will be cast out, and the vision of the City of God on earth will claim the obedience of men. The world as we see it to-day renders any attitude of unthinking optimism singularly out of place. Yet with Plato may we not assert, 'We do not speak of things that are impossible, though we admit that they are difficult,' even making our own, it may be, the words of a greater than Plato, 'Fear not: only believe. All things are possible to him that believeth.'

[22] Quoted by Rufus Jones, *Spiritual Reformers in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 114.

THE WARFARE OF THE MODERNIST

Job 7, 1.—'Is there not a warfare to man upon earth?'
Phil. 3, 13.—'Brethren, I count not myself yet to have apprehended.'

A general impression of a week's Conference is apt to suggest some minds the words of the Greek sage, πάντα ῥεῖ—'all is in a flux'. Where are we now, and where shall we end? But it was the same philosopher who said πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων, 'War is the father of all things'. Intellectual warfare, if it is honestly waged, leads to truth.

Let us never be afraid of the intellectual side of religion. As the great Cambridge thinker, Hort, says: '*There is no surer sign of a decay of faith than nervousness about commending Reason, as if it were but a necessary evil.*' And to quote an older Cambridge thinker, the great Christian Platonist, Benjamin Whichcote: '*it ill becomes us to make our intellectual faculties Gibeonites*'—that is, mere hewers of wood and drawers of water—useful for practical purposes and nothing more.

For there is no higher activity of the mind than the love of Truth for its own sake and the search for Truth as distinct from *the* truth or truths—that is, the tenets of particular Churches.

How is it that amid so much disagreement we often notice a striking agreement among ourselves—for instance, on the ministry of women, our attitude to Nonconformity, and general principles of Bible criticism? It is, surely, not because we are all equally able or learned, but because we are *looking the same way*. We have all learned to welcome truth from every quarter without fear. In Church circles there is sadly too little of that *intellectual honesty* which we find at its best among men of science—sadly too little belief in truth as an end in itself. It makes all the difference, as a wise man said, *whether we put truth in the first or in the second place.*

Is it always a duty to put it first? May we not sometimes put edification before it? There is a grave practical problem, as every parish priest knows.

Philosophers may talk of the cowardice and dishonesty of those who encourage what they regard as useful falsehoods in simple minds, but I think the question is well answered by *George Tyrrell: one must not teach lesser truths in such a way as to uproot important and vital truth. E.g.*, we have no right to point out defects in Holy Scripture to one whose faith in Our Lord would be uprooted thereby. Those spiritual children, babes in Christ, who have not learned to keep their balance on the precipitous paths that some of us delight to tread, must be treated tenderly and not asked to run before they can walk. But when they ask for truth, it is another matter—we must not give them falsehood. And if some find that the truth as they see it is leading them outside the Church, I cannot doubt that if they are honest and sincere they are nevertheless not far from the Kingdom of God.

The question: *What are the essentials of Christian faith?* what is that bare minimum of creed without which one cannot claim to be a loyal Christian? is, I think, unanswerable. It must be left to everybody's conscience in the presence of God. We must all work out our own salvation and avoid condemning others. Freedom and originality are

very precious things. And *originality*, as J. S. Mill says, *is the one thing that unoriginal minds cannot see the use of.* We must never expect to be in the majority. There are *special temptations* that beset us. One is, to envy the enthusiastic mass-movements of some of our fellow-Churchmen, the crowded meetings and loud cheers, the warmth of their devotion and the quick returns in their parish work. Another temptation is to envy their clear dogmatic statements, the simplicity and teachableness of their faith, the power it has of capturing large crowds, the ease with which they handle it in the nursery and the school.

All this is hard to bear for some of us, and it is harder still if we in our own circle, our home, or parish, or diocese, find a *perpetual warfare* appointed us. We stand up perhaps for something that is to us one of the commonplaces of modern theology, and to our surprise and disappointment find ourselves howled down by people who have obviously never studied the subject, and we sadly realise the truth of the Preacher's words: *'He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow'*—or still more sadly we remember that *Our Lord came not to send peace, but a sword,* and that in the home itself, where all should be love.

'Is there not a warfare to man upon earth?' Yes, but let us never doubt that it is worth while. The modernism of one generation generally becomes the orthodoxy of the next. But for the present it is—it must be—ahead of the average man and woman. Nay more, it must be ahead of the official utterances of the Church's leaders.

Let us be content to know that the leaven is working. The process is slow and gradual, but all the more sure for that reason. We have no cut and dried programme to offer, and no infallibilities with which to tempt the willing slavery of idle minds, but the indirect influence of our movement has already been great, and is increasing.

Do you envy the definiteness of traditionalist teaching? Then think of the *logical completeness of Calvinistic theology,* and its absurdity; or think of the majesty and coherence of *belief in the inerrancy of Holy Scripture* as the very Word of God, and ponder while you marvel how any careful reader of the Bible could ever have accepted it. And then remember that fortunately for us *the Reformation* did not set up any complete new system of thought to replace that which it overturned. There would soon have been another Reformation if it had.

We have seen the danger of over-definition. Let us then accept *the discipline of incompleteness.*

> Think not thy wisdom can illume away
> The ancient tanglement of night and day.
> Enough to acknowledge both, and both revere:
> He sees not clearliest who sees all things clear.

William Watson is right: 'He sees not clearliest who sees all things clear.' *So is St. Paul*: 'For now we see through a mirror in a riddle.' 'Brethren, I count not myself yet to have apprehended.' The vision here remains blurred, but we go forward with the assurance that *the Spirit is leading us into all truth,* and that *the truth will make us free.*

But we must go on seeking till the end of life. When a man says he has found the truth it generally means he has given up the search. The warfare between truth and error must never cease. And not only between truth and error, but between truth and truth.

There is the perpetual *conflict of ideals*—the claims of self and the claims of others—the claims of the study and the claims of the parish—

the *Kingdom of God in this world* and *the Kingdom not of this wor* There is perhaps no final solution, no complete answer—we go on fr day to day as well as we can.

Our citizenship is in heaven. But we cannot be true citizens of heav without being good citizens here. We have to help to save others, a we cannot save the souls of others if we neglect their bodies. And so must try to promote better conditions of earthly life for those wh spiritual life is quenched by their environment. We must in fact try establish the *reign or rule of God*—for that is what His Kingdom rea means—over all human affairs.

There will still be doubts and difficulties—fresh ones arise as soon we have laid old ones—and sometimes it is hard to see any meaning purpose in the world at all. But the most sustaining thought is, I thi the very old one, that *God is over all* and that He knows all. *He ha purpose* and He is working that purpose out in us and by us and throu us. Surely it is one of the worst of intellectual follies to place m above his Maker, to attribute personality to man and to deny it to G *If God is not personal in the human sense, He is super-personal,* He cludes and transcends all that is highest in human personality. impersonal God is no object for our worship.

Trust *Science* as far as it can take you *and then take a leap forwa* knowing that you are compassed about with a great cloud of witness *Have faith in the purposeful love and wisdom of a God who is above and through all and in all.*

'Brethren, I count not myself yet to have apprehended, but this o thing I do—forgetting the things that are behind and reaching forw to the things that are before, I press on toward the goal for the prize of t heavenward calling of God in Christ Jesus.'